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ABSTRACT
The dissertation thesis deals with privacy-preserving cryptographic protocols for secure
communication and information systems forming heterogeneous networks. The thesis fo-
cuses on the possibilities of using non-conventional cryptographic primitives that provide
enhanced security features, such as the protection of user privacy in communication sys-
tems. In the dissertation, the performance of cryptographic and mathematic primitives
on various devices that participate in the security of heterogeneous networks is evaluated.
The main objectives of the thesis focus on the design of advanced privacy-preserving cryp-
tographic protocols. There are three designed protocols which use pairing-based group
signatures to ensure user privacy. These proposals ensure the protection of user privacy
together with the authentication, integrity and non-repudiation of transmitted messages
during communication. The protocols employ the optimization techniques such as batch
verification to increase their performance and become more practical in heterogeneous
networks.
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ABSTRAKT
Disertační práce se zabývá kryptografickými protokoly poskytující ochranu soukromí,
které jsou určeny pro zabezpečení komunikačních a informačních systémů tvořících
heterogenní sítě. Práce se zaměřuje především na možnosti využití nekonvenčních
kryptografických prostředků, které poskytují rozšířené bezpečnostní požadavky, jako je
například ochrana soukromí uživatelů komunikačního systému. V práci je stanovena
výpočetní náročnost kryptografických a matematických primitiv na různých zařízeních,
které se podílí na zabezpečení heterogenní sítě. Hlavní cíle práce se zaměřují na návrh
pokročilých kryptografických protokolů poskytujících ochranu soukromí. V práci jsou
navrženy celkově tři protokoly, které využívají skupinových podpisů založených na bi-
lineárním párování pro zajištění ochrany soukromí uživatelů. Tyto navržené protokoly
zajišťují ochranu soukromí a nepopiratelnost po celou dobu datové komunikace spolu
s autentizací a integritou přenášených zpráv. Pro navýšení výkonnosti navržených pro-
tokolů je využito optimalizačních technik, např. dávkového ověřování, tak aby protokoly
byly praktické i pro heterogenní sítě.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, there are more and more sophisticated communication and informa-
tion systems that integrate various types of communication protocols and devices.
Emerging technologies such as Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN), Vehicular Ad hoc
Networks (VANET), smartgrids, Internet of Things (IoT) or more complex informa-
tion systems in government infrastructure, large institutions or public transport are
widely used and serve to their users. These systems are generally complicated het-
erogeneous networks with a number of end and intermediate nodes using a wired or
wireless connection. Heterogeneous networks connect various types of communica-
tion nodes and communication protocols with different specifications. The commu-
nication and information systems are usually responsible for data communication,
data management and monitoring. On the other hand, these systems can be harmed
by a number of passive attacks (e.g. eavesdropping) and active attacks (e.g. data
tampering, denial of service attacks, man in the middle attacks, etc.). Hence, the
systems must be adequately secured in accordance with possible security threats.
The security and cryptographic protocols used in communication systems are
usually designed according to the specific security requirements of the systems. Fur-
thermore, the cryptographic designers have to consider the computational capabil-
ities of intermediate and end nodes, bandwidth, communication delay, the number
of users and other aspects as well. Therefore, cryptographic schemes have to meet
the properties and requirements of the heterogeneous systems. Besides the secu-
rity requirements, the cryptographic schemes focus on their computational cost and
the length of a cryptographic header used. Nevertheless, there are many services
and applications which require not only the basic security properties but also some
enhanced properties such as user privacy, user revocation, traceability and so on.
Privacy is usually demanded by users especially in services which work with users’
private and vital information, e.g. user location, user ID, medical data, etc. On
the other hand, there are applications, e.g. vehicular communication, where data
confidentiality is not too important like data authenticity, integrity and user pri-
vacy during communication among users. In this case, conventional cryptographic
schemes and anonymous authentication schemes are not enough, and the designers
try to implement a special kind of digital signature schemes that ensure the au-
thentication and integrity of messages and user privacy. These requirements can
be provided by group signature schemes. The privacy-preserving solutions usually
employ these schemes to ensure user privacy and data security. On the other hand,
service providers usually require a mechanism which can detect and correctly iden-
tify of a user who violates the rules of the system. This mechanism is usually called
as user revocation but some group signature schemes lack this feature.
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A comprehensive privacy-preserving and secure communication system requires
a set of appropriate cryptographic schemes and primitives that are interconnected to
provide not only basic security services but also the advanced properties (e.g. user
privacy, user revocation, etc.). Moreover, the privacy-enhancing schemes such as
group signature schemes, anonymous authentication schemes, etc., are usually more
computationally expensive than conventional cryptographic schemes due to more
basic primitives and operations used. Thus, the designers must take into account
the different computational specifications of nodes used in heterogeneous networks.
This thesis deals with privacy-preserving cryptographic schemes and focuses mainly
on research in group signature schemes which are usually based on bilinear pairing
operations. In the state of the art, several group signature schemes are proposed
by several cryptographers but these schemes are computationally expensive due to
many modular arithmetic operations and pairing operations. Due to this fact, these
schemes are usually inconvenient for heterogeneous networks with restricted devices.
In this thesis, the evaluation of the basic cryptographic primitives and optimization
techniques for those schemes are outlined. The thesis mainly contributes by two
novel privacy preserving protocols based on group signatures, see Chapters 7 and 8,
and by one framework for secure geosocial applications using heterogeneous networks
presented in Chapter 9.
The thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 presents the field of interest of
this thesis. Thesis’s objectives and chosen methodology are outlined in Chapter 3.
Chapter 4 contains cryptographic background that focuses on the privacy-enhancing
technologies, pairing-based cryptography and group signatures. Chapter 5 describes
the state of the art in group signatures and other schemes providing the privacy pro-
tection in heterogeneous networks. Chapter 6 presents the performance analysis of
cryptographic primitives and optimization techniques. Chapters 7 and 8 introduce
two novel privacy preserving protocols based on pairing-based group signatures. The
first proposed protocol uses group signatures with efficient revocation. The second
proposed protocol uses group signatures with categorized batch verification that is
designed to be used in the vehicular ad hoc network applications. In these chap-
ters, protocol implementations, evaluations, the comparison of the solutions with
related solutions and experimental results are described. Chapter 9 presents the
privacy-preserving framework for secure geosocial applications which run on hetero-
geneous networks. Chapter 10 outlines the discussions dealing with the framework
and protocols and the thesis is concluded in Chapter 11.
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2 FIELD OF INTEREST AND MOTIVATION
In this chapter, the security issues of heterogeneous networks are discussed. Fur-
thermore, the types of communication networks and devices used in heterogeneous
networks are defined. In addition, privacy-enhancing technologies are introduced.
2.1 Security in Heterogeneous Networks
Heterogeneous networks aggregate different types of communication standards, pro-
tocols, technologies and end devices. Heterogeneous networks usually cover large ar-
eas and contain various wireless networks. In telecommunications research, the het-
erogeneous network term has two meanings. Firstly, heterogeneous network means
the paradigm of seamless and ubiquitous interoperability among various protocols
with different types of end nodes. Secondly, heterogeneous network refers to the
non-uniform spatial distribution of mobile users in wireless networks.
Nowadays, ubiquitous connectivity services for mobile users are obtained by
heterogeneous wireless networks. These networks integrate cellular networks, Mobile
Ad hoc Networks (MANET), WLAN, WiMAX, and mesh networks with the non-
uniform spatial distribution of users or wireless nodes. In heterogeneous networks,
users with their devices can move from one access network to another.
It is essential to consider the security issue as one of the main objectives in devel-
oping heterogeneous networks. Currently, standard security approaches provide the
basic security properties such as authentication, data integrity, non-repudiation and
confidentiality. These security properties can be ensured by common cryptographic
primitives and methods which are employed in services provided in heterogeneous
networks. There are several security solutions dealing with secure communication,
key establishment, authentication or access control in heterogeneous networks, e.g.
[174], [85], [172], [30], [75]. On the other hand, user privacy in a heterogeneous
environment is a challenge. Due to the open, wireless, distributed and large scale
nature, heterogeneous networks are subjects to various attacks. Adversaries have
several opportunities to eavesdrop communication, inject data, replay messages, and
impersonate others in unsecured heterogeneous networks. Some nodes can be easily
used to capture user connections and traffic. This is also a threat to user privacy.
Communication applications and services which run on the heterogeneous networks
can send sensitive user data like personal identities, activities, location information,
movement patterns, financial information, transaction profiles, and so on. The leak
of these data can compromise user privacy. Hence, providing user privacy should be
one of main objectives in heterogeneous networks.
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The security solution of a heterogeneous communication system enhancing user
privacy requires basic and several advanced security properties. The main challenge
is to find an efficient and secure design of a cryptographic scheme that provides
advanced properties and keeps the number of expensive cryptographic operations
low. The design of these schemes is more complicated on the computational and
memory restricted end nodes which occur in heterogeneous networks. Advanced
security properties can be ensured, for example, by group signature schemes. Nev-
ertheless, to ensure the whole spectrum of security properties, the group signature
schemes have to be supplemented by other cryptographic tools, such as: anonymous
authentication schemes, secure key establishment protocols, ciphers and so on.
This thesis is aimed at end-to-end security at the application layer. The the-
sis deals with the design of privacy-friendly cryptographic solutions which secures
chosen applications and services in heterogeneous networks. The proposed solutions
are based on group signature schemes which are convenient for geolocation-based
services and services in mobile ad hoc networks, especially vehicular ad hoc network
services.
2.1.1 Types of Communication Networks in Heterogeneous
Environment
Heterogeneous networks aggregate various communication networks which differ by
their scale, the type of link connection (wired, wireless, optical) and communica-
tion pattern (peer-to-peer, client-server, master-slave, broadcast, unicast, anycast,
multihop, many to one, ad-hoc, infrastructure-based and so on).
Common wired and wireless networks used in heterogeneous environment are
characterized in the following text:
• Ad hoc Network (ANET) - These wireless networks consist of nodes which
can communicate without any base stations. These infrastructure-free net-
works are self-organized, adaptive and support peer-to-peer multihop commu-
nication. Nodes are usually mobile. Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANET) allow
the spontaneous formation and deformation of mobile networks. Each mobile
host acts as a router and the mobility causes route changes. Mobile ad hoc net-
works face many technical problems such as packet collisions, transmissions
errors, routing loops, varied channel quality and node’s power consumption
and computational restrictions.
• Mesh Network (MN) - These wireless networks consist of mobile or sta-
tionary mesh clients and mesh routers. A mesh topology is characterized
by dynamic self-organization and self-configuration. The connectivity among
nodes can be ad hoc. MN uses multiple radios and multiple channels per
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radio for increasing the capacity, throughput and lowering interference. The
mesh networks usually integrate different wireless technologies, such as IEEE
802.11 (WLAN), IEEE 802.15 (LowPAN), IEEE 802.16 (WiMAX) and so on.
A typical Wireless MN (WMN) contains three layers. The first layer connects
the access points via wired high-speed connection to Internet. The second
layer connects mesh routers via last-mile wireless networks such as Worldwide
Interoperability for Microwave Access (WiMAX) networks, which is formed
as a multihop backbone. The third layer contains end users or mesh clients
that communicate via a multihop connection or via the mesh router in their
distance.
• Cellular Network (CN) - These wireless networks consist of mobile nodes
which communicate via base stations (transceivers). The network is dis-
tributed over land areas called cells which use different sets of frequencies
in neighboring cells to avoid interference but the same radio frequency can
be reused in sufficiently distant areas. There are cells with different sizes
and scales such as network—macro, micro, pico, femto, and umbrella cells.
Nowadays several cellular technologies are used, for example Global System
for Mobile Communications (GSM), General Packet Radio Service (GPRS),
Enhanced Data Rates for GSM Evolution (EDGE) and Universal Mobile
Telecommunications System (UMTS).
• Personal Area Network (PAN) - These networks cover a small area (up to
tens meters) and are used for communication among the personal devices such
as computers, mobiles, tablets, personal digital assistants, embedded units,
smartcards and small hand held devices. These devices can communicate and
can be connected via the Internet. Wireless PAN can be realized by wireless
network technologies, such as Bluetooth, ZigBee, IrDA, NFC, Z-Wave and
others. The special kind of PAN is Body Area Network (BAN) which is based
on IEEE 802.15.6 standard. BAN connects body sensor units which serve in
healthcare applications, monitoring or in access control services.
• Local Area Network (LAN) - These networks cover a limited area such
as a home, building, and so on (up to hundreds meters) and are used for
communication among the servers and personal devices (computers, laptops,
smartphones). LAN provides usually the connection to the Internet. LAN
devices may be connected in various topologies such as ring, bus, mesh and
star. Local area networks are realized by several technologies and protocols,
e.g. Ethernet (802.3) or WiFi (IEEE 802.11).
• Metropolitan Area Network (MAN) - These networks cover a metropoli-
tan area (up to thousands meters) and are used for communication among com-
puters, servers and others. MAN (under IEEE 802.6 standard) can be realized
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Fig. 2.1: Example Topology of Wireless Mobile Ad hoc Network.
by various technologies such as Distributed-queue dual-bus, Synchronous Op-
tical Network (SONET), Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) and Ethernet
with several active and passive network devices.
• Wide Area Network (WAN) - These networks cover a broad area (regional
or national geographic areas). These networks usually serve as core networks
that connect metropolitan and local area networks. The Internet is a kind of
WAN. The service providers who manage WAN might employ protocols such
as TCP/IP, Synchronous Optical Networking (SONET)/Synchronous Digital
Hierarchy (SDH), Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS), ATM and Frame
relay technology.
2.1.2 Vehicular Ad hoc Networks
Vehicular Ad hoc Networks (VANET) are large scale mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs).
VANET use vehicles as mobile nodes to create a mobile communication network.
Vehicular ad hoc networks or vehicular networks can be useful in many ways, from
increasing a driver safety to reducing traffic congestions. VANET applications can
work in short distances, e.g. monitoring collision warnings, change lanes, break alerts
and so on. The data processing and communication of these applications should be
as fast as possible for the safe and on-time responses of drivers. The sending period
of beacon messages should last less than 300 ms [86]. These messages are sent via
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the Vehicle to Vehicle communication (V2V). On the other hand, there are applica-
tions which work in wide areas to distribute useful VANET messages, e.g., accident
warnings, traffic jam warnings or weather monitoring. These messages can be sent
via V2V or via the communication model called Vehicle to Infrastructure (V2I) and
then, these messages are broadcasted to other users in a specific area (V2I-I2V).
Considering the communication latency due to longer distances, it is assumed that
the sending period of these messages should last seconds. In addition, it is also
important to provide security and protection against the potential attacks.
2.1.3 Specification of Devices Used in Heterogeneous Net-
works
Heterogeneous networks consist of communication nodes of different types or ar-
chitectures. End devices usually have different hardware and software specifica-
tions. These devices can provide various computational abilities, memory storages,
communication interfaces with specific bandwidth or operation systems with spe-
cific software applications. Unfortunately, there are several cryptographic schemes
which use the computationally expensive operations such as bilinear pairings or the
exponentiation of big numbers. These schemes are not suitable for end devices that
are computationally, memory and/or energy restricted. Furthermore, some crypto-
graphic schemes produce a large cryptographic overhead and are not suitable for
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narrow bandwidth communication protocols with a small communication overhead.
Only some light cryptographic schemes are possible to implement on the restricted
devices and restricted connections. These schemes can provide a certain level of
security despite of mentioned restrictions.
The devices and their security properties used in the heterogeneous networks are
characterized in the following text:
• RFID/NFC tags - RFID and NFC tags can serve as authentication items
that belong to an entity (a user, a device, an animal, a thing). These tags
can be divided to active and passive. Passive tags usually do not support
any cryptographic schemes besides some easy-to-run authentication schemes.
Active RFID and NFC tags have low computing performance. The CPU
frequency reaches units to tens of MHz. On the other hand, the active tags
can support several computationally low-cost cryptographic schemes such as
symmetric ciphers or message authentication codes [91]. Several works [99],
[5] propose to implement privacy enhancing cryptographic solutions on active
tags.
• Smart cards - Smart cards usually serve as authentication items and/or are
used for hosting the services such as e-ticketing in public urban transport,
e-payments, e-tolls, access systems or storing the licence key. Smart cards
provide low computing performance. The CPU frequency reaches up to sev-
eral tens of MHz. Smart cards usually offer a sufficient memory storage for
various services and applications. Many platforms of smart cards provide con-
ventional cryptographic schemes such as AES, DES, RSA, SHA, MD5, PRNG.
Programmable smart cards (.NET, JAVA, Multos) can be used for the imple-
mentation of non-conventional cryptographic schemes which can provide ad-
vanced security properties. The works [18], [156] describe the implementation
of anonymous authentication schemes on JAVA smart cards. Nevertheless,
both implementations on the JAVA cards take about 10 s in the verification
phase. On the other hand, Multos cards provide modular arithmetic oper-
ations natively that speed up the performance of anonymous authentication
systems. More results can be found in [129].
• Smart sensor nodes - Smart sensor nodes are usually employed in wire-
less sensor networks. The nodes collect, process and forward data that are
sensed in a certain environment. Smart sensor nodes have various performance
characteristics. The CPU frequency reaches up to several hundreds of MHz.
Nevertheless, the memory capabilities are usually reduced due to minimizing
the power consumption. Sensor platforms usually offer some cryptographic
schemes, mostly AES and DES. The security solutions in sensor networks have
to deal with many restrictions such as key management in mesh topologies,
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energy limits, memory limits and so on. There are few works which describe
the efficient security solutions, e.g. [166], [135]. Nowadays, it is still an open
problem to design the efficient and privacy enhancing security solutions for
sensor networks with various nodes and topologies.
• Hand-held Devices - Smartphones, tablets, mobiles, etc. can be used as
authentication items and/or can host many secure services such as e-payment,
geo-localization. Several solutions are described in [3], [162] and [53]. Further,
hand-held devices provide various communication interfaces, e.g. GSM, GPRS,
UMTS, 802.11/a/b/g/n, NFC etc. Nowadays, these devices have stronger
performance characteristics than smart sensors and cards. The CPU frequency
reaches up to units of GHz. The operation systems on these devices such
as Android, iOS, Windows enable to use various conventional cryptographic
methods and schemes. Due to the support of plenty cryptographic and math
functions, the hand-held devices can host advanced cryptographic schemes,
such as group signatures. On the other hand, the operation systems of these
devices are targets for many attacks. Moreover, the secure storage of the secret
keys is still a problem these days.
• Embedded systems control units - Embedded systems are widely used in
industry. But, these units can be also used as on-board units in vehicles and
serve as communication/process nodes in Vehicular Ad hoc Networks VANETs.
Also embedded systems can be used as smart units in smartgrids networks.
The performance characteristic of these devices can be various. In contrast
to smart sensors and smartphones, the embedded devices usually do not need
a battery source and do not host online services such as smartphones. The
CPU frequency reaches several hundreds MHz to units of GHz. The privacy-
enhancing security schemes can be implemented on these units. For example,
a VANET service needs to broadcast some alerts and notification messages
in real time to many nodes (other vehicles, information tables, servers) in
a neighborhood. Usually, some VANET services have to deal with tens of
messages in real time. The message processing must be as efficient as possible.
Further, message security and user privacy have to be solved in VANETs. The
works [108] and [179] design security solutions with user privacy for VANETs
services. Nevertheless, current solutions are not efficient quite enough if the
time interval of message processing is ≤ 300 ms.
• Computer nodes - These devices are usually personal computers and servers.
The CPU frequency reaches units of GHz, but more cores are usually used.
The servers can manage expensive computational procedures and tasks such
as generating cryptographic parameters, revocation procedures, etc.
• Other devices and units - There are plenty devices which can be used in het-
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erogeneous networks but these devices do not participate in the security tasks
of cryptographic protocols at the application layer. The security network de-
vices such as firewalls, IPS probes, passive infrared sensors and others devices
are out of scope of the proposed cryptographic solutions, and are omitted in
this thesis.
2.2 Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs) are protocols, applications and mechanisms
which provide user privacy. PETs prevent unnecessary processing of private infor-
mation without losing the functionality of information and communication systems.
The users of these systems are protected against the leakage of their personally iden-
tifiable data and private information. PETs can protect privacy at different layers,
mostly at the network layer, transport layer and application layer. General PET
methods are described in the next subsections.
2.2.1 Shared Accounts
This simple method can be easily done by creating a bogus online account which is
shared by a group of users. An account creator fills in a required information form
by bogus data for name, address, phone number, preferences etc. Then, the creator
sends the user ID (e.i. Login) and the password to users. Users who use this shared
account do not reveal their identities and private information. On the other hand,
if an anonymous user misuses the shared account then no party even the creator is
able to trace, reveal and revoke this user. This method can be used only in systems
where no security is required.
2.2.2 Data Minimization and Blurring
Data minimization methods minimize the private information which are collected in
online systems and are used by service providers. These methods try to collect only
necessary personal data and ensure the proper function of systems. The collected
data are automatically deleted within a certain time period. Users usually negotiate
the type of personal data that are sent into the systems. Sometimes, users can
inspect, delete and correct their personal data but in compliance with negotiated
conditions.
Data blurring is especially used in location-based services. Nowadays, location
technologies and services increase in mobile devices, and the actual positions of users
can violate their privacy. Blurring the position slightly enhances user privacy and
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does not encumber geolocation and geosocial applications. On the other hand, users
can not be precisely located due to this approach.
2.2.3 Anonymous Routing and Communication
Online communication becomes interactive and real-time by using ICT technologies
such as instant messaging, the world-wide web, remote logins, Voice-Over-IP (VoIP),
games, social and geo-social online services. So-called communication anonymizers
hide the real online identity such as an email address, an IP address and so on. The
real identities are replaced with a non-traceable identities such as one-time email
addresses, pseudonyms, a random IP of host from an anonymized network and so
on. Anonymization can be done at the network layer and at the application layer.
Anonymization at the network layer is usually based on anonymous routing. There
are systems such as TOR [58] that provide anonymous routing and protect the pri-
vacy of sources. Besides one way anonymous communication, there is bidirectional
anonymous communication where the sender and receiver can not be identified. The
concrete systems are described in the following text.
Anonymizer Proxies
This simple approach is based on using proxy servers. A proxy server works as
a middleman who resends messages from a client to a recipient. The client’s source
address is replaced by the proxy’s source address. Hereby, the proxy server estab-
lishes a private channel so the recipient is unable to distinguish who is the initiator
of the received message and who sends messages to the proxy server. The proxy
server resends the responses back to clients. To increase security, encryption between
clients and proxy servers can be added. The proxy server has to be a trusted entity
because is able to link sessions and read the content of messages. This property
is a weakness of this approach. There is a commercial solution called Anonymizer
(https://anonymizer.com/) that provides anonymous web surfing and masks real IP
addresses and location.
Crowds
Crowds systems are based on the group of many users. A user can simply get lost
in a crowd. Messages are anonymously sent from senders to recipients due to the
fact that the messages are relayed by the users of a crowd alliance. The path of
the relayed message is random but it also can be direct. An attacker is not able to
detect a message originator with a certain probability which is defined by a number
of users between a sender and a receiver. A larger group of users provides stronger
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anonymity. Users do not have to trust a single entity (e.g. a proxy server). On the
other hand, this mechanism burdens communication in the network infrastructure
because one message is relayed to several paths. The crowd mechanism can be
applied, for example, on web transactions. More information can be found in [146].
Mixes Mechanism
The mixes mechanism called Web Mixes has been introduced in [17]. To improve
anonymous communication, this mechanism provides anonymity and unobservabil-
ity. Unobservability ensures that nobody, not even the transport network, is able to
determine who communicates with whom. The Web MIXes system is a structure
of several MIX entities, which are controlled by different organizations. A MIX en-
tity can be a simple computer connected via Internet. The MIX entity scrambles
and reorders the traffic. Senders encrypt their data of constant size and send it to
a MIX entity. The MIX entity receives data from all senders, decrypts and reorders
it. Then, these data go via a cascade (chain) of MIX entities. During this process,
these MIX entities make some cryptographic operations. The last MIX entity sends
the data to a cache-proxy server which communicates with recipients such as web
servers. To enhance privacy, the senders can add dummy messages (random data)
if they do not have messages to send.
Onion Routing and TOR Protocol
The objective of onion routing is to protect the privacy of the sender and recipient of
a message. Messages are relayed by a sequence of network nodes called onion routers
that work as proxies. The TOR protocol [58] is a practical implementation that
employs onion routing. To prevent eavesdropping, messages are encrypted among
the onion routers by using symmetric and asymmetric cryptography. Two nodes,
which directly communicate with each other, establish a session key for encryption by
asymmetric cryptography (the Diffie-Hellman protocol). To enhance efficiency, the
whole correspondence between these nodes is encrypted by symmetric cryptography
which uses the session secret keys. With the increase of relay nodes, the layers of
encryption increase as well. The message’s path is random between the sender and
receiver. TOR offers anonymity to communication services using TCP/IP, a low
latency, end-to-end integrity and variable exit policies for routers. Nevertheless,
onion routing and TOR have weaknesses such as the timing analysis that enable to
determine whether a node is communicating with a service due to a low latency.
TOR can provide anonymous Internet channels in more complex security solutions
used in IP networks.
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2.2.4 Anonymous Authentication
Anonymous authentication solves the problem of how to authenticate the users with-
out revealing their identities. Anonymous authentication protocols work on the top
of an anonymous routing method, described in previous subsection, that guarantees
both user anonymity (removing the identifying information from user sessions) and
unlinkability (multiple user’s sessions run with a server are indistinguishable). To
get more detailed information about the notation please see [109]. Anonymous au-
thentication schemes can be based on the concept of zero knowledge protocols, group
signatures, blind signatures, commitments and electronic coins. The electronic coins
can be generalized to anonymous tokens or credential systems. A user having a valid
token (or credential) can be authenticated and can gain access to protected services.
Anonymous authentication schemes have been proposed in many papers, e.g.,
[161], [38], [134], [32] [31], [101], [111], [36], [41], [12] [155], [11] and [49]. Anony-
mous authentication schemes usually use authentication items such as smartcards,
protected data storages and so on. These items are used for access to protected
spaces (buildings, rooms, labs, etc.). The items can be also plugged to a computer
via a reader, and used for access to online services, operation systems and so on.
The authentication item which carry authentication data can be combined with user
knowledge such as passwords, pin codes, etc.
Attribute-Based Schemes
Attribute-based schemes are cryptographic schemes, e.g. [78], that are designed to
enhance user privacy. These schemes provide anonymous proofs of the ownership of
personal attributes. The personal attribute represents a specific information about
a user, e.g., age, driver license or birthplace. The user who demands a service has
to prove the ownership of the attribute to a verifier. The users of an information
system that uses an attribute-based scheme are anonymously proven without leaking
any other information.
Credential Schemes
Current solutions such as the Idemix scheme [31] and the U-Prove scheme designed
by Stefan Brands [27] provide the anonymous authentication of users. The U-Prove
scheme uses tokens (a cryptographic construction) to prove user’s attributes anony-
mously. The users’ identities are not disclosed when they are presenting attributes.
Nevertheless, U-prove does not provide the unlinkability of verification sessions.
Therefore, the sessions of the user can be linked together, and this decreases user
privacy.
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Users of Idemix provide the proofs of credential possessions and the proofs of
attribute possessions without revealing their identity. The cryptographic core of
Idemix is based on the Camenisch and Lysyanskaya (CL) signature scheme presented
in [37]. The scheme used in Idemix is provably secure. Recently, Idemix has been
implemented on current smart-card devices (i.e. JavaCards, Multos Cards).
The problem of credential schemes could be the practical revocation of malicious
or expired users if slow off-line devices (e.g. smart-cards) are used for storing at-
tributes. Nevertheless, authentication systems based on cards such as the electronic
ID cards, employees’ smart-cards, library access cards etc. require a practical re-
vocation. The paper [78] presents a novel cryptographic scheme which allows both
expiring the user revocation and the de-anonymization of malicious users on com-
mercially available smart-cards. The paper presents results measured on .NET V2+
and MultOS smart-card platforms. On the other hand, the paper does not solve the
privacy protection in data communication.
2.2.5 Privacy-Preserving Cryptographic Protocols
These schemes and protocols provide some basic security properties, e.g., confiden-
tiality, data integrity, authentication, non-repudiation and some enhanced security
properties that provide user privacy, for example pseudo-anonymity, anonymity, un-
linkability, revocation and untraceability. Current cryptographic schemes try to be
secure, computationally efficient and keep low communication overhead (short sig-
natures, public keys). But, advanced privacy-preserving properties may increase
communication and computational overhead. Besides schemes based on common
computational hardness assumptions, such as integer factorization, the RSA prob-
lem or the discrete logarithm problem, there are schemes based on elliptic curves
and bilinear parings which can offer efficient and new cryptographic schemes.
Privacy-preserving cryptographic protocols usually integrate several types of
cryptographic schemes such as authentication schemes, key agreement schemes, dig-
ital signatures and encryption schemes. To provide privacy and anonymity to user,
the schemes have to be properly combined. Schemes and methods such as group
signature schemes, blind signatures, commitment schemes, zero-knowledge proof
methods, homomorphic encryption schemes offer several useful privacy-enhancing
properties, e.g. identity hiding, binding information, data confidentiality, unlinka-
bility, untracebility, etc.
Currently, several cryptographic schemes providing privacy protection have been
designed, such as [134], [32], [12], [11], [111], [101], [31]. These schemes have been
applied to authentication and access control solutions with keeping the user privacy.
To design security solution in communication systems that ensure user privacy and
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data security, a group signature scheme can be a suitable cryptographic tool. Group
signature schemes have been introduced by Chaum in [47] and have been studied
in, e.g., [39], [15], [38], [20], [26] and [76]. The current drawbacks of group signature
schemes are computational expensiveness and long signatures. The basic phases,
i.e. signing and verification, of group signature schemes are more expensive than
the phases of common digital signature schemes such as RSA, DSA or ECDSA.
It is a hard task to implement the group signature schemes onto computationally
restricted devices.
This thesis focuses on group signature schemes and their use in privacy-preserving
applications in heterogeneous networks. More information about group signature
schemes, zero-knowledge protocols and commitment schemes is presented in Chap-
ter 4.
2.2.6 Advanced Requirements on Privacy-Preserving and
Secure Communication
Recently, some applications and services require privacy protection inside commu-
nication systems. The current secure communication systems offer authentication,
data integrity and non-repudiation. But, users and providers of communication
systems can demand different security properties which are out of basic security
properties. These advanced properties are usually connected with user privacy. The
following text sums up the advanced security properties and requirements.
• Privacy/Anonymity - privacy protection is ensured for every user in system
who follows the rules. Users can communicate in anonymous way. Their
identities can be revealed only in special cases, e.g. when a user breaks a rule,
authority order, police order, emergency events etc. Privacy protection can
be distinguished on two types: a basic anonymity and a full anonymity [26].
the basic anonymity property protects an user identity against passive attacks
(e.g. eavesdropping). On the other hand, the full anonymity property protects
also against active attacks (e.g. Man in the Middle attack) when an attacker
gets access to all old messages, signatures and another data. Nevertheless, if
the full anonymity is ensured, then the attacker is not able to connect certain
signatures together. This property is called unlinkability.
• Responsibility/revocation - every user, who breaks the rules of a system,
has to be revealed and revoked. The identification can be done by a certain
key (trace key). The revocation ensure that the revoked user has no rights or
access in whole systems afterwards. The revocation helps protect the system
against repeated misusing. In some applications, the traceability of malicious
users’ messages is demanded.
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• Efficient and secure key management - key establishment, key exchange
and key revocation in systems have to be secure, efficient and computation-
ally/memory non-expensive. In privacy-preserving solutions, key management
has to keep user privacy.
• Efficient and secure execution of cryptographic protocols - the phases
of a cryptographic protocol should be as efficient as possible to minimize the
negative influence of a system, especially, if the restricted devices have been
deployed.
• Exculpability - no user, either revocation or key manager (group manager,
key generator entity, ...), who hold trace keys, can be able to produce a valid
signature behalf another user. User can not be accused that makes signature
which he does not make. This property is mainly required in group signature
schemes. For example, exculpability is ensured in a group signature scheme
designed by Boneh, Boyen and Shacham (BBS04) [20].
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3 THESIS OBJECTIVES
According to the state of the art, the open problem is to propose a secure, privacy-
preserving, and yet efficient solution for communication systems used in heteroge-
neous networks with varied devices such as sensors, smartphones, embedded system
units, smart cards and so on. The several proposals dealing with privacy protection
during authentication have been proposed. Nevertheless, there are not many effi-
cient schemes which also ensure privacy protection during communication among
huge number nodes. In heterogeneous networks, the end nodes can be devices with-
out any support of cryptographic and math operations. These nodes have to be
equipped by software cryptographic libraries that ensure operations needed. Be-
sides software restrictions in heterogeneous networks, the security solutions have to
deal also with various bandwidth, type of communication or specific topologies. Key
management is another problem related with communication systems which provide
a privacy protection. The phases that ensure join of users and their registration
have to be secure and maintain privacy protection. Furthermore, it is still problem
to design and develop an efficient revocation method which serves in a system with
a huge number of revoked users.
3.1 Objectives
The main goal of this dissertation thesis is the research and design of privacy-
preserving cryptographic protocols for data communication in heterogeneous net-
works. Cryptographic protocols must fulfill standard and advanced security re-
quirements, and practically suit the nature of the communication system which may
employ devices with low computational power and low memory space, may demand
a short time interval for message processing, may have a large number of commu-
nication nodes and users, may have restricted bandwidth B or may have a higher
error rate in transmission channels. Whereas efficient anonymous authentication
schemes offers only privacy and user authentication, the security solutions in data
communication need to keep the data authentication, integrity and non-repudiation
of messages that may be sent in short intervals. Group signature schemes should be
an useful cryptographic tool which keeps above security properties and ensures the
privacy protection. Moreover, the current devices like smartphones and embedded
devices with a certain computational performance allow using these more expen-
sive but privacy-preserving schemes. On the other hand, the existed protocols and
schemes based on group signatures must be optimized.
This thesis focuses on the design of privacy-preserving cryptographic protocols
which use group signatures based on bilinear pairing. The proposed protocols are
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designed to ensure chosen standard and advanced security requirements. The main
goal of this thesis is to outline the secure and efficient cryptographic protocols based
on group signature schemes with an user privacy protection. These protocols are
optimized to be proper for applications in heterogeneous networks such as VANET
applications and geolocation applications.
The objectives of the dissertation thesis are:
• to analyze and evaluate modern privacy-preserving cryptographic schemes
such as group signature schemes and security options in heterogeneous net-
works with the occurrence of computationally restricted devices,
• to empirically measure the efficiency of cryptographic primitives and opera-
tions,
• to propose privacy-preserving cryptographic protocols based on pairing-based
group signatures that focus on efficiency and user privacy,
• to optimize the proposed cryptographic protocols in basic phases such as sign-
ing the messages and the verification of signatures,
• to propose a privacy preserving cryptographic framework that is suitable for
heterogeneous networks and provides user privacy and data security,
• to outline the security analysis of the proposed framework.
3.2 Chosen Methodology
It is important to choose the suitable cryptographic schemes which provide basic and
advanced security properties and yet are efficient and applicable for heterogeneous
networks. To establish a secure and privacy preserving framework, a key establish-
ment scheme, an encryption scheme and an efficient digital signature scheme with
privacy protection have to be properly chosen.
To increase efficiency, the phases of the chosen schemes should be optimized.
Thus, it is appropriate to analyze optimization techniques which enable decreasing
the number of expensive math and cryptographic operations such as modular ex-
ponentiation operations, bilinear pairing operations, etc. Furthermore, the math
operations, such as modular multiplication, can be optimized by choosing a proper
algorithm. The next step is to design novel cryptographic protocols which ensure the
demanded security requirements and are suitable for applications in heterogeneous
networks. The analyzed optimization techniques can be applied on the proposed
protocols. Due to this step, the certain phases of proposed cryptographic protocols
can be more efficient. After this step, the security analyses of proposed crypto-
graphic solutions are outlined. Finally, the chosen phases of the protocols should be
implemented, measured, evaluated and compared with related work.
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In the following text, the thesis solution procedure is summed up:
1. to analyze and evaluate advanced privacy-preserving methods and crypto-
graphic schemes and choose the schemes providing advanced security prop-
erties with a proper cryptographic construction in view of computational and
memory requirements,
2. to analyze optimization techniques which are proper to apply on privacy-
preserving cryptographic schemes,
3. to propose novel privacy-preserving protocols based on group signatures which
ensure the secure and anonymous communication,
4. to optimize the concrete cryptographic phases of pairing-based group signa-
tures and decrease the expensive operations such as modular exponentiation
and bilinear pairing by suitable optimization methods,
5. to implement, measure and evaluate the proposed protocols,
6. to propose the complex cryptographic framework providing user privacy pro-
tection and security in communication systems formed as heterogeneous net-
works,
7. to provide the security analyses of the proposed protocols including the active
and passive attacks on a system.
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4 CRYPTOGRAPHY BACKGROUNDAND PRE-
LIMINARIES
This chapter presents the existing cryptographic primitives and schemes that are
used in this thesis. Firstly, basic cryptographic primitives, which are used in the
proposed security solutions, are introduced. Secondly, pairing-based cryptography,
the basic properties of pairing operations and assumptions are described. Finally,
group digital signature schemes are introduced, and two pairing-based group signa-
ture schemes are outlined. These two schemes are used for proposed protocols in
this thesis.
4.1 Basic Cryptographic Primitives
Privacy-preserving cryptographic schemes, e.g. anonymous authentication schemes
and group signature schemes, are usually constructed from primitives such as Proof
of Knowledge (PK) protocols, Zero-Knowledge (ZK) protocols and commitment
schemes.
4.1.1 Proof of Knowledge and Sigma Protocols
Users (provers) can convince a remote party (a verifier) that they know secret num-
bers (statements) without disclosing them by using a Proof of Knowledge (PK)
protocol. This protocol is useful for user authentication and for building the pro-
tocols for identity and attribute verification. These types of protocols, e.g. a Proof
of Knowledge of Discrete Logarithm (PKDL) protocol, usually have provable prop-
erties and their security is based on strong mathematical assumptions. In PKDL,
a prover computes the proof of the knowledge of a discrete logarithm. The most
common example of a PKDL is the Schnorr’s protocol [149], see Figure 4.1. A prover
can convince a verifier by using the Schnorr’s protocol that they know a secret num-
ber 𝑤 such that 𝑐 = 𝑔𝑤 mod 𝑝 without disclosing 𝑤. The environment is the same
as for the DSA algorithm, namely 𝑝 is a large prime, 𝑔 is the generator of group Z𝑞,
and ’∈𝑅 Z𝑞’ denotes a number randomly chosen in the group Z𝑞 (integers less than
𝑞). The usual size of the modulus 𝑞 is 160 bits and 𝑝 is at least 1024 bit long. The
protocol employs one modular exponentiation and one multiplication.
The Schnorr’s protocol is used as the core building block for many modern cryp-
tographic systems, e.g. Proofs of Representation [40], Verifiable Encryption [9] or
E-cash schemes [46].
The Schnorr’s protocol is a typical Σ (Sigma) protocol because it consists of three
steps called commitment, challenge and response. Sigma protocols enable proving
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Prover Verifier
𝑔, 𝑝, 𝑞, 𝑐
𝑟 ∈𝑅 Z𝑞
𝑐 = 𝑔𝑟 mod 𝑝
𝑐−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
𝑒 ∈𝑅 Z𝑞←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
𝑧 = (𝑟 − 𝑒𝑤) mod 𝑞
𝑧−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Check: 𝑐 ?≡ 𝑔𝑧𝑐𝑒 (mod 𝑝)
Fig. 4.1: Schnorr’s Protocol as Proof of Knowledge of Discrete Logarithm.
various statements such as the knowledge to discrete logarithms. Moreover, the
prover can also prove that the discrete logarithm is of a specific form. These proto-
cols are often used in the construction of anonymous and attribute-based schemes.
4.1.2 Zero-Knowledge Protocols
Zero-Knowledge (ZK) protocols or proofs enable that one party (a prover) can con-
vince another party (a verifier) of a given statement is true without yielding any
additional information besides the fact that the statement is indeed true. Only the
prover who has some secret information is able to prove the statement. After the
ZK protocol, the verifier will not be able to prove the statement to anyone else. The
formal definitions can be found in [73].
ZK protocols must satisfy these three properties:
• Completeness: in the case of the statement is true, a honest verifier (following
the protocol properly) is convinced of this fact by an honest prover.
• Soundness: in the case of the statement is false, a dishonest prover is not able
to convince a honest verifier that it is true. The soundness error means that
a cheating prover is able to convince the verifier of a false statement.
• Zero Knowledge: in the case of the statement is true, a honest verifier learns
nothing else than this fact.
Zero-Knowledge protocols can be divided as follows:
• Honest Verifier Zero-Knowledge protocols (HVZK): protect a prover
from a honest verifier. This is a property that the verifier behaves honestly
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according to the specified protocol.
• Computational Zero-Knowledge protocols (CZK) are protocols that
the zero-knowledge condition holds even against cheating verifiers who use
a probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machine. The amount of information
that the prover leaks to the verifier is negligible.
• Statistical Zero-Knowledge protocols (SZK) are protocols that the zero-
knowledge condition holds even against cheating verifiers with infinite comput-
ing power. The amount of information that the prover leaks to the verifier is
negligible.
• Perfect Zero-Knowledge protocols (PZK): protect a prover from a veri-
fier. The protocol is secure even the verifier is dishonest because the amount
of information that the prover leaks to the verifier is zero.
• Interactive Zero-Knowledge protocols (IZK) are classic ZK protocols
where a prover wishes to prove knowledge of secret information to a verifier by
communication via a sequence of rounds. In every round, the prover sends the
proof to the verifier. For a single round, cheating provers have the 0.5 prob-
ability of successfully cheating. Nevertheless, the probability of successfully
cheating is negligible by executing a large number of rounds.
• Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge protocols (NIZK): use a common ran-
dom string that is shared between a prover and a verifier. The string is sized
enough to achieve computational zero-knowledge without requiring an interac-
tion. NIZK protocols enable no interaction between the prover and the verifier.
The prover sends the proof to the verifier only once. Pairing-based cryptogra-
phy can provide powerful and efficient non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs.
In pairing-based NIZK protocols, values are usually hidden for the evaluation
of the pairing in a commitment. These zero-knowledge proof systems that
are using different commitment schemes are built under certain assumptions
such as the sub-group hiding and under the decisional linear assumption. The
NIZK protocols are also used in proposals in this thesis.
4.1.3 Commitment Schemes
In privacy-preserving cryptography, commitment schemes are two-stage protocols
which commit chosen values. These values are hidden to others but the commit-
ment cannot be changed later without changing the hidden values. Stages are called
Commit and Reveal. The commitment schemes provide hiding and binding prop-
erties and can be interactive or non-interactive. There are perfectly binding and
computationally hiding commitment schemes and computationally binding and per-
fectly hiding commitment schemes. Nevertheless, there is no scheme which is both
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perfectly hiding and perfectly binding. The Pedersen commitment scheme [138] is
given as an example:
• Setup: A verifier sets large primes 𝑝 and 𝑞 such that 𝑞 divides 𝑝− 1, and the
generator 𝑔 of the order-𝑞 subgroup of 𝑍*𝑝 . Then, a random secret value 𝑎
is chosen from 𝑍𝑞 and a public value ℎ = 𝑔𝑎mod𝑝 is computed. The values
𝑝, 𝑞, 𝑔, ℎ are public and 𝑎 is secret.
• Commit: A prover chooses a random value 𝑟 ∈ 𝑍𝑞 and commits 𝑥 ∈ 𝑍𝑞 by
𝑐 = 𝑔𝑥ℎ𝑟mod𝑝. Then, the prover sends 𝑐 to the verifier.
• Reveal: To open the commitment, the prover reveals 𝑥 and 𝑟, and the verifier
verifies that 𝑐 = 𝑔𝑥ℎ𝑟mod𝑝
The Pedersen commitment scheme is perfectly (unconditionally) hiding and compu-
tationally binding:
• Hiding: for a verifier is statistically indistinguishable to learn 𝑥 due to the
random 𝑟 which randomizes the commitment 𝑐.
• Binding: for a prover is difficult to find (𝑥′, 𝑟′) where 𝑐 = 𝑔𝑥′ℎ𝑟′mod𝑝 is equal
𝑐 = 𝑔𝑥ℎ𝑟mod𝑝. The prover has to solve the discrete logarithm problem to
compute (𝑥′, 𝑟′), which is computationally infeasible.
Some zero-knowledge protocols use the commitment schemes to allow the prover
to do ’cut and choose’ proofs.
4.2 Pairing-Based Cryptography
Pairing-Based Cryptography (PBC) is based on the use of a pairing (mapping)
function. Pairings can be a useful and flexible tool to construct new cryptographic
protocols, which are often based on new security assumptions.
The main benefit of PBC is that it enables reducing the hardness of one problem
in one group to an easier problem in another group (so called gap group). The
security of PBC schemes is usually based on another problem which still remains
hard. Pairing-based cryptography enables designing three-party protocols. More-
over, PBC schemes use elliptic curves that provide for short lengths of signatures
and other cryptographic parameters.
4.2.1 Bilinear pairing operations
A pairing operation is defined by mapping between two elements of certain crypto-
graphic groups 𝐺1 and 𝐺2. The output of the pairing operation is an element of the
third cryptographic group. The pairing operation is often described as a bilinear
map in the literature. Two types of notation can be usually used: an additive and
a multiplicative notation.
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Bilinear Pairing with Multiplicative 𝐺1
The multiplicative notation, used in [20], presents the concept of bilinear maps as:
𝐺1, 𝐺2 and 𝐺𝑇 are multiplicative cyclic groups of a prime order 𝑝. Then, 𝑔1 is the
generator of 𝐺1; 𝑔2 is the generator of 𝐺2; and 𝜓 is an isomorphism from 𝐺2 to 𝐺1
where 𝜓(𝑔2) = 𝑔1. So 𝑒 is a computable bilinear map 𝑒 : 𝐺1 × 𝐺2 → 𝐺𝑇 with the
following properties:
• Bilinearity: for all 𝑢 ∈ 𝐺1, 𝑣 ∈ 𝐺2
and 𝑎, 𝑏 ∈ 𝑍𝑝, 𝑒(𝑢𝑎, 𝑣𝑏) = 𝑒(𝑢, 𝑣)𝑎𝑏.
• Non-degeneracy: 𝑒(𝑔1, 𝑔2) ̸= 1𝐺𝑇 .
• Computability: 𝑒 is efficiently computable.
Bilinear Pairing with Additive 𝐺1
In the following text, the additive notation is outlined. Let 𝐺1 be a cyclic additive
group generated by P, whose order is a prime q, and 𝐺2 be a cyclic multiplicative
group with the same order q. Let e : 𝐺1 × 𝐺1 → 𝐺2 be a map with the following
properties:
1. Bilinearity: e(aP, bQ) = e(P,Q)𝑎𝑏 for all P,Q ∈ 𝐺1, a, b ∈ Z𝑞.
2. Non-degeneracy: 𝑒(𝑃,𝑄) ̸= 1 if 𝑃 ̸= 0.
3. Computability: There is an efficient algorithm to compute e(P,Q) for all
P,Q ∈ G1.
A bilinear map satisfying these three properties given above is called a bilinear
pairing (more exactly called an admissible bilinear pairing). Typically, the group
𝐺1 is a subgroup of the additive group of points of an elliptic curve 𝐸/𝐹𝑝 and the
group 𝐺2 is a subgroup of the multiplicative group of a finite field 𝐹 *𝑞2 . If 𝐺1 = 𝐺2
then the pairing is symmetric. If 𝐺1 ̸= 𝐺2 then the pairing is asymmetric.
Following the notation from [71], the symmetric pairing is a Type 1 pairing.
For asymmetric pairings, the function 𝑒 is called a Type 2 pairing if there is an
efficiently-computable isomorphism 𝜓 : 𝐺2 → 𝐺1. Otherwise, 𝑒 is called a Type 3
pairing if no efficiently-computable isomorphism from 𝐺2 to 𝐺1 (or from 𝐺1 to 𝐺2)
is known.
Pairing operations can be implemented by the Weil pairing, the Tate pairing or
other types of pairings (e.g. Ate, Eta, O-Ate,...). Many of them, which compute
pairings on pairing-friendly elliptic curves, use the Miller algorithm or the Miller
loop [127].
The Weil pairing and the Tate pairing can be used to construct a bilinear pair-
ing between two groups (𝐺1, 𝐺2) and bilinear maps 𝑒 : 𝐺1 × 𝐺2 → 𝐺𝑇 where
𝐺1, 𝐺2 and 𝐺𝑇 are multiplicative groups of prime order p. The Tate pairing is usu-
ally faster than the Weil pairing, and hence it is preferred in practice.
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Nevertheless, the pairing operation is a costly process and is computationally
more expensive than the exponentiation of big numbers used in RSA, curve points
respectively (approximately 10 times more, see the paper [151]). More details about
the pairing operation efficiency, pairing types and their security can be found in [45].
4.2.2 Hardness Assumptions in Pairing-based Cryptogra-
phy
In general, the security of cryptographic schemes is based on some hardness assump-
tions such as the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP), the Decision Diffie-Hellman
Problem (DDHP) and the Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem (CDHP). These
problems can be defined as follows:
• DLP: Given 𝑃 and 𝑎𝑃 , it is hard to compute 𝑎 where 𝑃 is a point of an elliptic
curve over finite field 𝐸(𝐹𝑞), 𝑎 ∈ Z.
• DDHP: Given 𝑃 , 𝑎𝑃 , 𝑏𝑃 , and 𝑐𝑃 , it is hard to decide if 𝑐 = 𝑎𝑏.
• CDHP: Given 𝑃, 𝑎𝑃, and 𝑏𝑃 , it is hard to compute (𝑎𝑏)𝑃 .
The Discrete Logarithm Problem in 𝐺1 is no harder than the Discrete Logarithm
Problem in 𝐺2. In PBC, two groups are called as gap groups where the DDHP is
easy but the CDHP remains hard. Well-known gap groups are those if it is possible
to compute pairings: 𝑐 ≡ 𝑎𝑏⇔ 𝑒(𝑎𝑃, 𝑏𝑃 ) = 𝑒(𝑐𝑃, 𝑃 ). In the multiplicative notation,
it is easy to determine whether 𝑐 ≡ 𝑎𝑏 by checking if 𝑒(𝑔𝑎, 𝑔𝑏) = 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔𝑐).
In PBC, there is another variation of CDHP called the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman
Problem (BDHP) with three basic variations:
• general Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem (BDHP): For 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐 ∈ Z*𝑞, given 𝑃, 𝑎𝑃,
𝑏𝑃, 𝑐𝑃 , compute 𝑒(𝑃, 𝑃 )𝑎𝑏𝑐.
• Bilinear Inverse Diffie-Hellman Problem (BIDHP): For 𝑎, 𝑐 ∈ Z*𝑞, given 𝑃, 𝑎𝑃,
𝑐𝑃 , compute 𝑒(𝑃, 𝑃 )𝑎−1𝑐.
• Bilinear Square Diffie-Hellman Problem (BSDHP): For 𝑎, 𝑐 ∈ Z*𝑞, given 𝑃, 𝑎𝑃,
𝑐𝑃 , compute 𝑒(𝑃, 𝑃 )𝑎2𝑐.
Some pairing-based schemes are based on extended variations BIDHP and BSDHP.
Nevertheless, many of hardness assumptions have been proposed so far, see more
in [61], [24]. In the following definitions, only assumptions used in this thesis are
listed.
• Strong Diffie-Hellman Problem (q-SDHP): Let 𝐺1, 𝐺2 be two cyclic groups
of prime order p, respectively, generated by 𝑔1 and 𝑔2. The q-Strong Diffie-
Hellman (q-SDH) problem in 𝐺1, 𝐺2 is defined as follows: Given a (q+3)-tuple
of elements (𝑔1, 𝑔𝛾1 , ..., 𝑔𝛾
𝑞
1 , 𝑔2, 𝑔
𝛾
2 ) as input, output a pair 𝑔
1∖𝛾+𝑥
1 , 𝑥 where x∈ Z*𝑞
and the probability is over the random choice of 𝛾 and the random bits of A.
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• External Diffie-Hellman Problem (XDHP): while DDHP is easy in 𝐺2, XDHP
states that DDHP is hard in 𝐺1. Let G, generated by g, be a cyclic group of
prime order p. The Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem in G is defined
as follows: Given a tuple of elements (𝑔, 𝑔𝑎, 𝑔𝑏, 𝑔𝑐) as input, output is 1 if 𝑐 = 𝑎𝑏
and 0 otherwise.
• Decision Linear Diffie-Hellman problem (DLDHP). Given 𝑢, 𝑣, ℎ, 𝑢𝑎, 𝑣𝑏, ℎ𝑐 ∈
𝐺1 as input, the output is 1 if 𝑎 + 𝑏 = 𝑐 and 0 otherwise. More detailed
description can be found in [20].
4.2.3 Pairing-Friendly Elliptic Curves
In general, Elliptic Curves Cryptography (ECC) provides the same security level as
schemes based on the discrete logarithm problem (e.g. DH) and the factorization
problem (e.g. RSA) but with smaller lengths of some parameters (keys, signa-
tures,...). The elliptic curve arithmetic reduces a modular exponentiation operation
to a multiplication operation within a group.
In PBC for efficiency reasons, the first pairing argument is set as an elliptic curve
E(F𝑞)[𝑟] that is defined over a field F𝑞, and 𝑟 is coprime to F𝑞. Then, the pairing
on E is a function 𝑒 :E(K)[𝑟] × 𝐺 → 𝜇𝑟 where K is a convenient extension of F𝑞,
𝐺 is a convenient subgroup of E(K), and 𝜇𝑟 is the subgroup of F𝑞* consisting of
all 𝑟-th roots of unity. Typically, pairing-based cryptography schemes use elliptic
curves with a small embedding degree k, e.g., k=2; 3-4; 6-8; 10-16; 12-20, and a large
prime-order subgroup with subgroup size r, e.g., r=160 ; 224; 256; 384; 512 bits.
The embedding degree of an elliptic curve E(K)[𝑟] is determined by 𝑟|𝑞𝑘−1, where
K is the smallest extension of F𝑞 containing all coordinates of points of 𝑟-torsion of
E. PBC schemes use pairing groups based on the Barreto-Naehrig curves [10], e.g.,
256-bit with 𝑘 = 12„ supersingular curves with a low embedding degree (𝑘 = 2),
non-supersingular curves called MNT (Miyaji-Nakabayashi-Takano) [128], e.g., 170-
bit with 𝑘 = 6, and other pairing-friendly curves which are described in [70]. The
supersingular curves and MNT curves offer different performance characteristics.
4.2.4 Pairing-Based Cryptographic Schemes
PBC schemes can be designed in many ways, such as digital signature schemes
(short, group, blind, aggregate, ring, threshold), identity-based schemes (for sig-
nature, encryption, authentication), a singcryption scheme, etc. For example, the
short digital signature scheme BLS [22] is based on bilinear pairings and uses the
Weil pairing described in [90]. This scheme produces only 20 B signatures.
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More information about pairing-based cryptography can be found in papers [61],
[38], [20], [10], [74], [71] or [139].
4.3 Group Signatures
Common digital signatures such as RSA, DSA, ECDSA etc. are widely spread and
are used to secure communication and information systems. These schemes can be
used in privacy enhancing systems only with pseudonyms for obfuscation of user
identity. Nevertheless, the huge number of pseudonymous certifications burdens
the key management and user revocation. Moreover, common digital signatures
still remain linkable and traceable to a user identity. In order to ensure privacy,
authentication and unlinkability of users, a user identity should be decoupled from
a verification procedure. Group signatures allow users to authenticate themselves
on behalf of a group. Group signatures enable generating pseudonyms by users
itself. These pseudonyms are computed by using one secret group member key.
All signatures produced by these member keys can be verified by one public group
key. Besides the group signatures keep signers (i.e. anonymous group members) in
anonymity, another advantage is that there are no more certificates and public keys
but only one group public key is used.
Group signatures can be used in many privacy-preserving services and authen-
tication schemes. Group signatures can be understood as a subset of attribute
authentication systems which contain only one attribute representing a membership
in a group. A user who is a member of a group can sign a message behalf of the
group and send the message anonymously to a verifier. A group manager releases
only one common group public key 𝑔𝑝𝑘 which serves to verify the message that is
signed by the group member. The basic principle of group signatures is depicted in
Fig. 4.2. There are many flavors of group signature schemes with various phases
and properties. A general group signature scheme usually contains 6 basic phases:
setup (or key generation), join, message signing (or signature generation), signature
verification, open and user revocation.
For adversaries, it is computationally hard to solve which member has signed
the message. The identities of the members are traceable only in certain circum-
stances, e.g. breaking the rules. Revocation can be done by the group manager or
a revocation manager who owns group manager’s secret key 𝑔𝑚𝑠𝑘. Only the group
manager who manages group member secret keys 𝑔𝑠𝑘[𝑖] can open the signature of
the message and release the real identity of the member. Furthermore, this member
can be revoked and his/her signing rights can be abolished. The verifier checks the
signature and has to also check if the member has no rights to use services or/and
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Fig. 4.2: Basic Principle of Group Signatures.
his/her message is of no validity. This phase is called the revocation check. The
group signature schemes usually employ the following entities:
• Group manager - this entity adds group members into a group, and generates
and issues the secret keys of group members.
• Revocation manager - this entity disclosures the identity of dishonest members.
• User - is a group member who owns the group member secret key 𝑔𝑠𝑘[𝑖]. The
user can sign a message on behalf of the group.
• Verifier - this entity verifies the validity of the signature by using the group
public key 𝑔𝑝𝑘.
Since the first scheme of a group digital signature was introduced by Chaum
and Heyst [47] in 1991, many of group signature schemes have been proposed with
various attributes and different ways how to revoke group members. Group signature
schemes usually provide the following properties:
• Unforgeability - only an unrevoked group member can create a valid signature
on behalf of the group.
• Anonymity - a verifier is not able to determine the identity of a signer.
• Complete anonymity - if an attacker obtains a valid signature and knows 𝑔𝑝𝑘
and all keys of group members’ 𝑔𝑠𝑘[𝑖], he is not able to determine the identity
of a signer.
• Traceability - all members can be tracked by the group manager or the revo-
cation manager by member’s signed message.
• Untraceability - any member cannot be tracked by a verifier and/or other
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group members by his/her signed messages.
• Unlinkability - a verifier and other members are not able to link two signatures
which have been signed by one member of the group.
• Coalition-resistance - it is impossible to create a valid signature by a subgroup
of users.
• Exculpability - even group manager is not able to create the valid signature
of a group member.
• Correctness - every correct signature of a group member has to be always
accepted during verification.
• Revocation - a revoked member is not able to create valid signatures on behalf
of the group.
• Differentiation of group members - all members of a group must have a different
𝑔𝑠𝑘[𝑖].
• Immediate-revocation - if a group member is revoked, his capability of creating
the group signatures is immediately disabled.
4.3.1 Static and Dynamic Group Signatures
Group signatures can be divided on static and dynamic. In static group signature
schemes, the number of group members is fixed during setup (an initialization stage),
and group member secret keys are computed for each member in setup. The static
group signature schemes have usually 4 phases: key generation, signing, verification
and open. These types of group signature schemes do not have a join phase and are
not convenient for systems where the number of group members is unpredictable. On
the other hand, dynamic group signature schemes have a join phase which enables
adding new members into a group. The key generation phase does not produce
group member secret keys as in static group signature schemes. The dynamic group
signature schemes consist of 5 phases: key generation, join, signing, verification
and open. Furthermore, some group signature schemes provide new phases such
as a membership revocation and a update procedure. These phases prevent former
group members and malicious members, who are excluded from the group, from
generating the valid signatures.
4.3.2 Pairing-Based Short Group Signatures
At Crypto 2004, Boneh, Boyen and Shacham proposed a short group signature
scheme (BBS04) [20] which is based on the use of bilinear pairing. The security of
the BBS04 scheme is based on the Strong Diffie-Hellman and the Decisional Linear
assumptions. The scheme uses the standard generalization of Schnorr’s protocol
40
for proving the knowledge of a discrete logarithm. These types of signatures are
often called signatures of knowledge due to using a proof of knowledge via the Fiat-
Shamir heuristic, see [1], [68]. The scheme is secure in the random oracle model due
to employing a hash function 𝐻 :{0,1}* → 𝑍𝑝. This group signature scheme consists
of these phases: Key generation, Sign, Verify and Open.
Key Generation Phase
In this phase, a generator 𝑔2 in a multiplicative cyclic group 𝐺2 is uniformly selected
at random. Then, 𝑔1 ← 𝜓(𝑔2) is set where 𝜓 is a computable isomorphism from
𝐺2 to 𝐺1. Let the bilinear groups 𝐺1, 𝐺2 be subgroups of the group of points of
an elliptic curve 𝐸/𝐹𝑞, the trace map on the curve is used as this isomorphism.
Parameters 𝜉1, 𝜉2 ∈ 𝑍*𝑝 , ℎ ∈ 𝐺*1 are randomly selected and 𝑢, 𝑣 ∈ 𝐺*1 are set such
that 𝑢𝜉1 = 𝑣𝜉2 = ℎ.
Further, a random 𝛾 ∈ 𝑍*𝑝 is selected, and 𝑤 = 𝑔𝛾2 is computed. For each member
(the 𝑖-th user of the group) a tuple (𝐴𝑖, 𝑥𝑖) is computed by the holder of 𝛾 (a private-
key issuer) such that 𝐴𝑖 = 𝑔
1
𝑥𝑖+𝛾
1 where 𝑥𝑖 ← 𝑍*𝑝 is randomly selected. The tuple
(𝐴𝑖, 𝑥𝑖) is the private key of the 𝑖-th user 𝑔𝑠𝑘[𝑖].
The group public key is 𝑔𝑝𝑘 = (𝑔1, 𝑔2, 𝑢, 𝑣, 𝑤, ℎ) and the group manager secret
key is 𝑔𝑚𝑠𝑘 = (𝜉1, 𝜉2) that allows tracing signatures.
Sign Phase
The sign phase generates a signature 𝜎 on a message 𝑀 ∈ {0,1}*. Given as other
inputs is a member secret key 𝑔𝑠𝑘[𝑖] = (𝐴𝑖, 𝑥𝑖) and a group public key 𝑔𝑝𝑘 =
(𝑔1, 𝑔2, ℎ, 𝑢, 𝑣, 𝑤). The signature is computed by the zero-knowledge protocol of the
Strong Diffie-Hellman assumption as follows:
1. A signer randomly selects exponents 𝛼, 𝛽 ← 𝑍𝑝 and computes the linear en-
cryption of A represented by values 𝑇1, 𝑇2, 𝑇3,:
𝑇1 = 𝑢𝛼, 𝑇2 = 𝑣𝛽, 𝑇3 = 𝐴𝑖ℎ𝛼+𝛽,
𝛿1 = 𝛼𝑥, 𝛿2 = 𝛽𝑥.
(4.1)
2. The blinding values 𝑟𝛼, 𝑟𝛽, 𝑟𝑥, 𝑟𝛿1 , 𝑟𝛿2 are randomly picked from 𝑍𝑝, and values
𝑅1, 𝑅2, 𝑅3, 𝑅4, 𝑅5 are computed:
𝑅1 = 𝑢𝑟𝛼 , 𝑅2 = 𝑣𝑟𝛽 , 𝑅3 = 𝑒(𝑇3, 𝑔2)𝑟𝑥 · 𝑒(ℎ,𝑤)−𝑟𝛼−𝑟𝛽 · 𝑒(ℎ, 𝑔2)−𝑟𝛿1−𝑟𝛿2 ,
𝑅4 = 𝑇 𝑟𝑥1 𝑢−𝑟𝛿1 , 𝑅5 = 𝑇 𝑟𝑥2 𝑣−𝑟𝛿2 .
(4.2)
3. The signer computes a challenge 𝑐 ∈ 𝑍𝑝 using the hash function
𝑐 = 𝐻(𝑀,𝑇1, 𝑇2, 𝑇3, 𝑅1, 𝑅2, 𝑅3, 𝑅4, 𝑅5), (4.3)
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4. Using the challenge 𝑐, values 𝑠𝛼, 𝑠𝛽, 𝑠𝑥, 𝑠𝛿1 , 𝑠𝛿2 are computed to seal the proof
of knowledge of (𝛼, 𝛽, 𝑥, 𝛿1, 𝛿2)
𝑠𝛼 = 𝑟𝛼 + 𝑐𝛼, 𝑠𝛽 = 𝑟𝛽 + 𝑐𝛽, 𝑠𝑥 = 𝑟𝑥 + 𝑐𝑥,
𝑠𝛿 = 𝑟𝛿1 + 𝑐𝛿1, 𝑠𝛿2 = 𝑟𝛿2 + 𝑐𝛿2.
(4.4)
5. Output the signature 𝜎 = (𝑇1, 𝑇2, 𝑇3, 𝑅2, 𝑅3, 𝑅5, 𝑐, 𝑠𝛼, 𝑠𝛽, 𝑠𝑥, 𝑠𝛿1 , 𝑠𝛿2).
Verification Phase
In the verification phase, a verifier checks the validity of the signature 𝜎 generated
on the message 𝑀 by using only the group public key 𝑔𝑝𝑘 = (𝑔1, 𝑔2, ℎ, 𝑢, 𝑣, 𝑤).
1. All the values 𝑅1, 𝑅2, 𝑅3, 𝑅4, 𝑅5 are restored:
𝑅
′
1 = 𝑢𝑠𝛼𝑇−𝑐1 , 𝑅
′
2 = 𝑣𝑠𝛽𝑇−𝑐2 , 𝑅
′
4 = 𝑢𝑠−𝛿1𝑇 𝑠𝑥1 , 𝑅
′
5 = 𝑣−𝑠𝛿2𝑇 𝑠𝑥2 , (4.5)
𝑅
′
3 = 𝑒(𝑇3, 𝑔2)𝑠𝑥𝑒(ℎ,𝑤)(−𝑠𝛼−𝑠𝛽)𝑒(ℎ, 𝑔2)(−𝑠𝛿1−𝑠𝛿2 )
(𝑒(𝑇3, 𝑤)𝑒(𝑔1, 𝑔2)−1)𝑐.
(4.6)
2. The verifier restores the challenge 𝑐′ :
𝑐
′ = 𝐻(𝑀,𝑇1, 𝑇2, 𝑇3, 𝑅
′
1, 𝑅
′
2, 𝑅
′
3, 𝑅
′
4, 𝑅
′
5),
if 𝑐 is equal with restored 𝑐′ then the verifier accepts the signature, and rejects
otherwise.
Open Phase
An entity who knows the group manager’s secret key 𝑔𝑚𝑠𝑘 = (𝜉1, 𝜉2), the group
public key 𝑔𝑝𝑘 = (𝑔1, 𝑔2, ℎ, 𝑢, 𝑣, 𝑤) together with a message𝑀 and the corresponding
signature 𝜎 = (𝑇1, 𝑇2, 𝑇3, 𝑅2, 𝑅3, 𝑅5, 𝑐, 𝑠𝛼, 𝑠𝛽, 𝑠𝑥, 𝑠𝛿1 , 𝑠𝛿2) on this message is able to
trace a signer. Firstly, the signature is checked whether is valid for the message.
Then, the signer’s private parameter 𝐴 is recovered by 𝐴 = 𝑇3/(𝑇 𝜉11 𝑇 𝜉22 ). Finally,
𝐴 is compared with the elements 𝐴𝑖 of the users’ private keys, and the index that
indicated the signer identity information is looked up.
Security and Signature Length
The BBS04 scheme satisfies these security properties: correctness, full-anonymity
and full-traceability. The properties are proved under the random oracle model.
The detailed security analysis can be found in [20]. The BBS04 signature consists of
three elements of 𝐺1 and six elements of 𝑍𝑝. Using 170 bit curves (|𝐺1| = 171 bits),
the total length of the signature is 1533 bits (192 bytes). The proposed protocol in
Chapter 8 is based on the BBS04 group signature schemes.
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4.3.3 Pairing-Based Group Signatures with Verifier-Local
Revocation
A pairing-based short group signature scheme with a verifier-local revocation is
proposed by Boneh and Shacham in [23]. The scheme employs the verifier-local
revocation mechanism that uses a revocation list containing users’ revocation to-
kens. In this approach, signers do not need recompute any group signature scheme
parameters and keys in the case of the revocation of a user. Only verifiers download
and update the revocation list. In the case of breaking the rules, a private key is
published online by a trusted authority or a group manager. The revoked users loose
their privacy because their signatures signed by their revoked keys become linkable.
The security of the BS04 scheme is based on the Strong Diffie-Hellman and the
Decisional Linear assumptions. The scheme is secured in the random oracle model
and employs two hash functions. The first hash function is a function 𝐻 mapping
0, 1* → 𝑍𝑝. The second hash function is a function 𝐻0 mapping {0, 1}* → 𝐺22. This
group signature scheme consists of these phases: Key Generation, Sign and Verify
(with Revocation Check).
Key Generation Phase
1. A generator 𝑔2 ∈ 𝐺2 is randomly selected and 𝑔1 = 𝜓(𝑔2) is set if 𝑒(𝜓(𝑔2), 𝑔1) ̸=
1.
2. A issuer private key is randomly selected 𝛾 ← 𝑍*𝑝 and the third element of a
public group key is set as 𝑤 = 𝑔𝛾2 . The group public key is 𝑔𝑝𝑘 = (𝑔1, 𝑔2, 𝑤).
3. For each user (the 𝑖-th user of the group), a tuple (𝐴𝑖, 𝑥𝑖) is computed by the
holder of 𝛾 (the private-key issuer) such that 𝐴𝑖 = 𝑔
1
𝑥𝑖+𝛾
1 where 𝑥𝑖 ← 𝑍*𝑝 is
randomly selected. The tuple (𝐴𝑖, 𝑥𝑖) is the private key of the 𝑖-th user 𝑔𝑠𝑘[𝑖].
A revocation token 𝑔𝑟𝑡[𝑖] = 𝐴𝑖 corresponds to the A-element of the 𝑖-th user
private key.
Sign
The signing phase is performed by a signer who produces a signature 𝜎 on a message
𝑀 ∈ {0,1}*. As other inputs, a member secret key 𝑔𝑠𝑘[𝑖] = (𝐴𝑖, 𝑥𝑖) and a group
public key 𝑔𝑝𝑘 = (𝑔1, 𝑔2, 𝑤) are given. The signature is computed as follows:
1. A signer picks a random nonce 𝑟 ← 𝑍𝑝 and obtains generators
(𝑢, 𝑣) = 𝐻0(𝑔𝑝𝑘,𝑀, 𝑟) ∈ 𝐺22, (4.7)
where 𝐻0 is a two-dimensional hash function with mapping {0,1}* to 𝐺22, and
computes their images in 𝐺1 by
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𝑢 = 𝜓(𝑢), 𝑣 = 𝜓(𝑣). (4.8)
2. The signer randomly selects an exponent 𝛼 ∈ 𝑍𝑝 and computes pseudonyms
𝑇1, 𝑇2 by
𝑇1 = 𝑢𝛼, 𝑇2 = 𝐴𝑖𝑣𝛼. (4.9)
3. The signer sets
𝛿 = 𝛼𝑥𝑖, (4.10)
and picks random values 𝑟𝛼, 𝑟𝑥, 𝑟𝛿 ∈ 𝑍𝑝.
4. The signer computes helper values by
𝑅1 = 𝑢𝑟𝛼 ,
𝑅2 = 𝑒(𝑇2, 𝑔2)𝑟𝑥𝑒(𝑣, 𝑔2)−𝑟𝛿 𝑒(𝑣, 𝑤)−𝑟𝛼 ,
𝑅3 = 𝑇 𝑟𝑥1 𝑢−𝑟𝛿 .
(4.11)
5. The signer computes a challenge 𝑐 value by
𝑐 = 𝐻(𝑔𝑝𝑘,𝑀, 𝑟, 𝑇1, 𝑇2, 𝑅1, 𝑅2, 𝑅3) ∈ 𝑍𝑝, (4.12)
and response values by
𝑠𝛼 = 𝑟𝛼 + 𝑐𝛼,
𝑠𝑥 = 𝑟𝑥 + 𝑐𝑥𝑖,
𝑠𝛿 = 𝑟𝛿 + 𝑐𝛿.
(4.13)
6. The signature is outputted as 𝜎 = (𝑟, 𝑇1, 𝑇2, 𝑐, 𝑠𝛼, 𝑠𝑥, 𝑠𝛿).
Verification Phase
The verification phase is performed by a verifier who checks a purported signature
𝜎 on a message 𝑀 ∈ {0,1}*. As other inputs, the group public key 𝑔𝑝𝑘 = (𝑔1, 𝑔2, 𝑤)
and a set 𝑅𝐿 (Revocation List) of revocation tokens are given. The verify phase
consists of two parts, namely Signature check and Revocation check. Both parts are
proceeded as follows:
1. A verifier restores generators
(𝑢, 𝑣) = 𝐻0(𝑔𝑝𝑘,𝑀, 𝑟) ∈ 𝐺22, (4.14)
and computes their images in 𝐺1 by
𝑢 = 𝜓(𝑢), 𝑣 = 𝜓(𝑣). (4.15)
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2. The 𝑅1, 𝑅2, 𝑅3 values are restored by
𝑅
′
1 = 𝑢𝑠𝛼/𝑇 𝑐1 ,
𝑅
′
2 = 𝑒(𝑇2, 𝑔2)𝑠𝑥𝑒(𝑣, 𝑔2)−𝑠𝛿 𝑒(𝑣, 𝑤)−𝑠𝛼 · (𝑒(𝑇2, 𝑤)/𝑒(𝑔1, 𝑔2))𝑐,
𝑅
′
3 = 𝑇 𝑠𝑥1 𝑢−𝑠𝛿 .
(4.16)
3. The verifier restores the challenge 𝑐′ :
𝑐
′ = 𝐻(𝑔𝑝𝑘,𝑀, 𝑟, 𝑇1, 𝑇2, 𝑅
′
1, 𝑅
′
2, 𝑅
′
3),
if a purported 𝑐 is equal with 𝑐′ restored then the verifier accepts the signature,
and rejects otherwise.
4. The verifier proceeds Revocation check. Each element 𝐴 ∈ 𝑅𝐿 is checked
whether is encoded in (𝑇1, 𝑇2) by
𝑒(𝑇2/𝐴, 𝑢) = 𝑒(𝑇1, 𝑣). (4.17)
If no element of 𝑅𝐿 is encoded in (𝑇1, 𝑇2), the signer of the signature has not
been revoked. In revocation check, the verifier has to check all 𝐴 elements in
the revocation list with purported elements (𝑇1, 𝑇2) and restored elements 𝑢
and 𝑣.
Security and Signature Length
The BS04 scheme satisfies these security properties: correctness, selfless-anonymity
and traceability. The properties are proved under the random oracle model. The
detailed security analysis can be found in [23]. The BS04 signature consists of two
elements of 𝐺1 and five elements of 𝑍𝑝. Using 170 bit curves (|𝐺1| = 171 bits),
the total length of the signature is 1192 bits (149 bytes). The proposed protocol in
Chapter 7 is based on the BS04 group signature schemes.
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5 STATE OF THE ART
This chapter summarizes the state of the art of privacy-preserving cryptographic
protocols which are employed to secure communication in heterogeneous networks.
Due to a huge number of cryptographic protocols, this analysis is focused on the
cryptographic schemes that secure communication between nodes where data in-
tegrity, authentication, non-repudiation, privacy and session unlinkability are re-
quired. These properties are usually ensured by digital signatures, authentication
schemes and group signature schemes. These security approaches can be designed
to secure communication at different layers (link, network, transport, application).
In fact, anonymous and security solutions in heterogeneous networks are mainly fo-
cused on the network layer where the IP protocol is common for various technologies
and networks.
Nevertheless, the proposed protocols in the thesis are mainly designed for certain
applications in heterogeneous networks such as VANET (Chapter 8) and geoloca-
tion (Chapter 9). These applications are mostly secured by specific cryptographic
solutions at the application layer. Furthermore, the proposed protocols in Chapters
7, 8, 9 are based on group signature schemes. Due to this fact, the evolution and
evaluation of group signature schemes are analyzed as well.
5.1 Anonymous and Security Solutions in Hetero-
geneous Networks
Recent years have witnessed a number of privacy-enhancing and security solutions
in heterogeneous networks. Researchers focus mainly on wireless networks, namely
mesh networks and ad hoc networks. The group of wireless networks such as the
Mobile Ad hoc Network (MANET), Vehicular Ad hoc Network (VANET), Wire-
less Sensor Network (WSN) and Wireless Mesh Network (WMN) can be called as
Self-Organizing Networks (SONs), and the basic security issues of these networks
are summarized in [137]. Nevertheless, many proposals and security solutions are
focused only on the concrete network technology and topology. In fact, lot of these
solutions such as anonymous routing schemes and secure roaming schemes solve
the security and privacy at the network layer. In the following subsections, these
security and privacy-enhancing solutions for MANET, WMN and hybrid wireless
networks are discussed.
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5.1.1 Anonynous Routing in Mobile Ad hoc Networks
Several studies and papers deal with anonymous communications in MANETs.
Many of them focus on anonymous routing protocols and key management.
Zhang et al. [180] propose an anonymous communication protocol for Mobile
Ad hoc Networks (MANETs), termed MASK. The protocol uses dynamic chang-
ing pseudonyms to hide identities of senders from outside observers. MASK uses
a pair-based authentication protocol between neighbors which ensures anonymity of
senders, receivers and sender-receiver relationships. Only a trusted third party can
link pseudonyms and reveal nodes’ identities in MASK.
Huang [84] deals with anonymous communication in mobile ad hoc networks and
in wireless broadcasting environments. The solution is based on identity-based cryp-
tography and uses pseudonyms and blind signatures to set up anonymous communi-
cation sessions. The proposed solution provides a pseudonym-based encryption and
the revocation of pseudonyms. However, the solution has few flaws such as the pres-
ence of a centralized party called Private Key Generator (PKG) which is a trusted
third party, and the vulnerability of the pseudonym-based encryption scheme to
the Sybil attack (i.e. forging identities/pseudonyms) because of any device with an
initial identifier can generate an arbitrary number of pseudonyms [125].
Seys and Preneel [153] describe an Anonymous on demand Routing protocol for
MANETs (ARM) based on one-time public/private key pairs to provide destination
privacy. In ARM, each authorized node (a source) pre-shares a unique symmetric
key with its neighbors (1-hop destination) to encrypt route reply messages.
El Defrawy and Tsudik [64] introduce a PRISM scheme that is on-demand anony-
mous MANET routing protocol based on group signatures. In PRISM, nodes have
no a priori topology knowledge and have to first determine their geographical area
of interest and probe it with a route-request message (RREQ). Later, these authors
present the ALARM scheme [63]. ALARM is also based on group signatures which
construct one-time pseudonyms to identify nodes at their current locations. ALARM
is a link-state protocol. In ALARM, nodes know the entire MANET topology before
their communication. Hence, precise destination addressing is used. On the other
hand, the privacy decreases by exposing the topology information.
More information about security and privacy in MANETs and overviews of
anonymous routing protocols in MANETs can be found in papers [44], [94] and
[130].
5.1.2 Security and Privacy in Wireless Mesh Networks
Furthermore, there are proposals enhancing the privacy and security in Wireless
Mesh Networks (WMN). Sun et al. [158] propose a security architecture to ensure
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unconditional anonymity for honest users and the traceability of misbehaving users
in wireless mesh networks. The solution uses tickets, self-generated pseudonyms
and a hierarchical identity-based cryptographic scheme. The solution uses a blind
signature technique and pseudonyms to achieve user privacy by delinking user iden-
tities from their accesses. The pseudonym generation mechanism does not rely on
a central authority but the system does not provide routing anonymity.
Wan et al. [167] present two solutions for security and privacy protection in
Wireless Metropolitan Mesh Networks (WMMN). In the first solution, group sig-
natures (BBS04) are used to anonymously establish session keys and enforce access
control. In this solution, the user’s identities are protected from eavesdroppers but
have to be disclosed to mesh router because of routing in the mesh backbone. The
second solution uses pairwise shared secrets along with group signatures to keep
mesh clients anonymous from mesh routers.
Sgora et al. [154] provide the overview of security and privacy issues in wireless
mesh networks. The paper discusses the proposals focusing on intrusion prevention
mechanisms, security routing and intrusion detection systems. Another overview is
provided by Sen [152] who focuses more on privacy issues.
5.1.3 Secure and Anonymous Roaming Authentication Pro-
tocols in Wireless Networks
Anonymous roaming authentication has been addressed by several solutions, e.g.
[170], [173], [81]. These solution usually provide secure and privacy-enhancing au-
thentication in roaming services. These services allow legal users to get access to
wireless network services in foreign domains.
Yang et al. [173] propose two secure roaming protocols which can be used in
various kinds of roaming networks such as cellular networks and interconnected
wireless local area networks. The first protocol is a two-party authentication protocol
with strong user anonymity based on group signatures (BS04). The second protocol
is a two-party authentication protocol with weak anonymity and is based on identity
based signatures. Both protocols are universal and provide key establishment by
a challenge-response approach. Nevertheless, in the paper [81], the authors point
out that the both protocols have some flaws. The protocols do not provide a DoS
attack resistance. An adversary can send a large volume of forged login requests to
exhaust the storage and processing resources of servers. Secondly, the protocols do
not provide user untraceablility and backward and forward unlinkabilities because
a foreign server is able to identify all protocol runs where the user has and will be
involved.
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He et al. [81] propose a privacy-preserving universal authentication protocol for
wireless communications. The two-party authentication and key agreement protocol
is based on group signatures (BS04) which performs 4 pairing operations and 15.75
elliptic curve scalar multiplication on a roaming user. Nevertheless, the number of
operation in the revocation and a revocation list size increase with the number of
revoked users and with the number of user secret keys. More secret keys provide
backward unlinkability. Nevertheless, the checking operation can be misused by an
adversary to launch a resource depletion attack on the foreign servers.
Wen et al. [170] propose a smart card-based anonymous user authentication
scheme for global roaming services in Global Mobility Networks (GLOMONET).
This scheme provides user anonymity, mutual two-factor authentication, key agree-
ment, Denial of Service (DoS) resistance and replay attack resistance. However, the
scheme efficiently solves authentication and key establishment but there is assump-
tion that every user has a smart card. Moreover, the scheme does not offer the
anonymous communication after the authentication phase.
The similar work [89] proposes a three-round anonymous roaming protocol. The
proposed protocol does not require the participation of home servers in wireless
mobile networks. The protocol uses a pseudo-identity-based signcryption scheme to
perform efficient revocation with a short revocation list. Signcryption minimizes the
number of pseudo-identities which are stored in a Subscriber Identification Module
(SIM) card. However, this protocol are solely designed for mobile networks with
SIM cards.
5.1.4 Security and Privacy in Hybrid Wireless Networks
The application of schemes mentioned in the previous subsections can be hard on
heterogeneous networks that aggregate more network technologies. In this case,
a cryptographic solution or framework that runs on application layer is needed.
Prasad et al. [141] discuss Authentication, Authorization and Accounting (AAA)
services and end-to-end security in heterogeneous access networks. In the paper, the
authors present the security objectives for mobility on IP networks. The authors
discuss existing AAA protocols such as DIAMETER and RADIUS, however, the
privacy-enhancing solutions are not considered.
Capkun et al. [42] propose a secure and privacy-preserving communication pro-
tocol in hybrid ad hoc networks. The protocol offers secure communication and
protects a user anonymity and a location privacy. The proposed approach is based
on frequently changing node pseudonyms and cryptographic keys. Each node stores
a set of public/private key pairs and certificates with different pseudonyms signed
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by a trusted third party. The node uses a key pair during the authentication pro-
cess and during the establishment of shared symmetric keys with neighbors. To
ensure the privacy, node’s public/private key pair and shared symmetric keys with
its neighbors are periodically changed. Nevertheless, this approach has several flaws.
The revocation of keys is problematic due to using a large number of keys in the
network. Then, periodically refilling the keys may burden the network. Moreover,
each node with a set of public/private keys and certificates requires a large storage
space.
The paper [4] presents an anonymous communication protocol that preserves
(user,server)- anonymity in mobile hybrid networks that involves cellular, wired and
wireless (WiFi) connections. The communication anonymity is provided without as-
suming trusted mobile network operators and the approach is designed for an anony-
mous communication based on a request/response messages such as web browsing,
social network activities, posts in blogs, small-file uploads and so on. However, this
approach does not provide the authentication of users, non-repudiation and does
not ensure a user responsibility.
Mahmoud et al. [113] propose a lightweight secure and privacy-preserving proto-
col for hybrid ad hoc wireless network. The scheme is based on short-life pseudonyms,
one-time session keys, and per-hop encryption/decryption operations to preserve
users’ privacy. Nevertheless, this scheme is suitable only for multihop packet relay
services. Then, the scheme is not proper for services that do not need to know the
exact locations of source nodes such as in geolocation and VANET applications.
In summary, there are many solutions which offer some privacy-preserving meth-
ods. Nevertheless, these solutions focus often on one technology or services such as
routing, roaming, mesh communication and so on. On the other hand, only few
solutions (mentioned in the previous subsections) provide secure and private com-
munication in hybrid networks. But these solutions have flaws which are described
in these previous subsections.
5.2 Security and Privacy in Vehicular Ad hoc Net-
works
The protocol proposed in Chapter 8 provides a secure and privacy-friendly solution
for the vehicular networks that are consisted of several network technologies. Due
to this fact, recent privacy and security solutions of VANETs are discussed in the
following text.
Privacy in VANETs can be achieved in many ways. For example, in the paper
[50] the authors deal with privacy and security in VANETs with a safe distance-
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based location privacy scheme called SafeAnon. The scheme uses a safe distance
measurement technique to determine the maximum obfuscation radius for preserv-
ing location privacy while maintaining traffic safety. The SafeAnon scheme fights
against a Global Passive Adversary (GPA) that can locate and track any vehicle
in an area of interest by eavesdropping on broadcast messages. Nevertheless, this
protection can be only employed in several VANET applications based on a short
distance among vehicles, e.g., collision detection. In comparison with this scheme,
the proposed protocol in Chapter 8 aims at VANET applications used in medium
and long distances, e.g., the detection of traffic jams, accidents and so on. Horng
et al. [82] propose a private V2V communication mode that can be used in wide
areas. Nevertheless, the main drawback of these proposed private V2V scheme is
the restriction of privacy which can be kept only in the specific group of users, where
users know the public keys of other participants and can build their profiles. The
second disadvantage is the presence of a session key establishment subphase which
can slow the communication process.
Using pseudonyms in VANETs is proposed in [72] and [69]. Raya and Hubaux
[144] use anonymous certificates which are stored in vehicles (usually in a tamper-
proof device). This approach uses a set of short-lived pseudonyms, and privacy
among vehicles is provided by changing these certified public keys. Nevertheless, in
large urban VANETs, this approach is burdened by preloading and storing a large
number of anonymous certificates with pseudonyms.
To provide privacy and security in VANETs, the solutions may use group signa-
tures. Group signatures (GS) provide user anonymity by signing a message on behalf
of a group. GS guarantee the unlinkability of honest users and the traceability of
misbehaving users. VANET security solutions based on group signatures are ana-
lyzed in the following text. The scheme [108], called GSIS, uses the combination of
a group signature scheme (BBS04) [20] with a hybrid membership revocation mech-
anism in the V2V communication, and Identity Based Group Signature (IBGS) in
the V2I communication. The hybrid membership revocation with the list of revoked
members (RL) works with a threshold value 𝑇𝜏 . In case |RL| < 𝑇𝜏 , the scheme
uses a revocation verification algorithm. Otherwise, the scheme updates the pub-
lic/private group keys of all non-revoked members. For efficient verification, the
authors of the paper [177] propose a GS with batch verification in V2I, which takes
three pairing operations. This scheme, called IBV, has several drawbacks such as
using tamper proof devices, being thus vulnerable to tracking or impersonation at-
tacks. The complete description can be found in [52]. Schemes proposed in [179]
and [168] can efficiently verify a large number of messages in V2V. These schemes
use short group signatures with fast batch verification (only two pairing operations
are used instead of 5 n, where n is the number of messages). Nevertheless, the per-
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formance of batch verification degrades in dense V2V communication with bogus
messages. The On Board Units (OBUs) must process the messages quickly (they
have between 100 ms and 300 ms to process a message [86]). Thus, the computa-
tion of expensive pairing and exponentiation on limited On Board Units (OBUs) is
a hard requirement to meet because of the short response time. This fact limits the
security of VANETs in practice. Qin et al. [143] employ an identity-based group sig-
nature scheme with the batch verification, provides a scalable management of large
VANETs and an efficient revocation of members, but suffers from more expensive
signing and verification phases than phases in solutions based on group signatures.
Generally, related VANET security solutions usually deal with two problems.
Firstly, the solutions based on pseudonyms can be fast, but using the many pseudonyms
burdens the communication and management of VANET systems. Secondly, the so-
lutions based on group signatures employ only one public key to verify signed mes-
sages, and provide user privacy and unlinkability. Nevertheless, these solutions have
problems with efficiency (many expensive operations) during signing or verification
or with DDoS attacks. Protocol 2 (Chapter 8) focuses on these problems.
5.3 Group Signatures Schemes
The proposed protocols in Chapters 8 and 7 are based on group signatures. This sec-
tion discusses the evolution of group signature schemes and evaluates these schemes.
5.3.1 Evolution of Group Signature Schemes
Group signatures were introduced and first four schemes were presented by Chaum
and Heyst [47] in 1991. The main disadvantage of these schemes is long sizes of
a group public key 𝑔𝑝𝑘 and a signature. These sizes depend on the number of
members in a group. If a new member is added to the group, it is necessary to
modify 𝑔𝑝𝑘. These deficiencies are very impractical for large groups of members.
Therefore, these schemes are not suitable for many services and applications with
a large number of users. In the work CS97 [39], published in 1997, authors propose
a scheme which uses the constant size of 𝑔𝑝𝑘 and signatures. New members can
be added to the group without the need to generate a new key pair 𝑔𝑝𝑘 and group
member secret key 𝑔𝑠𝑘[𝑖]. The paper ACJT00 [7], introduced in 2000, presents
an efficient scheme which is resistant of coalition, i.e. it is impossible for a subset
of group members including a group manager to create a valid signature. The
disadvantage of the scheme is missing of the revocation of group members and
prevention to a revoked member generates the valid signatures on behalf of the
group. The work AST02 [8], published in 2002, is based on the scheme ACJT00
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[7] and adds the revocation of the group members without using a time stamp.
This approach keeps a constant length of a signature, i.e. this length does not
increase linearly with the number of revoked members. However, the scheme has
more operations in signing and verification phases than related schemes. The scheme
TX03 [165], published in 2003, provides the dynamic revocation of group members.
Revoked members are no longer able to create a valid signature. On the other
hand, the disadvantage is that, 𝑔𝑝𝑘 has to be recalculated when a member is added
to the group or remove from the group. This approach is highly inefficient in the
real time systems working with large groups. The schemes BS04 [23] and BBS04
[20], published in 2004, allow creating short group signatures. These schemes are
based on bilinear maps and produce short signatures which are suitable in systems
where bandwidth is restricted. Unless as the previous schemes that are secure in
the random oracle model, the scheme BMW03 [15], introduced in 2003, is secure in
the standard model. Nevertheless, this scheme is designed for the static and small
groups of users. Therefore, this scheme is not proper for services with a large number
of users.
The scheme ACHM05 [6], introduced in 2005, is provably secure in the standard
model and works with dynamic groups. The scheme provides anonymity, unforge-
ability, untraceability and exculpability, and is secure against a non-adaptive adver-
sary who does not have 𝑔𝑠𝑘[𝑖] of group members. Nevertheless, the scheme does not
achieve forward anonymity and security is proved under non-standard assumptions.
The scheme DP06 [57], proposed in 2006, ensures the security in the RO-model
and works with dynamic user groups. This scheme provides the complete anonymity
of members’ signatures with very short sizes (i.e. around 181 B), shorter than the
scheme BBS04.
The scheme BW06 [25] provides the provable security in the standard model.
But, the size of the signature depends on the size of the group. The newer scheme
BW07 [26], introduced in 2007, produces shorter and almost constantly sized signa-
ture in comparison with the previous schemes. The length of a signature increases
logarithmically as the size of the group.
The scheme LCSL07 [102] produces short signatures with constant lengths. This
scheme offers full anonymity and full traceability, and the public key and signatures
are shorter than in the previous schemes (5 group elements). Nevertheless, the verify
algorithm takes 6 pairings.
The scheme G07 [76], published in 2007, ensures full anonymity in the standard
model. The scheme is based on bilinear groups and produces the constant lengths
of keys and signatures. The scheme also supports the dynamic addition of new
members to the group. Anyway, the signature consists of about 50 elements.
The scheme LCHH09 [100] provides a reversible user revocation. If a user is
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revoked by a mistake and a group manager make a decision that the user can remain
in a group after this event then the user can keep his/her group user secret key
without any new distribution process.
The scheme BCNSW10 [19] allows creating even shorter signatures than the
previous schemes and the security of the scheme is provided in the RO model.
In 2011, Hwang et al. [87] proposed another pairing-based short group signatures
with controllable linkability. The scheme is based on the 𝑞-Strong Diffie-Hellman
problem and the revocation is solved by a key update approach. The scheme is
similar like the BBS04 scheme [20].
In 2012, Libert et al. [104] proposed a scalable revocable group signature scheme.
This scheme ensures the security in the standard model. Nevertheless, the scheme
produces large signatures (96 group elements, i.e. around 6 kB.) that is not conve-
nient for practical deployment in systems with restricted bandwidth. The scheme
is not proper for large systems due to the many operations in the signing and veri-
fication phases that depend on the number of users.
Several group signature schemes employ batch verification to get more efficient
verification of signed messages. The efficiency of batch verification is studied in the
paper [66]. The verification of 𝑛 messages during one batch can reduce the number
of expensive bilinear pairing operations. More information about batch verification
can be found in Chapter 6.
The group signatures schemes have to deal with the revocation of dishonest users,
attackers or users who left group. There are three ways how to revoke user from
the group. The first and naive method is based on the reinitialization of group
public key and sending it to all unrevoked members who must re-computate their
group member secret keys. The second method is based on an accumulator, and
the third method employs a list with revoked users. These revocation methods are
more described in Chapter 7.
Besides the problems with revocation, group signature schemes cause problems
with their implementations on memory and computational restricted devices due to
more expensive operations and larger signatures or keys in comparing with classic
signature schemes such as RSA, ECDSA and Message Authentication Code (MAC)
schemes. Also an efficient verification in short time and/or the verification of many
signatures can be the bottleneck of these cryptographic schemes.
5.3.2 Evaluation of Group Signature Schemes
Group signature schemes can be evaluated by their performance, signature sizes,
parameter sizes and security assumptions used. The performance of group signa-
ture schemes strongly depends on two main phases: signing and verification. More
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efficient schemes in the signing phase are convenient for different applications than
the efficient schemes in the verification phase. The parameters of chosen group
signature schemes are compared in Table 5.1. The operations and marks are abbre-
viated as p - bilinear pairings, e - exponentiation, mul - multiplication, div - division,
add - addition (subtraction), H - hash, k - the length of identities in bits, m - the
length of message in bits, RL - the number of members in a revocation list, EF -
efficiently computable isomorphism from G2 to G1, T - the total time of a period,
N - number of members. In Table 5.1 the performance of several schemes, e.i. the
number of signing operations, the number of verification operations or the sizes of
signatures are usually outlined without any optimization and improvements. Thus,
some schemes can be optimized, for example, schemes BBS04, DP08 and HLCCN
enable precomputing all pairing operations in the signing.
Usually, the schemes which are secured in the random oracle model are more
efficient in signing and verification phases and have shorter signatures than schemes
secured in the standard model. It is not easy to determine the number of oper-
ations in the phases of schemes which are secured in the Standard model due to
these schemes use various sets of vectors and parameters that causes many arith-
metic operations. For example, the scheme G07 [76] consists in the signing algo-
rithm of a Non-Interactive Witness-Indistinguishable (NIWI) proof of knowledge,
the Boneh-Boyen signature scheme, a public key encryption and a Non-Interactive
Zero Knowledge (NIZK) proof. On the other hand, the scheme BCNSW10 [19] is
the most efficient from schemes compared in the signature size, i.e. only 3 group
elements in 𝐺1 and 2 elements in 𝑍𝑞. The most efficient scheme in the signing phase
is the NS04 scheme [133] due to the scheme has 0 pairing operation and only 3 ex-
ponentiation operations. The most efficient scheme in the verification phase is the
scheme BCNSW10 [19] due to 2 pairing and 3 exponentiation operations.
In summary, group signatures can have three bottlenecks that are a user revoca-
tion, the efficiency of phases (signing, verification) and the length of signatures. In
this thesis, the schemes BBS04 [20] and BS04 [23] are chosen due to their balanced
properties and they are further optimized and modified to fit in the proposed group
signature-based cryptographic protocols for the chosen communication services in
heterogeneous networks. Protocol 1 (Chapter 7) aims at the user revocation. Pro-
tocol 2 (Chapter 8) deals with the efficiency of phases (signing, verification) and
a DDoS mitigation in the verification phase.
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Tab. 5.1: Parameters of Group Signatures.
Scheme Signing
operations
Verification
operations
Size of
signature
Size of
group
public
key
Efficiency Security
model
Type
ACJT00
[7]
14e + 1H+
9mul + 2div
+ 6add
15e + 1H +
9mul + 2div
+ 4sum
8696 b 6144 b Constant gpk
and sign.
Random Ora-
cle
Non-
bilinear
NS04
[133]
3e + 32mul
+ 14add +
1H
3p + 2e +
14mul +
8add + 1H
4776 b 2904 b Constant gpk
and sign.
Random Ora-
cle
Bilinear
BBS04
[20]
3p + 12e
+ 10mul +
8add + 1H
5p+12e
+7mul +
1div + 2add
+ 1H
3|G1| +
6|Zp| 1
553 b
6|G1| 1026
b
Constant gpk
and sign.
Random Ora-
cle
Bilinear
BS04 [23] 3p + 2EF +
8e +8mul +
3add + 2H
(6 +|RL|)p
+ 8e + 4mul
+ 2div +2H
+ 2EF
2|G1| +
5|Zp| 1
192 b
3|G1| 513
b
Constant gpk
and sign.
Random Ora-
cle
Bilinear
ACHM05
[6]
12e + 2div
+ 3add
10p + 1e +
3mul
6|G1|+2|G2|
2052 b
2|G1| +
4|G2| +
|GT|
Constant gpk
and sign.
Interactive
assumptions
avoiding ran-
dom oracle
Bilinear
BW06
[25]
(5k + m +
5)e + (4k +
m + 4)mul
+ (2k-1)add
(3+2k)p
+ me +
(m+k)mul
(2k +
3)|G|
(k + m
+ 3)|G|
+ |Gq| +
|GT|
Logarithmic
gpk and sign.
Standard Bilinear
ZL06
[181]
2p + 17e
+ 17mul +
7add + 2div
+ 1H
(3 + RL)p
+17e
+9mul
+ 2div +
1H
8|Zp| +
5|G| 2215
b
(3 + T)|G| Constant
sign.
Random ora-
cle
Bilinear
DP06 [57] 3p + 3e +
15mul +
7add + 1div
+ 1H
5p +4e
+11mul +
3add + 2div
4|Zq| +
4|G| +
1|H| (1444
b)
4|G1|+2|G2|
+3|GT|
Constant
sign.
Random ora-
cle
Bilinear
BW07
[26]
(12 + 2m)e
+ (11 +
2m)mul
6p +(3 +
m)e + (4 +
m)mul
6|G| 1026
b
(4 + m)|G|
+ |Gq| +
|GT|
Logarithmic
gpk a con-
stant sign.
Standard Bilinear
LCSL07
[102]
12e + 10mul
+ 1div + 1H
+ 1add
6p + 3e +
4mul
5|G| 3|G| +
|Gq|
Constant gpk
and sign.
Standard Bilinear
G07 [76] NIWI +
NIZK + BB
signature
246p ([62]) 50|G| 8|G| Constant
sign.
Standard Bilinear
BCNSW10
[19]
4p + 5e +
2m + 1div
+ 1add +
1h
2p + 3e +
1m + 1div
3|G1| +
2|Zq|
2|G| Constant gpk
and sign.
Random Ora-
cle
Bilinear
HLCCN11
[87]
4p + 11e +
11m + 5add
6p + 10e +
7m + 1div
+ 1h
3|G1|
+ 5|Zq|
(1363 b)
6|G1| +
2|G2| +
4|GT|
Constant gpk
and sign.
Random Ora-
cle
Bilinear
LPY12
[104]
(logN)e 4p + 2e +
the verifica-
tion of one
time signa-
ture
96|G|
(6kB)
|G| + |Gq| Constant
sign. and
logarithmic
gsk and gpk
Standard Bilinear
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6 PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF CRYPTO-
GRAPHIC PRIMITIVES AND OPTIMIZA-
TION TECHNIQUES
The goal of this chapter is to evaluate the performance of cryptographic primitives
and figure out security parameters for devices used in heterogeneous networks. The
chapter also presents optimization techniques that reduce the number of operations
in cryptographic protocols. Further, it is focused on the optimization techniques
that can be used in digital signatures, group signature schemes and pairing-based
schemes.
6.1 Performance Analysis of Cryptographic Prim-
itives and Modular Arithmetic
Cryptographic primitives and math operations used in cryptography have different
computational and memory requirements. Hand-held and embedded devices usu-
ally offer sufficient computational and memory performance also for asymmetric
cryptographic primitives and more expensive math operations such as exponentia-
tions and bilinear pairings. Unlike smart-cards and some highly-restricted microcon-
trollers which have lower computational and memory performance, hand-held and
embedded devices allow employing the advanced cryptographic and math libraries.
These libraries offer optimized cryptographic primitives and operations and enable
designing the privacy-preserving cryptography solutions. Moreover, to speed up
some cryptographic operations, the most widespread devices often have some cryp-
tographic support provided by a dedicated chip. How to use this chip for increasing
the performance is described in subsection 6.1.3.
6.1.1 Performance Results of Cryptographic Operations
The cryptographic components and modular arithmetic operations can be imple-
mented in many languages and on many platforms. To compare cryptographic op-
erations with pairing-based operations, the object-oriented programming languages
(JAVA, C#, C++) have been used to obtain the following results.
Performance Results of Cryptographic Operations on PC
Current PC machines provide sufficient computational and memory performance
for various cryptographic primitives. Table 6.1 shows the average times of crypto-
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graphic operations measured in the JAVA implementation. The results are mea-
sured on a PC machine with Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU X3440 @ 2.53GHz, 4 GB Ram,
Windows 7 Professional. The average values are taken from 1000 measurements
executed on the machine used. The modular arithmetic operations are provided by
the java.math.BigInteger class. The pairing based operations are implemented by
the Java Pairing Based Cryptography (jPBC) Library 1. The implementation em-
ploys the MNT curves type D with the embedding degree 𝑘 = 6, the 171-bit order
of curves and the pre-generated parameters d840347-175-161.param. The schemes
based on RSA employ the size of a group element of 1024 bit. The pairing opera-
tion takes about 40 ms and is the most expensive operation measured. The hash
operation applied on curve elements takes about 1 ms due to need to map a hash
value to a curve element. Addition, multiplication and the hash of RSA integers are
more efficient operations (up to tens 𝜇s) than exponentiation which takes approx.
5 ms.
Tab. 6.1: Times of Cryptographic Operations on PC machine.
Elements: 1024-bit RSA based 170-bit Curve Based
Operation: Average Time [𝜇s]
Pairing - 40640
Exponentiation 5370 5160
Multiplication 28 13
Hash (SHA-1) 16 1050 (with map to a curve)
Addition (Subtraction) 5 5
6.1.2 Performance Results of Modular Arithmetic and Se-
lected Cryptographic Primitives on Constrained De-
vices
Modular arithmetic operations with large numbers and moduli can be a computa-
tional bottleneck on resource restricted devices like smart-cards, hand-held devices
or sensors, especially, multiplication and exponentiation operations. The modular
arithmetic is important for a wide variety of computations in these devices, from
communication to signal processing. Many asymmetric protocols used today for
authentication and digital signatures work with multiplicative groups modulo large
numbers. The most common examples are the RSA (Rivest, Shamir, Adleman)
[147] or DSA (Digital Signature Algorithm) [97] algorithms. But, there are more
1(available on http://gas.dia.unisa.it/projects/jpbc/index.html)
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cryptographic primitives that can be based on modular operations, such as the Zero-
Knowledge protocols [73], Proofs of Knowledge (PK) schemes, e.g. Schnorr’s scheme
[149], and so on. From the knowledge of the construction of these advanced proto-
cols and the knowledge of performance of underlying operations, the performance
of these protocols can be predicted. Based on the implementation of atomic opera-
tions on various devices, it is possible to estimate the theoretical performance of the
selected primitives such as commitment schemes, the proof of knowledge schemes
and so on.
It can be observed from the cryptographic background in Section 4 that the proof
of knowledge protocols heavily rely on arithmetic operations in groups where the
discrete logarithm operation is hard to compute. Namely, modular operations with
moduli in orders of thousand bits are required. These operations are usually avail-
able on the PC platform in the form of BigInt libraries (such as OpenSSL, Bouncy
Castle, etc.). Unfortunately, these libraries are missing on smart-cards. Only the
MultOS platform supports direct modular operations. Thus, the following opera-
tions have to be implemented on many platforms and devices without the support of
existing libraries. The bit-lengths of moduli and operands are selected according to
the most popular group sizes in cryptography (1024 and 2048 bit modulus). Addi-
tionally to modular operations, some non-modular (plain) big-integer operations are
implemented as they are contained in 𝑃𝐾 protocols which operate in hidden order
groups (1024 bit groups and 160 bit secrets such as 𝑤). The results are outlined in
Table 6.2.
The measured operations are denoted as follows:
• MPow[mod] [exp]: Modular Exponentiation with mod b modulus and exp
b exponent.
• MMul [len]: Modular Multiplication with len b modulus and operands.
• Mult320: Multiplication of two 320 b numbers.
• Sub400: Subtraction of two 400 b numbers.
• RNG: The random number generation of a 560 b number.
• PK: Proofs of Knowledge of discrete logarithm (Schnorr’s protocol), |𝑤| =
160 b, |𝑔| is a generator in 𝑍𝑞 where |𝑞| = 160 b, |𝑐| = 1024 b.
Using these benchmarks, it is possible to easily predict the approximate time of
newly designed protocols or cryptographic schemes. More results can be found in
the paper [79].
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Tab. 6.2: Performance Estimation Based on Benchmarks.
Time in milliseconds
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 A1 A2 A3
MPow2048 560b 1047 1273 844 - 539 64.35 42.66 41.11
MPow2048 160b 958 673 440 - 386 20.19 13.32 12.96
MPow1024 368b 204 664 214 90 254 14.83 9.69 8.83
MPow1024 160b 186 477 166 58 226 6.13 4.30 3.97
MMul 2048b 448 392 691 51 29 0.25 0.20 0.20
MMul 1024b 205 187 353 37 28 0.16 0.14 0.10
Mul 320b 101 106 133 34 29 0.03 0.03 0.02
Sub 400b 15 9 33 33 27 0.01 0.02 0.01
Hash SHA1 20kB 111 38 155 381 92 0.12 0.02 0,02
RNG 560 b 5 52 53 65 42 0.12 0,08 0.08
𝑐 = 𝑔𝑤 (DL commitment) 186 476 165 226 58 6 4 4
𝑐 = 𝑔𝑤ℎ𝑟 (Pedersen commit.) 580 1161 717 513 195 12 9 8
𝑃𝐾{𝑤 : 𝑐 = 𝑔𝑤} 325 830 433 352 222 15 10 9
Glossary:
S1: Oberthur Technologies ID-One Cosmo V7.0-A
S2: Gemalto TOP IM GX4
S3: Gemalto .NET V2+
S4: MultOS ML2-80K-65
S5: MultOS ML3-36K-R1
A1: Samsung Galaxy S i9000 (smart-phone)
A2: Samsung Galaxy Nexus I9250M (smart-phone)
A3: ASUS TF 300T (tablet)
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Performance Results of Pairing-Based Cryptographic Operations on Hand-
held Devices
It can be expected that some expensive operations such as pairings are more time
consuming on less computational powerful devices, e.g., smartphones. The times of
bilinear pairing operations and other operations used in pairing-based cryptographic
schemes are measured on two smartphones: Samsung Nexus i9250 (OS: Android
v4.2.2, RAM: 1 GB, CPU: ARMv7-A Dual-core 1.2 GHz Cortex-A9) and LG Nexus
5 (OS: Android v4.4, RAM: 2 GB, CPU: ARMv7 Quad-core 2.3 GHz Krait 400).
Nexus 5 enables using both virtual machines, Dalvik and ART. The results are
outlined in Table 6.3. The average values are taken from 10 measurements executed
on smartphones. The pairing operation is the pairing type d(175) with parameters
d840347-175-161. This asymmetric d pairing takes 3597.03 ms on Nexus i9250.
Nevertheless, the pairing takes only 2383.3 ms on Nexus 5 with ART, or 3016.9
ms on Nexus 5 with Dalvik. In this case, ART outperforms Dalvik by ca. 21%.
Exponentiation PowZn 𝑢𝛼 (both elements are in 𝐺1) is faster than pairing and takes
ca 87 ms on Nexus 5 with ART. The hash operation with mapping to 𝑍𝑛 field, which
is applied on curve elements, takes 0.20 ms on Nexus 5 with ART. Multiplication of
two elements in 𝐺1 (MulZn) takes ca. 0.05 ms on all the smartphones used. In the
measurement, the addition and other relatively fast operations are ommited. More
results can be found in the paper [122].
Tab. 6.3: Performance of Pairing-Based Cryptographic Operations on Hand-held
Devices.
Devices: Nexus i9250 Nexus 5 (Dalvik) Nexus 5 (ART)
Operation: Average Time [ms]
Pairing e 3597.03 3016.91 2383.30
Exponentiation PowZn 131.73 105.82 87.87
Multiplication MulZn 0.06 0.06 0.05
Hash with map to Zn H() 1.26 0.55 0.20
6.1.3 Efficient Modular Multiplication by Using Coproces-
sor
In the journal paper [118], the comparison of the accelerated method of multipli-
cation with three classical methods for (modular) multiplication are provided. The
standard methods are represented by the operand-scanning multiplication algorithm
(the schoolbook method), the product-scanning method (Comba’s method) and the
Montgomery multiplication. The accelerated method is based on using the RSA
61
encryption support for multiplication tunneling. The goal is to use the resources of
a crypto-coprocessor to accelerate general modular operations such as exponentia-
tion by two.
The search for a fast modular multiplication algorithm is motivated by its need
in the attribute authentication systems which need modular arithmetic operations
like subtraction, addition, multiplication and exponentiations to be efficiently com-
puted by the restricted devices. Since the exponentiation operation can be done
directly by the RSA function (which is simply an exponentiation), the most de-
manding modular operation is the multiplication. The computation complexity of
multiplication is 𝑂(𝑛2), where 𝑛 is the length of input operands, in most cases equal
to the length of the modulus. Fortunately, a trick with RSA method [147] can be
used to reduce the computation complexity to almost a constant value given by the
RSA implementation. This trick is called RSA tunnel method.
RSA Tunnel Method
RSA algorithm introduced in [147] is the most common algorithm for public-key
cryptography. The RSA function is a simple exponentiation (1),
𝑐 = 𝑚𝑒 mod 𝑛 (6.1)
where 𝑚 is a message for encryption, 𝑒 is a public key, 𝑛 is a public modulus and the
result is 𝑐, the cipher text. By a wise choice of RSA encryption parameters 𝑚, 𝑒, 𝑛
the RSA function can be used for the exponentiation and multiplication. However,
the RSA tunnel works only on devices having an accelerated RSA support (without
a dedicated chip for the RSA acceleration there would be no performance gain).
Exponentiation is provided directly by importing parameters where𝑚 is the base,
𝑒 is the power and 𝑛 is the modulus of the intended exponentiation operation. For
example, the cryptographic API of the .NET smart-card allows setting the exponent
𝑒 and the modulus 𝑛 directly. Then it is necessary to call the RSA method with the
base as a parameter and choose no padding for it. The RSA encryption (1) gives
the output in the form of a byte array.
The modular multiplication operation is not so straightforward, nevertheless it
is also very simple. To use the performance of the crypto co-processor with RSA for
the modular multiplication of integers 𝑎 and 𝑏, the binomial formula (2) is used.
𝑎𝑏 = (𝑎+ 𝑏)
2 − 𝑎2 − 𝑏2
2 (6.2)
By such a conversion, a single multiplication is transformed to three exponentiations,
three additions and one division by 2 (just a bit shift). But since the addition is
efficient and the exponentiation can use the RSA function, all resulting operations
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are much faster than a single multiplication. The larger the input parameters are,
the more efficient the transformation is. The computational complexity of the RSA
Tunnel method depends mostly on the length of the modulus 𝑛 and grows much
slower than in previous methods.
Results of Modular Multiplication Methods
The following results are measured on .NET smart-card (.NET Gemalto V2+, 66
MHz CPU, 16 kB RAM). The time of addition, subtraction and exponentiation
operations with large integers is satisfactory due to low complexity (or the direct use
of RSA in case of exponentiation). All these operations can be efficiently computed
in tens of milliseconds on the chosen .NET smart-card. Moreover, the actual time
of these simple operations is negligible in comparison to the card initialization time
(cca. 150 ms for card initialization, 120 ms for communication).
On the other hand, multiplication is more challenging because it has the com-
putational complexity 𝑂(𝑛2). The schoolbook and Comba’s methods depend on the
length of the input operands 𝑎, 𝑏. Montgomery multiplication and the RSA Tunnel
method depend on the length of the modulus 𝑛.
The dependence of computation time on length of inputs 𝑎, 𝑏 for the constant
length 𝑛 is shown in Figure 7.1 and Figure 7.2. The schoolbook method and Comba’s
method are more efficient for small inputs 𝑎, 𝑏 (length ≤ 600 bits) than Montgomery
multiplication or the RSA Tunnel (see Figure 7.1). If the length of the modulus re-
mains constant and the length of inputs 𝑎, 𝑏 becomes higher, the situation changes.
For 1024 bit inputs the RSA Tunnel is the best option and Montgomery multiplica-
tion is the worst (see Figure 7.1). The efficiency of the RSA Tunnel is obvious for
bigger modulus (≥ 1024 bits), see Figure 7.2 which confirms the almost constant
computation complexity of the RSA tunnel method.
In summary, the RSA Tunnel is optimal for larger inputs (length of 𝑎, 𝑏 ≥ 850
bits) with the length of modulus |𝑛| ≥ 400 bits. The schoolbook method is the best
choice for the length of inputs |𝑎|, |𝑏| ≤ 300 bits and Comba’s method is appropriate
for the length of inputs 300 ≤ |𝑎|, |𝑏| ≤ 850 bits. Assuming all public key crypto-
graphic protocols require parameters longer than 1024 bits, the RSA tunnel method
is very useful in practice.
More information and results about modular arithmetics and cryptographic op-
erations on restricted devices can be found in the papers [116], [79], [115] and [118].
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6.2 Optimization Techniques Used in Digital Sig-
natures
The design of cryptographic schemes usually follows two basic goals. Cryptographers
try to make schemes as secure as possible, i.e., provably secure under general as-
sumptions. The second goal is communication and computational efficiency. Many
cryptographic schemes like digital signatures are adopted in practice to secure in-
formation and communication systems. Aimed at digital signatures, these schemes
consist of signing and verification phases. Many digital signatures schemes, e.g., RSA
[147], ECDSA [93], group signatures (e.g. [20]), etc., provide different properties,
such as a signature size, the performance of signing procedure or the performance of
verification process. In this section, the optimization techniques of digital signatures
such as a signature aggregation and a batch verification are investigated. Aggregate
signature schemes save the communication overhead by providing a small size of the
chain of signatures. In contrary to this, the batch verification saves the computa-
tional overhead by providing the optimized verification process of many signatures.
In practice, if the signature size is minimized, the verification process takes usually
more operations but if the verification process is optimized, the signature size is
usually increased. The results in this section have been presented in the conference
paper [121].
6.2.1 Aggregate Signatures
Aggregate signatures can significantly reduce the size of chains of signatures by the
aggregation of all signatures into one signature. Due to this fact, the total size of
transmitted signatures can be approximately reduced to the size of a single signature.
The general principle of aggregate signatures is depicted in Fig. 6.3.
Basic Types of Aggregate Signatures
Generally, there are three kinds of aggregate signatures: multi-signature schemes,
non-sequential and sequential aggregate signature schemes. In multi-signature schemes,
for example [13], all participants sign the same message.
The definition of multi-signature schemes:
Each user 𝑈𝑖 signs a same message 𝑀 to obtain a signature 𝜎𝑖. A third party
can combine a list of signatures 𝜎𝑖 with public keys 𝑝𝑘𝑖 into the final single signature∑︀ ← Mulsig(𝜎𝑖, 𝑝𝑘𝑖,𝑀) which is sent to a verifier. Then, the verifier takes the
signature ∑︀ and pairs (𝑝𝑘𝑖,𝑀) to indicate that ∑︀ is valid for 𝑖 signers with 𝑝𝑘𝑖 and
the message 𝑀 , or ∑︀ is invalid.
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Fig. 6.3: The Basic Principle of Aggregate Signatures.
Aggregate signature schemes generalize multi-signature schemes where several
signatures created on distinct messages from different participants are combined
into a single signature that has nearly the same size as an ordinary signature. The
aggregation can be done by a third party which can be untrusted but he/she has no
access to any private key. The aggregate signatures can be non-sequential (defined
above) or sequential.
The definition of non-sequential aggregate signature schemes:
Each user 𝑈𝑖 signs a distinct message 𝑀𝑖 with a private key 𝑠𝑘𝑖 to obtain a sig-
nature 𝜎𝑖. A third party (an aggregating party/a user) combines a list of signatures
𝜎𝑖 with public keys 𝑝𝑘𝑖 into the final single signature
∑︀← Aggregate(𝜎𝑖, 𝑝𝑘𝑖,𝑀𝑖).
Then a verifier takes the signature ∑︀ and pairs (𝑝𝑘𝑖,𝑀𝑖) to indicate that ∑︀ is valid
or not.
The non-sequential aggregate signature schemes aggregate the tuple of signa-
tures, messages and public keys independently on the order of the parties.
The aggregation of sequential schemes is performed sequentially when each signer
gets an aggregate-so-far signature and combines this with its own signature.
The definition of sequential aggregate signature schemes:
A user 𝑈𝑖 checks with the set of public keys pk that the current aggregate 𝜎𝑖−1’
is a valid signature for the preceding messagesM whereM and pk are the sequences
of messages M = (𝑀1,𝑀2,...,𝑀𝑖−1) and public keys pk = (𝑝𝑘1,𝑝𝑘2,...,𝑝𝑘𝑖−1). Then,
the user 𝑈𝑖 signs a distinct message 𝑀𝑖 with his/her private key 𝑠𝑘𝑖 to obtain a
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Tab. 6.4: Comparison of Aggregate Signature Schemes.
Scheme Security
Model
Size of Aggregated
Signature
Sign and Aggregate Verification Sequential
BGLS [21] RO 𝑘𝑝 (𝑁+1) mul + 1 exp +
1 hash
(𝑁 + 1) pair + 𝑁 mul
+ 𝑁 hash
no
LMRS [112] RO 𝑘𝑓 (2𝑁 + 1) exp + 1
hash
2𝑁 exp + 𝑁 hash yes
LMRS (with
certification)
[112]
RO 𝑘𝑓 4𝑁 mul + 1 exp + 𝑁
hash
4𝑁 mul + 𝑁 hash yes
LOSSW [110] Standard 2𝑘𝑝 2 pair + (2𝑁𝐿+𝑁 +
𝐿+ 6) mul + 1 exp
2 pair+ 𝑁𝐿 mul + 𝐿
mul
yes
Neven [132] RO 𝐿, 𝑘𝑓 + 𝐿 (2𝑁+1) mul + 1 exp
+ 1 add + 1 hash
2𝑁 mul + 𝑁 add + 𝑁
hash
yes
Schroder [150] Standard 4𝑘𝑝 (3𝑁+5) pair + (4𝑁+
5) exp + (2𝑁+3) mul
(3𝑁 +5) pair+ 2𝑁 exp
+ (𝑁 − 1) mul
yes
BGR [29] RO 2𝑘𝑓+256+(128+1)𝑁 1 exp + 2 hash 𝑁 exp + 2𝑁 hash no
Yu [175] RO 2𝑘𝑝 3𝑁 mul + 𝑁 hash +
2(𝑁+1) add
3 pair+𝑁 mul + (𝑁 -1)
add + 2 𝑁 hash
yes
aggregate-so-far signature 𝜎𝑖’ and adds it to tuple (𝜎𝑖’,M,pk). The last user in the
chain makes a final aggregate signature via 𝜎𝑖 ← Aggregate(𝜎𝑖−1’, 𝑝𝑘𝑖,𝑀𝑖). Then,
a verifier takes the signature 𝜎𝑖 and the pairs (𝑝𝑘𝑖,𝑀𝑖) to indicate that 𝜎𝑖 is valid
or not.
Evaluation and Comparison of Aggregate Signature Schemes
The comparison of aggregate signature schemes is listed in Table 6.4. The schemes
are usually secured in one from two security models, i.e. the Random Oracle model
and the Standard model. To denote the size of aggregate signatures, the parameter
𝑘𝑓 denotes the size of a RSA group element, e.g. 1024 bits. The parameter 𝑘𝑝 de-
notes the size of a elliptic curve element, e.g. 170 bits. The number of participants
(signatures) is denoted 𝑁 . The output length of a collision resistance function is
denoted 𝐿. It is assumed that the pairing operation (pair) is more computational
expensive than exponentiation (exp) and multiplication (mul). The aggregate sign-
ing of sequential schemes seems to be more expensive than non-sequential schemes.
Nevertheless, the sequential aggregation can be appropriate for many applications
such as authenticating the routing information and chaining the certificates.
6.2.2 Batch Verification
Digital signature schemes have a verification phase which is pure check of validity
of a signature or a commitment. If a verifier receives 𝑁 signatures, then he/she
can check the validity of these signatures one by one (an individual verification) or
he/she can check all 𝑁 signatures in one instance by a batch verification. In many
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Fig. 6.4: The Basic Principle of Batch Verification.
cases, the batch verification is more efficient than the individual verification. The
batch verification is a useful technique especially if verification costs many operations
like modular exponentiation, multiplication and/or bilinear pairings. On the other
hand, the majority of valid signatures is necessary. That causes better efficiency of
the batch verification. For example if fake signatures reach the half of all signatures
in a batch, then one instance of batch verification takes more time than all instances
of the individual verification.
The definition of the batch verification of signatures:
Assuming that the tuple of algorithms (Gen, Sign, Verify) is correct and se-
cure. Then, if Verify(𝑝𝑘𝑖, 𝑚𝑖, 𝜎𝑖) = 1 for all 𝑖 ∈ [1, 𝑛], then BatchVerify((𝑝𝑘1,
𝑚1, 𝜎1),...,(𝑝𝑘𝑛, 𝑚𝑛, 𝜎𝑛)) = 1. If Verify(𝑝𝑘𝑖, 𝑚𝑖, 𝜎𝑖) = 0 for any 𝑖 ∈ [1, 𝑛], then
BatchVerify((𝑝𝑘1, 𝑚1, 𝜎1),...,(𝑝𝑘𝑛, 𝑚𝑛, 𝜎𝑛)) = 0.
If all 𝑁 messages in the batch are valid, then the batch verification is valid. If one
message or 𝑤 messages in the batch are invalid, then the batch verification is invalid.
In this case, a verifier needs to identify all 𝑤 invalid messages in the batch. This can
cost more operations than the total operations of 𝑁 individual verifications. Fig.
6.4 depicts the basic principle of the batch verification of digital signatures.
RSA Batch Verification
Fiat [67] presents the batch RSA scheme which is suitable for centralized applications
using batch transactions. Nevertheless, if a public exponent used has a reasonable
small value, then the individual verification of RSA is quite efficient. Moreover, the
68
proposed batch verification works only with signatures produced by a single signer.
DSA/ECDSA Batch Verification
Harn [80] presents secure algorithms to verify multiple digital signatures based on
the discrete logarithm problem as known as DSA signatures. Instead of verify-
ing each individual DSA signature separately (2𝑁 modular exponentiation for 𝑁
signatures), multiple signatures are verified by the batch verification (2 modular
exponentiation for 𝑛 signatures). Nevertheless, the batch verification works only
with one signer, not multiple signers. Moreover, the proposed algorithms cannot
identify fake signatures without performing individual verification. Lin et al. [106]
deal with the improved batch verification of a DSA variant. They propose batch
verification which takes 3 modular exponentiation and 𝑙 + 𝑛(7 + 𝑙/2)-6 modular
multiplications, where 𝑙 is the bit number of small exponent test. Their scheme
does not need any modular inverse. The work [93] deals with the batch verification
of original ECDSA signatures. The authors propose several algorithms based upon
symbolic manipulations. Nevertheless, their approaches are efficient only for a small
batch size, fewer than 7 messages.
Batch Verification of Pairing Based Schemes
The batch verification applied in pairing-based signature schemes reduces the most
expensive operations - parings. Ferrara et al. [66] summarize the basic batching
techniques:
1. Change the verification equation. Check the correct subgroups of elements.
Combine all verification equations into one. Employ a small exponentiation
test [14].
2. Replace the exponents into the pairing operation, e.g. 𝑒(𝑔𝑖, ℎ𝑖)𝑎 → 𝑒(𝑔𝑎𝑖 , ℎ𝑖).
3. Combine the pairings with common elements, e.g. ∏︀𝑛𝑖=1 𝑒(𝑔𝑎𝑖 , ℎ𝑖)→ 𝑒(∏︀𝑛𝑖=1 𝑔𝑎𝑖 , ℎ𝑖).
The small exponentiation test adds an exponent (e.g 80 bit sized number) to protect
against submitting the fake pair elements [14]. The second technique gives a speedup
if element 𝑔𝑖 is smaller than the element computed by 𝑒(𝑔𝑖, ℎ𝑖). The third technique
reduces 𝑁 pairings into a constant number. The work [33] presents a batch verifi-
cation in two short pairing-based signatures so that the total number of pairings is
independent on the number of signatures. The proposed approach reduces the total
number of pairings by adding the random generation operation and modular expo-
nentiations. The work [114] uses a batch verification to enhance the performance of
the group signature scheme BBS04 [20]. Due to this improvement, the verification
of 𝑁 signatures takes only 2 pairing operations instead of 5𝑁 pairings.
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Identification of Fake Signatures in Batch
Fake signatures decrease the efficiency of a batch verification because the whole batch
is evaluated as invalid. Fake signatures in the batch can be identified by a divide and
conquer algorithm proposed by Pastuszak et al. in [136]. The algorithm recursively
splits the batch to sub-batches and does a generic test in every round until all fake
signatures are identified. This approach reduces batch performance where is 𝑂(1)
to 𝑂(𝑛log2𝑛). Ferrara et al. [66] empirically analyze the batch verification of short
group signatures based on pairings. The batch verification is applied on the group
signature scheme BBS [20]. They results show that if < 15% of the signatures are
invalid then the batch verification with the divide-and-conquer approach is more
efficient than an individual verification.
6.2.3 Experimental Results of Optimization Techniques
The implementation of a batch verification and aggregate signature schemes are
measured on a machine with Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU X3440 @ 2.53GHz, 4 GB
Ram, Windows 7 Professional. The cryptographic operations are provided by the
java.math.BigInteger class and jPBC Library.
The comparison of the signing performance of aggregate signatures is depicted
in Fig. 6.5. Besides the aggregate signature scheme proposed by Schroder [150],
all schemes take ≤ 1 s for the sign and aggregate of 100 signatures. The most
efficient scheme is the scheme BGR [29] using the lazy verification where the sign
and aggregate phase is independent on the number of signatures. The comparison
of verification performance of aggregate signatures is depicted in Fig. 6.6.
Due to a plenty of pairing operations used in a verification, Schroder’s scheme
[150] and BGLS scheme [21] take ≤ 1 second if the number of all messages are ≥
25. The most efficient scheme is the Neven scheme [132] which takes ≤ 8 ms for
100 messages. Nevertheless, the main goal of aggregate signature schemes is to keep
a signature size to minimum. The scheme BGLS [21] offers the shortest signature size
from schemes compared, it is only 170 bits. The signature aggregation is appropriate
in secure routing protocols such as Secure Border Gateway Protocol (SBGP) and in
wireless networks with restricted bandwidth.
The performance of the batch verification is compared with the individual veri-
fication, see Fig. 6.7. The batch verification significantly optimizes the verification
process of 𝑁 messages in the group signature scheme [20]. The total time of the
batch verification takes about 20 % of the total time of the individual verification.
Due to this fact, the batch verification is appropriate to apply in Vehicular Ad
hoc Networks (VANET), such as in the paper [120], and Many to one Networks
(MANET) where one node must verify a lot of messages from many nodes in a short
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time period. In general, the batch verification and signature aggregation techniques
can be also useful for anonymous authentication and credential schemes such as [31],
[77].
6.2.4 Optimization Techniques Applied to Pairing-Based Schemes
This section describes the basic optimization tricks that can be applied to PBC
schemes, especially PBC signature schemes.
Pairing Precomputation
If a pairing operation has static values as inputs, then this operation can be com-
puted in advance. Static values are usually generated cryptographic parameters that
are not changed during the scheme’s lifetime. For example, the signing phase of the
BBS04 scheme costs 3 pairing operations without precomputation. On the other
hand, pairings 𝑒(ℎ,𝑤), 𝑒(ℎ, 𝑔2) and 𝑒(𝑔1, 𝑔2) can be precomputed because all inputs
to the pairing functions are static. Also, the pairing 𝑒(𝑇3, 𝑔3) can be precomputed,
but this approach has no effect in real-time applications, where signatures are com-
puted periodically because 𝑇3 has to be computed for each signature, see Equation
4.1 in Section 4.3.2.
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Pairing Collapsing
Pairing collapsing is a technique that enables aggregating pairings into one pairing,
see an example in equation 6.3.
𝑒(𝑇3, 𝑔2)𝑠𝑥(𝑒(𝑇3, 𝑤)𝑐 = 𝑒(𝑇3, 𝑔𝑠𝑥2 𝑤𝑐) (6.3)
Pairing Delegation
The pairing delegation approach can be used if a computational restricted device
delegate the computation of pairing 𝑒(𝐴,𝐵) to a third party with a more powerful
device, e.g. server. The inputs 𝐴 and 𝐵 of the pairing operation can be public
but there are techniques that enable to compute pairing 𝑒(𝐴,𝐵) where 𝐴 an 𝐵 are
private and by using randomized masking a third party does not learn nothing about
these inputs. More about the secure delegation of pairing operations can be found
in the paper [51].
6.3 Summary of Chapter 6
The empirical measurement of cryptographic and modular arithmetic operations
shows that many of these operations can be computed relatively fast on some of
hand-held devices. Nevertheless in case that the devices with CPU frequency of few
tens MHz are employed in a communication system, then these devices may have
longer computational time of some more expensive operations such as exponentia-
tion and multiplication of large integers. On the other hand, the most demanding
operation is the pairing operation which may take several seconds on some compu-
tationally constrained devices. To reduce the number of pairings in the protocols,
the optimization techniques such as the batch verification, the pairing collapse ap-
proach and others can be employed. The optimization techniques applied on digital
signature schemes reduce a communication and computation overhead. Aggregate
signature schemes add a few cryptographic operations to save a communication
overhead. A small communication overhead is demanded for example in routing
protocols. The pairing based aggregate signatures have a shorter signature size
than RSA based schemes. On the other hand, these pairing-based schemes are more
computationally expensive. According to the experimental results, the batch veri-
fication of pairing based group signatures optimizes the verification process up to
20 % to the invidual verification. The batch verification techniques significantly
decrease the number of pairing operations in a verification. The efficient verification
is needed if nodes have to verify several tens or hundreds signatures, e.g. in cloud
computing, many to one networks or vehicular ad hoc networks.
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7 PROTOCOL 1: PAIRING BASED GROUP
SIGNATURE WITH EFFICIENT REVOCA-
TION
This chapter deals with a user revocation in group signatures and presents a novel
cryptographic protocol with a group signature scheme with Verifier-Local Revoca-
tion (VLR) employing a natural expiration. This work has been presented in the
conference paper [119].
The first scheme of a group signature was introduced in [47]. Thereafter, many
group signature schemes have been proposed with various parameters and different
ways how to revoke group members. Revocation can be divided into three main
mechanisms. The first method revokes members by the reinitialization of group
public key and sending it to all unrevoked members which must recomputate group
member secret keys. This method burdens communication and adds computational
operations anytime when a member is added or revoked. The second and more
efficient mechanism than the first one is based on sending a single public broadcast
message to all members without need to recompute secret keys. This accumulator-
based revocation method is mostly used as a white-list revocation but can be used
as a black-list revocation as well. Users must prove their validity proofs called
witnesses and that are included on a white-list accumulator (or not present on
a black-list accumulator). Verifiers do not need any revocation list. Nevertheless,
signers have to keep track of the changes of the accumulator and have to be online.
This approach is more convenient for verifiers than for signers. The third option
how to check the revoked users is to employ a list with revoked users (keys, tokens
credentials etc.) maintained by GM. GM sends it to verifiers who must perform
a revocation check. This method is called Verifier-Local Revocation (VLR). Group
members do not have to track any updates or refresh their witnesses. Since the
members have no work with revocation check, this check must be computed by the
verifier. VLR solutions provide less interactivity so signer can be off-line and has no
additional computation compared to accumulator-based solutions. The drawback
of VLR solutions is usually the growth of revocation lists to enormous sizes in
a large group. Hence, the revocation check is too expensive for verifiers and the
reinitialization of parameters and keys have to be done.
Revocation based on accumulators, presented in [34], and verifier-local revoca-
tion, such as in [23], are two revocation techniques having different pros and cons.
For example the work [65] proposes a group signature scheme based on [20] using the
pairing-based dynamic accumulator introduced in [34]. Every group member has to
refresh his/her witness and an accumulator, otherwise a verifier rejects his/her sig-
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nature. Users have to be online and download refreshed accumulators from a group
manager. The solution works only if users and verifiers are online and has the same
distribution of accumulators.
The protocol proposed in this thesis is aimed to immediate revocation which is
also suitable for off-line signers in non-large groups. The solution is based on the
verifier-local revocation approach. A group signature scheme with VLR employing
a natural expiration is proposed to reduce the length of revocation list by time.
The proposal focuses on efficiency in the signing phase and the verification phase
including the revocation check.
7.1 Revocation in Group Signatures
The verifier-local revocation introduced in [23] can be an efficient revocation so-
lution for signers. The signatures after revocation become linkable which can be
inadvisable for some applications. Therefore, the works, e.g. [131], [105] or [28],
add a property called Backward Unlinkability (BU). In the paper [131], the authors
extend a group signature scheme [23] and add BU. They employ the revocation to-
kens of revoked members for certain time intervals to ensure that former signatures
cannot be linkable if the member is revoked. While the proposal [131] is proven in
the random oracle model, the work [105] presents the VLR group signature scheme
with BU that is proven in the standard model. Nevertheless, the revocation check
also costs 1 pairing operation per one revocation token as in [131]. To improve
computational overhead, one revocation check is reduced from one pairing to one
exponentiation in the paper [48]. In the paper [28], the scheme proposed in [48]
is patched to satisfy backward unlinkability, traceability and exculpability in the
random oracle model. Time intervals that are used in [131], [105], [48] and [28] can
moderate the size of RL. If the time interval is too long then the revocation list is
too large, otherwise, if the time interval is too short then the group public key and
group member secret keys are too long.
CKS 2010 [35] present revocation with efficient updates. The validity time of
a credentials is encoded into an attribute. Nevertheless, the solution does not sup-
port an immediate revocation. In time-critic services, the solution has to be com-
bined with an accumulator solution. Due to the time validity of a credential, the
accumulator keeps limited size and the number of an accumulator and witness up-
dates is lower than no-time-restricted credentials. Anyway, users have to be online
to keep the newest version of accumulator. The authors claim that this approach
cannot be used on group signatures since a validity time period identifier is hard to
include. However, they suggest to sign the second message as an epoch identifier.
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The work [54] proposes a pairing-based group signature scheme with VLR em-
ploying time-bound secret keys and without BU. Each group secret key has an expi-
ration date so the verifier checks the revocation list that excludes expired members.
Only one exponentiation is needed to check whether the key is revoked. Neverthe-
less, the scheme performs seven pairing operations per one message in the verification
phase.
As in [54] also the protocol proposed in this chapter does not provide BU, thus,
it can be inappropriate for applications that demands backward linkability. The
proposed protocol which is based on BS scheme [23] provides more efficient verifica-
tion than the scheme in [54] and related VLR group signature schemes due to the
batch verification. Moreover, to ensure the shorter revocation tokens, the proposed
solution uses time offsets compared to using date formats in [54].
7.2 Preliminaries of Protocol 1
In this section, the cryptography background and system model are outlined.
7.2.1 Cryptography Used
The proposed scheme is based on a group signature scheme proposed by Boneh
and Shacham (the BS04 scheme) [23] with verifier-local revocation that ensures
anonymity, authenticity, message integrity, non-repudiation, unlinkability and trace-
ability. The scheme uses bilinear maps and is based on the q-SDH problem and
Decision Linear problem, which have been described in [23]. This scheme is modi-
fied to ensure more efficient verification algorithm by a verifier-local revocation with
time-bound group member secret keys and batch verification. To make time-bound
group secret member keys, the methods called 0-encoding/1-encoding presented in
[54] are employed.
Bilinear Pairings
The scheme is based on bilinear pairing operations like in [23]. The notification used
is as follows:
• 𝐺1 is a multiplicative cyclic group of prime order 𝑝.
• 𝐺2 is multiplicative group of exponent 𝑝.
• 𝐺𝑇 is multiplicative cyclic group of order 𝑝.
• 𝑔1 is a generator of 𝐺1 and 𝑔2 is a generator of 𝐺2.
• 𝜓 is computable homomorphism from 𝐺2 to 𝐺2, with 𝜓(𝑔2) = 𝑔1.
• 𝑒 is a computable bilinear map 𝑒 : 𝐺1×𝐺2 → 𝐺𝑇 with the following properties:
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– Bilinearity: for all 𝑢 ∈ 𝐺1, 𝑣 ∈ 𝐺2 and 𝑎, 𝑏 ∈ Z, 𝑒(𝑢𝑎, 𝑣𝑏) = 𝑒(𝑢, 𝑣)𝑎𝑏.
– Non-degeneracy: for all 𝑒(𝑔1, 𝑔2) ̸= 1 .
0/1-ENCoding
The 0-encoding and 1-encoding reduce the greater than predicate to set intersection
predicate by converting a date format in binary string to a value in 𝑍𝑝. To convert
elements of binary strings to a value in 𝑍𝑝, the procedure presented in [54] is used.
The procedure is defined as follows:
1. Use the 0/1-ENCoding of a 𝑙-bit binary string 𝑡 = 𝑡[𝑙]𝑡[𝑙−1]...𝑡[1], where 𝑡 is
a date encoded in binary string and 𝑡[𝑖] denotes 𝑖-th bit of 𝑡, by
𝑇 0𝑡 = {𝑡[𝑙]𝑡[𝑙−1]...𝑡[𝑖+11‖𝑡[𝑖] = 0, 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑙},
𝑇 1𝑡 = {𝑡[𝑙]𝑡[𝑙−1]...𝑡[𝑖‖𝑡[𝑖] = 0, 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑙}.
Based on the theorem in [107], 𝑥 > 𝑦 iff 𝑇 1𝑥 and 𝑇 0𝑦 have a common element.
2. Ensure that the sets start with ’1’ by adding ’1’
𝑇 0𝑡 = {1 · 10𝑙−𝑖+1 + 𝑡[𝑙] · 10𝑙−𝑖 + 𝑡[𝑙−1] · 10𝑙−𝑖−1...𝑡[𝑖+1 · 101 + 1‖𝑡[𝑖] = 0, 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑙},
𝑇 1𝑡 = {1 · 10𝑙−𝑖+1+ 𝑡[𝑙] · 10𝑙−𝑖+ 𝑡[𝑙−1] · 10𝑙−𝑖−1...𝑡[𝑖+1 · 101+ 𝑡[𝑖]‖𝑡[𝑖] = 1, 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑙}.
3. Fill up the sets with incomparable dummy elements to achieve an equal number
of elements: {𝑡𝑙, 𝑡𝑙−1, ..., 𝑡1} ← 0-ENC(𝑡), where 𝑡𝑖 ← {𝑧 if 𝑧 ∈ 𝑇 0𝑡 ∧ 2 · 10𝑖
otherwise } and {𝑡𝑙, 𝑡𝑙−1, ..., 𝑡1} ← 1-ENC(𝑡), where 𝑡𝑖 ← {𝑧 if 𝑧 ∈ 𝑇 1𝑡 ∧ 3 · 10𝑖
otherwise }.
Here, an example assuming two dates 𝑦=’1301’ and 𝑥=’1303’ (2013-January and
2013-March) in a date format ’YYMM’ is outlined. It can be shown that the 0/1-
ENCoding indicates which of date is the newer one and if common element appears
then 𝑥 > 𝑦. The date ’1301’ and ’1303’ are encoded into binary strings as 𝑦=101
0001 0101 and 𝑥=101 0001 0111. Nevertheless, a time offset based on number of
months from present can map much longer time period for the same length of bits.
The 0/1-ENCoding is employed on 𝑥 = 10100010111, 𝑦 = 1010001010 and output
is:
𝑇 0𝑦 = {11, 1011, 10101, 101001, 10100011, 1010001011},
𝑇 1𝑥 = {1, 101, 1010001, 101000101, 1010001011, 10100010111},
𝑇 0𝑦 = {111, 11011, 110101, 1101001, 110100011, 11010001011},
𝑇 1𝑥 = {11, 1101, 11010001, 1101000101, 11010001011, 110100010111},
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0-ENC(𝑦)→ {20, 111, 2000, 11011, 110101, 1101001, 20000000, 110100011, 2000000000,
11010001011,200000000000},
1-ENC(𝑥)→ {11, 300, 1101, 30000, 300000, 3000000, 11010001, 300000000, 1101000101,
11010001011,110100010111}.
It is clear if the element 11010001011 is common for both sets then 𝑥 > 𝑦 is
true. The sketch of proof can be found in [54].
7.2.2 System Model of Protocol 1
The designed system model consists of three parties:
• Group manager (GM). It is assumed that GM is a trusted party. GM initializes
all group signature parameters, one group public key, one group manager secret
key and group member secret keys. GM also manages a revocation list which
includes revoked users.
• Verifier (V). V checks only signed messages by a group public key and if user
is on the revocation list or not.
• User (U). U, who correctly joins into a group, can sign any message by his/her
group member secret key and send it to V.
7.3 Description of Protocol 1
In this section, the proposed protocol is outlined. The protocol consists of five main
phases: setup, join, sign, verify and open. The protocol is based on BS04 group
signature scheme [23] and it is enhanced on the efficient group signature scheme
with time-bound secret keys with batch verification.
7.3.1 Setup Phase of Protocol 1
In the setup algorithm Setup(𝜆) → (𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠, 𝑔𝑝𝑘, 𝑔𝑚𝑠𝑘), GM sets group
signature parameters, group public key and group manager secret key as follows:
• Based on the length of the security parameter 𝜆, the group signature param-
eters 𝐺1, 𝐺2, 𝑔1, 𝑔2,𝜓, 𝑒 are established since 𝑔1 = 𝜓(𝑔2) if 𝑒(𝜓(𝑔2), 𝑔1) ̸= 1.
• GM generates the group manager secret key 𝑔𝑚𝑠𝑘 = (𝛾) where 𝛾 𝑅← 𝑍𝑝.
• The group public key 𝑔𝑝𝑘 = (𝑔1, 𝑔2, 𝑤) is published where 𝑤 = 𝑔𝛾2 .
7.3.2 Join Phase of Protocol 1
In the join algorithm, the i-th user U𝑖 joins into a group which is managed by a group
manager GM. The join algorithm Join(𝑅𝐿, 𝑔𝑝𝑘, 𝑔𝑚𝑠𝑘) → 𝑔𝑠𝑘𝑈𝑖 is performed
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between GM and U𝑖 as follows:
• Based on the variable values such as the length of revocation list, the repu-
tation of U𝑖 etc., the group manager decides about the duration of expiration
date 𝜏𝑖 for the group member secret key 𝑔𝑠𝑘𝑈𝑖 .
• GM encodes the expiration date 𝜏𝑖 by the 1-Encoding: {𝜏𝑖𝑗}𝑗∈[1,𝑙] ←1-Enc(𝜏𝑖)
where 𝑙 is the length of date format.
• For (𝑗 = 0; 𝑗 ≤ 𝑙; 𝑗 + +), GM computes 𝐴𝑖𝑗 = 𝑔
1
𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑥𝑖+𝛾
1 , where 𝑥𝑖𝑗
𝑅← 𝑍*𝑝 and
𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑥𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾 ̸= 0
• GM sends user’s group member secret key 𝜏𝑖, {𝐴𝑖𝑗, 𝑥𝑖𝑗}, the group public key
and public parameters via secured connection to user (e.g. via TLS). The
revocation token 𝜏𝑖, {𝑥𝑖𝑗} is saved.
• U𝑖 encodes the expiration date 𝜏𝑖 by the 1-Encoding: {𝜏𝑖𝑗}𝑗∈[1,𝑙] ←1-Enc(𝜏𝑖)
and checks 𝑒(𝐴𝑖𝑗, 𝑤𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑔𝑥𝑖𝑗2 ) = 𝑒(𝑔1, 𝑔2) for each 𝑗 ∈ {1, 2, ..., 𝑙} if 𝑔𝑠𝑘𝑈𝑖 is valid.
7.3.3 Signing Phase of Protocol 1
Every user U𝑖 who wants to send a new message to a verifier has to sign the message.
Every U𝑖 has a member secret key 𝑔𝑠𝑘𝑈𝑖 = 𝜏𝑖, {𝐴𝑖𝑗, 𝑥𝑖𝑗} and a group public key
𝑔𝑝𝑘 = (𝑔1, 𝑔2, 𝑤). U𝑖 signs a message 𝑀 ∈ (0,1)* and outputs the signature of
knowledge 𝜎 = (𝑡𝑐𝑢𝑟, 𝑘, 𝑇1, 𝑇2, 𝑐, 𝑠𝛼, 𝑠𝑥, 𝑠𝛿, 𝑅2).
The Signing algorithm Sign(𝑀, 𝑔𝑠𝑘𝑈𝑖 , 𝑔𝑝𝑘, 𝑡𝑐𝑢𝑟) → 𝜎 is performed by U𝑖 as
follows:
1. U𝑖 checks if his/her 𝑔𝑠𝑘𝑈𝑖 is not expired by 𝑡𝑐𝑢𝑟 < 𝜏𝑖, where 𝑡𝑐𝑢𝑟 is a current
date (e.g. a current month or a current date in format ’YYMMDD’ as in [54])
or the date of the signature expiration. If 𝑡𝑐𝑢𝑟 ≥ 𝜏𝑖, the algorithm halts.
2. The dates are converted into intersection check by the 0/1-Encoding: {𝜏𝑖𝑗}𝑗∈[1,𝑙]
←1-Enc(𝜏𝑖) and {𝑡𝑗}𝑗∈[1,𝑙] ←0-Enc(𝑡𝑐𝑢𝑟) where 𝑙 is the length of date format
used.
3. The index 𝑘 ∈ {1, 2, ..., 𝑙} is found such that 𝜏𝑖𝑘 = 𝑡𝑘 and the pair of 𝐴𝑖𝑘, 𝑥𝑖𝑘
from 𝑔𝑠𝑘𝑈𝑖 is selected.
4. U𝑖 chooses random elements 𝛼, 𝑟𝛼, 𝑟𝑥, 𝑟𝛿 ∈ 𝑍*𝑝 .
5. U𝑖 computes the group signature by the following steps:
Firstly, U𝑖 sets
(𝑢, 𝑣) = 𝐻0(𝑀, 𝑔𝑝𝑘, 𝑡𝑐𝑢𝑟), (7.1)
where 𝐻0 is two-dimensional hash function, mapping {0,1}* to 𝐺22. Then, the
user computes the images in 𝐺1 by
(𝑢, 𝑣) = 𝜓(𝑢, 𝑣) (7.2)
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pseudonyms by
𝑇1 = 𝑢𝑥𝑖𝑘 , 𝑇2 = 𝐴𝑖𝑘𝑣𝛼, (7.3)
helper values by
𝛿 = 𝛼𝑥𝑖𝑘, (7.4)
𝑅1 = 𝑢𝑟𝑥 ,
𝑅2 = 𝑒(𝑇2, 𝑔2)−𝑟𝑥𝑒(𝑣, 𝑔2)𝑟𝛿 𝑒(𝑣, 𝑤)𝑟𝛼𝜏𝑖𝑘 =
𝑒(𝑇−𝑟𝑥2 𝑣𝑟𝛿 , 𝑔2) 𝑒(𝑣, 𝑤)𝑟𝛼𝜏𝑖𝑘 ,
𝑅3 = 𝑇 𝑟𝛼1 𝑢−𝑟𝛿 ,
(7.5)
a challenge value by
𝑐 = 𝐻(𝑔𝑝𝑘, 𝑡𝑐𝑢𝑟,𝑀, 𝑇1, 𝑇2, 𝑅1, 𝑅2, 𝑅3), (7.6)
and response values by
𝑠𝛼 = 𝑟𝛼 + 𝑐𝛼,
𝑠𝑥 = 𝑟𝑥 + 𝑐𝑥𝑖𝑘,
𝑠𝛿 = 𝑟𝛿 + 𝑐𝛿.
(7.7)
6. U𝑖 sends the message𝑀 with the signature 𝜎 = (𝑡𝑐𝑢𝑟, 𝑘, 𝑇1, 𝑇2, 𝑐, 𝑠𝛼, 𝑠𝑥, 𝑠𝛿, 𝑅2).
7.3.4 Verification Phase of Protocol 1
The verifier (V) verifies messages received from pseudonymous users. V checks the
group signature, the time validity of the signature and if a pseudonymous user who
signed the received message is not in a Revocation List (RL).
Individual Verification
The Individual verification algorithm InVerify (𝑀, 𝑔𝑝𝑘, 𝜎, 𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑡, 𝑅𝐿)→ valid/invalid
is performed by V as follows:
1. The time validity of the signature is checked by 𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑡 > 𝑡𝑐𝑢𝑟, if yes then the
algorithm halts. To continue the algorithm, the value 𝑡𝑐𝑢𝑟 must be equal or
newer than actual date 𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑡 measured by verifier.
2. The date 𝑡𝑐𝑢𝑟 is converted into the intersection check by the 0-Encoding:
{𝑡𝑗}𝑗∈[1,𝑙] ←0-Enc(𝑡𝑐𝑢𝑟) and by 𝑘 from the signature is found 𝑡𝑘.
3. V restores 𝑢, 𝑣:
(𝑢, 𝑣) = 𝐻0(𝑀, 𝑔𝑝𝑘, 𝑡𝑐𝑢𝑟), (7.8)
where 𝐻0 is a two-dimensional hash function, mapping {0,1}* to 𝐺22. Then,
the user computes the images in 𝐺1 by
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(𝑢, 𝑣) = 𝜓(𝑢, 𝑣) (7.9)
4. V restores 𝑅1 and 𝑅3:
𝑅1 = 𝑢𝑠𝑥𝑇−𝑐1 , 𝑅3 = 𝑢−𝑠𝛿𝑇 𝑠𝛼1 . (7.10)
5. V computes a new control hash 𝑐′ from the received parameters:
𝑐′ = 𝐻(𝑔𝑝𝑘, 𝑡𝑘,𝑀, 𝑇1, 𝑇2, 𝑅1, 𝑅2, 𝑅3).
and checks if 𝑐′ = 𝑐. If yes, then V continues with the verification, otherwise
the message is inconsistent and is refused.
6. V checks if
𝑅2 = 𝑒(𝑇2, 𝑔2)−𝑠𝑥𝑒(𝑣, 𝑤)(𝑡𝑘𝑠𝛼)
𝑒(𝑣, 𝑔2)(𝑠𝛿)(𝑒(𝑔1, 𝑔2)𝑒(𝑇2, 𝑤𝑡𝑘)−1)𝑐
= 𝑒(𝑇−𝑠𝑥2 𝑣𝑠𝛿𝑔𝑐1, 𝑔2)𝑒(𝑣𝑠𝛼𝑇−𝑐2 , 𝑤𝑡𝑘)
(7.11)
7. The signed message is valid if Equations 7.11 hold.
8. The verification phase continues by a revocation check in the following sub-
section.
Revocation Check
The verifier opens the actual revocation list 𝑅𝐿 =(𝜏𝑖, {𝑥𝑖𝑗}) containing 𝑟 revoked to-
kens where 𝑗 ∈ [1, 𝑙] (𝑙 is the length of the date format used) and 𝑖 ∈ [1, 𝑟] to check if
the signed message is received from a revoked or an unrevoked user. The Revocation
check algorithm RevCheck(𝑅𝐿, 𝜎) → revoked/unrevoked is performed as fol-
lows:
• For each 𝑖-pair of 𝜏𝑖, {𝑥𝑖𝑗}, V recomputes by the 1-Encoding: {𝜏𝑖𝑗} ←1-Enc(𝜏𝑖)
and find an index 𝑚 (1 ≤ 𝑚 ≤ 𝑙) such that 𝜏𝑖𝑚 = 𝑡𝑘, selects 𝑥𝑖𝑚 from RL and
checks if
𝑇1 = 𝑢𝑥𝑖𝑚 . (7.12)
• If Equation 7.12 holds then user’s signed message will be discarded because
the 𝑖-th user with 𝑥𝑖𝑚 has been revoked by GM.
If a new user is revoked then GM sends to verifiers the refreshed revocation list.
Further, every verifier discards old records with obsolete pairs 𝜏𝑖, {𝑥𝑖𝑗} to reduce the
length of RL.
Batch Verification
If V receives more messages in one short period then V verifies these signed messages
in one batch.
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The Batch Verification algorithmBatchVerify(𝑀1,𝑀2, ..,𝑀𝑛, 𝜎1, 𝜎2, .., 𝜎𝑛,
𝑔𝑝𝑘, 𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑡, 𝑅𝐿)→ valid/invalid.
V uses 𝑔𝑝𝑘 = (𝑔1, 𝑔2, 𝑤) to verify 𝑛messages with 𝜎𝑧 = (𝑡𝑧𝑐𝑢𝑟, 𝑘𝑧, 𝑇𝑧1, 𝑇𝑧2, 𝑅𝑧2, 𝑐𝑧,
𝑠𝑧𝛼, 𝑠𝑧𝑥, 𝑠𝑧𝛿) for 𝑧 = 1, ..., 𝑛, does:
1. V checks the time validity (of a signature) by 𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑡 > 𝑡𝑧𝑐𝑢𝑟, if yes then the
algorithm aborts. To continue the algorithm, the value 𝑡𝑧𝑐𝑢𝑟 must be equal or
newer than actual date 𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑡 measured by the verifier.
2. The date 𝑡𝑧𝑐𝑢𝑟 is converted into intersection check by the 0/1-Encoding: {𝑡𝑧𝑗}𝑗∈[1,𝑙]
←0-Enc(𝑡𝑧𝑐𝑢𝑟) and by 𝑘𝑧 from the signature is found 𝑡𝑧𝑘.
3. V restores 𝑢𝑧, 𝑣𝑧:
(𝑢𝑧, 𝑣𝑧) = 𝐻0(𝑀𝑧, 𝑔𝑝𝑘, 𝑡𝑧𝑐𝑢𝑟) (7.13)
where 𝐻0 is a two-dimensional hash function, mapping {0,1}* to 𝐺22. Then,
the user computes the images in 𝐺1 by
(𝑢𝑧, 𝑣𝑧) = 𝜓(𝑢𝑧, 𝑣𝑧) (7.14)
4. V restores 𝑅𝑧1 and 𝑅𝑧3:
𝑅𝑧1 = 𝑢𝑠𝑧𝑥𝑧 𝑇−𝑐𝑧𝑧1 , 𝑅𝑧3 = 𝑢−𝑠𝑧𝛿𝑧 𝑇 𝑠𝑧𝛼𝑧1 , (7.15)
5. V computes a new control hash 𝑐′𝑧 from the received parameters:
𝑐′𝑧 = 𝐻(𝑀𝑧, 𝑔𝑝𝑘, 𝑡𝑧𝑐𝑢𝑟, 𝑇𝑧1, 𝑇𝑧2, 𝑅𝑧1, 𝑅𝑧2, 𝑅𝑧3),
and checks if 𝑐′𝑧 = 𝑐𝑧. If yes, then V continues with the verification, otherwise
the message with the signature is inconsistent and is refused.
6. V randomly selects 𝜃1, 𝜃2, ..., 𝜃𝑛 ∈ 𝑍𝑝 with 𝑙𝑏 bit, checks the batch if
𝑧=𝑛∏︁
𝑧=1
𝑅𝜃𝑧𝑧2 = 𝑒(
𝑧=𝑛∏︁
𝑧=1
(𝑇−𝑠𝑧𝑥𝑧2 𝑣𝑠𝑧𝛿𝑧 𝑔𝑐𝑧1 )𝜃𝑧 , 𝑔2)
𝑒(
𝑧=𝑛∏︁
𝑧=1
(𝑇 𝑐𝑧𝑧2𝑣−𝑠𝑗𝛼𝑧 )𝜃𝑗 ,
𝑧=𝑛∏︁
𝑧=1
(𝑤𝑡𝑧𝑘))
(7.16)
7. The batch with signed messages is valid if Equations 7.16 hold.
8. V performs Revocation check algorithm to ensure that there are no mes-
sages from already revoked users.
It can be noted from Equations 7.11 and 7.16 that the individual verification costs
2 pairing operations per one message but the batch verification costs only 2 pairing
operations per 𝑛 messages.
In case the batch verification is valid, then all messages from the batch are valid.
In case the batch verification fails, then the divide-and-conquer approach is used to
identify the invalid signatures that can be discarded. At the end of the divide-and-
conquer approach, the final two messages are individually verified.
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7.3.5 Open Phase of Protocol 1
GM stores revocation tokens 𝜏𝑖, {𝑥𝑖𝑗} of all users. Every correctly signed message
𝑀 with the group signature 𝜎 and the group public key can be opened by GM. User
index 𝑖 which is connected with a user ID stored in a database can be revealed by
Revocation check algorithm. If the revealed user has still the unexpired group
member secret key then GM puts this user onto the revocation list and send refreshed
RL to verifiers.
7.4 Evaluation and Results of Protocol 1
This section evaluates the proposed protocol and compares it with the related work.
Further, an experimental implementation and initial results of the scheme are out-
lined. The proposed scheme is based on the BS04 scheme [23] and inherits all
security assumptions of [23].
GS scheme: Designed
scheme
BS04 [23] CLHZ12
[54]
NF07 [131] BP11 [28]
Batch: yes no no
Length of sig-
nature:
2𝐺1, 𝐺𝑇 , 4𝑍𝑝
(2059 bits)
2𝐺1, 5𝑍𝑝
(1192 bits)
4𝐺1, 5𝑍𝑝
(1549bits)
3𝐺1, 6𝑍𝑝
(1533 bits)
5𝐺1, 𝜆+6𝑍𝑝
(23301 bits)
Verification of 𝑛 messages with 𝑟 revoked users in RL:
Pairings 2 3𝑛 + 2𝑛𝑟 7𝑛 2𝑛 + 2𝑛𝑟 1𝑛
Exponentiation 10𝑛+ 1𝑛𝑟 6𝑛 13𝑛 + 1𝑛𝑟 6𝑛 3𝑛𝜆+1𝑛𝑟+5𝑛
Multiplication 9𝑛+1 6𝑛+1𝑛𝑟 9𝑛 6𝑛+1𝑛𝑟 2𝑛𝜆+8𝑛
Signing:
Pairings 2 2 5 1 1
Exponentiation 8 8 12 7 16
Multiplication 9 9 10 8 10+𝜆
Tab. 7.1: Performance Evaluation of VLR Group Signature Schemes - Signing and
Verification Phases.
7.4.1 Evaluation and Comparison
The protocol is evaluated in the main phases: signing and verification which includes
revocation. Table 7.1 depicts the comparison of the protocol with related solutions
BS04 [23], CLHZ12 [54], NF07 [131] and BP11 [28]. To be noted that the verification
of 𝑛 messages also includes the revocation check of 𝑟 revoked users. Assuming that 𝑝
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Fig. 7.1: Performance of Verification for 1 Signature.
is a 170-bit prime, the length of elements in 𝐺1 is 171 bits and the length of elements
in 𝐺𝑇 is 1020 bits. The protocol uses the date format for 255 months (21 years)
formed in an offset since the setup of system. Then, the date format and index 𝑘
take only 11 bits (8 bits for date, 3 bits for index 𝑘). The designed scheme produces
2059-bit signatures. Comparing with the revocation token used in CLHZ12 [54]
which has 14 elements, the revocation token has only 8 elements in the protocol. In
BP11 scheme [28], the size of 𝜆 is 80 which afflicts the length of a signature (23301
bits). Due to the batch verification applied in the protocol, the verification takes
only 2 pairings per 𝑛 messages.
7.4.2 Experimental Results
To obtain initial results, the proposal have been implemented as a proof of concept
application in JAVA. The main core of the experimental implementation is formed by
the group signature scheme that uses the Java Pairing Based Cryptography (jPBC)
Library1. The implementation employs the MNT curves type D with the embedding
degree 𝑘 = 6, the 171-bit order of curves and the pre-generated parameters d840347-
175-161.param. The implementation is tested on a machine with Intel(R) Xeon(R)
CPU X3440 @ 2.53GHz, 4 GB Ram, Windows 7 Professional. In the scheme, the
1(available on http://gas.dia.unisa.it/projects/jpbc/index.html)
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Fig. 7.2: Performance of Verification with 50 Revoked Users.
signing phase of one message takes approx. 120 ms and one verification with empty
RL takes 132 ms. The revocation check with one revocation token in the list takes
5,1 ms. In Figures 7.1 and 7.2, the performance of the verification phase of the
scheme and related schemes is depicted. The Figure 7.1 shows the performance of
verification of 1 signature with growing the number of revoked users. The Figure 7.2
depicts the performance of verification with the size of RL |RL| = 50 with growing
the number of signatures. Figures 7.1 and 7.2 confirm that the verification phase
in the protocol is more efficient than the verification phase in the related schemes
for a variable number of messages and revoked users. The proposed protocol is
approximately twice more efficient than the CLHZ12 scheme [54].
7.5 Summary of Chapter 7
The chapter presents the GS scheme with VLR using a natural expiration that can be
useful for many applications without back unlikability. The proposed protocol can
be applied in services used by the middle-sized groups of users who are off-line. The
protocol uses the batch verification to enhance the performance in the verification
phase. Hence, verifiers are able to check more signatures at once and save their
computational overhead. According to the experimental results, the protocol is
more efficient than the related schemes in the verification for the various number of
signed messages and revocation tokens placed in the revocation list.
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8 PROTOCOL 2: PAIRING BASED GROUP
SIGNATUREWITH CATEGORIZED BATCH
VERIFICATION
To fulfill the goal of this thesis, this chapter presents a cryptographic protocol that
ensures privacy and security in ad hoc networks where the heterogeneous devices
such as smartphones, embedded devices and servers are used. Protocol 2 is based on
pairing-based group signatures and a categorized batch verification. The protocol
ensures the privacy protection of users during data communication and protects
data integrity and authenticity. The first version of the protocol has been presented
in the conference paper [114]. The extended version has been accepted to publish as
the journal paper (IF=1.027) in [123]. The protocol is based on the group signature
scheme BBS04 [20]. The proposed solution provides the efficient signing phase and
the verification phase. The group signature scheme is designed to keep a long-
term unlinkability to ensure user privacy and a short-term linkability to increase
the performance of the scheme. Due to a batch verification and the short-term
linkability, it is possible to verify many signed messages in one batch. The batch
verification reduces the number of bilinear pairing operations 𝑒 from 𝑛*𝑘 to 𝑙, where
𝑛 is the number of messages, 𝑘 is the number of bilinear pairing operations during
an individual message verification and 𝑙 is the number of bilinear pairing operations
during the batch verification. In practice, the parameter 𝑙 is usually lower than 𝑘.
The batch verification can be computed by equations (8.1) and (8.2), where 𝑓𝑖, ℎ𝑖, 𝑐𝑖
are parameters (points on a elliptic curve) for each 𝑖 message from the total number
of messages 𝑛, and, 𝐴 is a constant (eg. 𝐴 = 1).
𝑒(
𝑛∏︁
𝑖=1
𝑓𝑖
𝑐𝑖 , ℎ𝑖) = 𝐴 (8.1)
𝑛∏︁
𝑖=1
𝑒(𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖 , ℎ𝑖) = 𝑎 →
𝑛∏︁
𝑖=1
𝑒(𝑓𝑖, ℎ𝑖)𝑐𝑖 = 𝐴 (8.2)
On the other hand, if a message in the batch is invalid, the computational com-
plexity of the batch verification, which is linear in case of presence 𝑛 valid messages,
degrades to logarithmic. If a message is invalid, then the batch verification is also
invalid. The batch is split to two batches that are verified again separately. This
procedure is performed until all invalid messages are detected.
Security solutions must be as efficient as possible, especially, in real time VANET
applications. In urban areas, vehicular ad hoc networks work with large number of
users and messages. The individual verification of group signature can take few tens
of milliseconds on an embedded device which serves as an on-board computer in
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vehicles. If tens messages are verified at one time, the verification phase must be
very efficient and fast. Only the batch verification can provide this efficiency but
the messages must be valid in most cases.
The protocol in this chapter proposes efficient signing and verification phases to
satisfy demanded efficiency by real time VANET applications or large VANETs. Due
to the proposed short-term linkability property, it is able to reduce 3 bilinear pairing
operations, which is a common number in many related works and the scheme [20],
to 0 bilinear pairing operations, 10 exponentiation to 9 and 14 multiplication to 9 in
the signing phase. Moreover, the solution proposes a categorized batch verification
that is able to detect potential valid messages due to short-term linkability. Thus,
these messages are processed with a higher priority. The categorized verification can
also resist to some denial of service attacks and the Sybil attack [60].
8.1 Vehicular Ad hoc Network Security
Vehicular network security plays a key role in situations such as the generation of
bogus and/or malicious messages, misusing at roads, eavesdropping etc. Common
solutions, e.g., [83], [145] guarantee the message integrity, authentication and non-
repudiation. Furthermore, privacy is required due to the possibility of drivers being
tracked by malicious observers. VANETs can serve in a urban traffic where hundreds
of vehicles communicate following the V2V or V2I paradigms, so that the security
overhead and computation time are minimal. There is a lot of solutions in VANETs
that are secure and keep users’ privacy. Nevertheless, privacy-preserving solutions
can be vulnerable against several denial of service attacks. The following scenario
demonstrates the current security problems which affect the solutions that provide
user privacy in VANETs.
Scenario 1 : A driver, Alice (A), with the car no. 2, which is depicted in Fig.8.1,
records special events (accidents, traffic jams, roads under construction etc.). De-
pending on the type of event, A immediately broadcasts a warning message through
the wireless V2V communication to all the cars which form the VANET. In this
scenario, an accident is depicted in Fig.8.1. Let us assume that another driver,
Bob (B), with car no. n-1, who is in range and coming closer to A, receives this
message. B also receives more messages from other cars in the area. Moreover,
other messages can contain contradictory warnings or malicious/bogus information.
In a short time, B must consider the validity of these messages and quickly decide
changing the route (from planed I. to II.). If B makes the right decision, he can
avoid the situation referenced by the first warning message. It is obvious that the
decision must come in real time and as soon as possible. Nevertheless, the received
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Fig. 8.1: VANETs in Urban Traffic - Scenario 1.
messages are from anonymous nodes so B may wonder which messages are coming
from honest sources and which are not. The protocol designed in this chapter is
based on the employment of a group signature scheme which adds new properties,
namely, the short-term linkability and the categorized batch verification. Due to
these properties, A can sort out known honest and malicious messages and perform
a verification process faster.
8.2 Preliminaries of Protocol 2
This section describes basic parties, the communication pattern, requirements and
the cryptography background of Protocol 2.
8.2.1 Parties in Proposed Solution
The solution consists of a Trusted Authority (TA), a Group Manager (GM), a user
(U) and a Vehicle (V).
• TA issues certified member pseudonyms and generates all public cryptographic
parameters in the solution. TA is a fully trusted entity in the model and
can reveal the real identity of a member (ID) in the revocation phase. TA is
securely connected with all group managers (e.g. via Transport Layer Security)
and manages the registration of all members.
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• GM is an entity which generates group secret keys to members in the join
phase. In the solution, it is assumed that GM is managed by a service
provider. GM broadcasts messages in the I2V communication. These mes-
sages are signed by GM. GM can also trace and open the malicious messages
in its own area but it cannot reveal the user ID.
• U is a user with ID. After the registration of the user in TA, U obtains the cer-
tified pseudonym. Then, U can join the VANET with a vehicle. Furthermore,
U can report a bogus message through the V2I communication to GM.
• V is a vehicle representing a user (driver) and user devices (e.g. smartphones,
navigations, vehicle’s OBU, ...). After joining the GM’s area through V2I
communication, the vehicle can broadcast and receive messages through the
V2V communication or V2I-I2V communication. These messages are signed
by a group signature key and verified by a batch or simple verification.
8.2.2 Communication Pattern
In this communication pattern (see Figure 8.2), a user U (specifically his/her vehicle
V) can broadcast signed messages to other users/vehicles by inter-vehicle communi-
cation V2V using short/medium distance communication technologies e.g. Wimax,
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ZigBee IEEE 802.15.4 or Bluetooth IEEE 802.15.1, more details can be found in
[176]. It is assumed that the user owns an On Board Unit (OBU) ensuring mainly
wireless communication in the V2V connection. The electronic element used to pro-
cess data and interact with OBU can be an external user personal device such as
a smartphone or a navigation device. These devices usually have enough compu-
tational power for basic modular arithmetic, pairing and cryptographic operations.
The use of these elements and devices reduces the overall costs of the VANET ar-
chitecture.
Furthermore, U can send signed messages via infrastructure connection V2I, en-
suring a long-distance mobile radio communication technology e.g. GSM, 3G/4G
mobile networks using Internet connection IPv4/IPv6. Road Side Units (RSU) are
substituted by existing Base Transceiver Stations (BTS) in GSM or nodes B in 3G
networks. Several VANET applications operating with long distances, e.g. monitor-
ing traffic congestion or accidents, send signed messages via a V2I-I2V connection.
For better efficiency of the V2I-I2V connection and fast switching of areas, the mech-
anisms of data aggregation and data dissemation, described in [163], can be adapted
into a central switch server. These mechanisms are ensured by a service provider that
issues VANET applications and navigation services. The service provider manages
several group managers for specific areas. GMs are securely connected to a shared
database. GMs may act as routers for incoming messages transmitted via the V2I-
I2V connection. Every GM is able to verify messages received via the V2I connection
while maintaining user privacy. Then, GMs send these messages to vehicles in cer-
tain areas. These messages can be signed by a GM private key and easily verified
by a GM public key.
Every GM controls a specific area and releases one group public key (gpk) for
this area. If a vehicle crosses different boundaries and receives messages from the
neighboring area, then the vehicle determines which messages are sent from a neigh-
boring area due to the fingerprint of gpk in these messages. The vehicle can use the
group public key of the neighboring area that is stored in a device memory. The
group public keys of the area and neighboring areas are obtained if the vehicle enters
a new area.
8.2.3 Requirements
The proposed protocol is designed to satisfy the following security and practical
requirements:
• Privacy (Revocable Anonymity). The protocol protects driver’s privacy
in a long term. An honest driver U with a VANET device and OBU can use the
pseudonym signed by TA to obtain group parameters and keys from GM. Then,
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its OBU can sign every message on behalf of the group members and keep
drivers’ anonymity. Every malicious driver can be revealed by the collaboration
of GM and TA. If some member breaks the rules, his/her messages can be
opened by GM and his/her pseudonym is sent to TA, which can extract the
member’s ID. Next time, when an adversary requests a new pseudonym with a
fresh time stamp (e.g. via IETF RFC 3161), TA checks if his/her ID appears
in the list of globally revoked members.
• Non-repudiation, Message Integrity and Authenticity. In the V2V
communication, the group signature ensures that a message is signed by a ve-
hicle which holds the right and fresh group key pair (authenticity). The system
must verify the received messages, i.e., the messages that have not been mod-
ified once they have been sent (integrity). Members stay private but can not
deny that they created the signed messages (non-repudiation).
• Short-term Linkability. In several VANET applications like the safe chang-
ing of road lanes and the short-term mapping of vehicle movements, the short-
term linkability is a desirable property [157]. In a short period, i.e., every
100÷300 ms, broadcasted V2V beacon messages are used to trace the vehi-
cle’s position and direction. The current proposals which use group signatures
cannot link related messages from one vehicle sent in a short interval. Pro-
tocol 2 balances the privacy of drivers and the linkability of messages, which
is available only for a short interval. On the other hand, long-term unlink-
ability is ensured by using the probabilistic encryption and by changing the
pseudonyms in the group signature, e.g., in the V2I-I2V communication.
8.2.4 Cryptography Background
Protocol 2 employs the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [93]
as a signature scheme with the public/private keys of TA, GM, V. Petit and Mam-
meri [140] investigate the authentication algorithm ECDSA in vehicular networks,
and processing delay of verification takes around 5 ms for ECDSA with P-256 bit
curves measured on a Pentium D 3.4GHz workstation. Additionally, a probabilistic
ElGamal encryption/decryption is used during the join of members. The modified
short group signature WLZ scheme [169], based on the BBS04 scheme [20] is used
in the V2V communication. This scheme uses bilinear maps and it is based on the
q-SDH problem and the Decision Linear problem, which have been studied in [20].
These problems are described in Section 4.2.
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Tab. 8.1: Notation Used in Protocol 2.
𝐴𝑖 the part of a member secret key 𝛼 a random element ∈ 𝑍*𝑝
𝛽 a random element ∈ 𝑍*𝑝 𝑐 a hash value in the group signature
/ self-challenge 𝑐 𝑅← 𝑍𝑞
𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑖 users’ certificate signed by TA 𝛿 a commitment value in a signature
𝑒() a pairing operation 𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑝𝑘𝑇𝐴 a ElGamal encryption by TA
𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑝𝑘𝑈𝑖 a ElGamal encryption by U 𝑓 the fingerprint of a group public
key
𝑔1 a generator of 𝐺1 𝑔2 a generator of 𝐺2
𝐺1 a multiplicative cyclic group of a
prime order 𝑝
𝐺2 a multiplicative cyclic group of a
prime order 𝑝
𝑔𝑚𝑠𝑘𝐺𝑀𝑘 a group manager secret key 𝑔𝑝𝑘𝐺𝑀𝑘 a group public key
GRL Global Revocation List 𝑔𝑠𝑘𝑉𝑖 a group member secret key
GTRL Group Temporary Revocation List 𝛾 a random element ∈ 𝑍*𝑝
ℎ a random element ∈ 𝐺*1 𝐻 a hash function
𝑐ℎ a challenge 𝑐 𝑅← 𝑍𝑞 𝐼𝐷𝑈𝑖 a user ID
𝑘 a counter value 𝑙 the security length of parameters
𝑀 a message 𝜇 a commitment value in a signature
𝜋𝑈𝑖 the user certificate issued by TA 𝑝𝑖 a temporary result of the pairing
𝑝𝑘𝐺𝑀𝑘 an ElGamal public key of GM 𝑝𝑘𝑇𝐴 an ElGamal private key of TA
𝑝𝑘𝑈𝑖 an ElGamal private key of a user 𝑟 random elements ∈ 𝑍*𝑝
𝑅𝑖 a commitment value in a signature 𝑠 elements in signature∈ 𝑍𝑞
𝑠𝑖𝑔𝐺𝑀𝑘 an ECDSA private key of GM 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑇𝐴 an ECDSA private key of TA
𝑠𝑘𝐺𝑀𝑘 an ElGamal private key of GM 𝑠𝑘𝑇𝐴 an ElGamal private key of TA
𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑈𝑖 an ECDSA private key of a user 𝑠𝑘𝑈𝑖 an ElGamal private key of a user
𝜎 the product of a group signature 𝑇𝑖 pseudonyms in a signature
TL Temporary List 𝑇𝑙 a time stamp
𝜃 random elements ∈ 𝑍𝑝 𝑢 the element of a group public key
𝑣 the element of a group public key 𝑣𝑒𝑟𝐺𝑀𝑘 an ECDSA public key of GM
𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑇𝐴 an ECDSA public key of TA 𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑖 an ECDSA public key of a user
𝑤 the element of a group public key W a validity value
𝑥𝑖 the element of a group member se-
cret key
𝑍𝑝 the (set of) p-adic integers
𝑍𝑞 the (set of) q-adic integers - -
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8.3 Description of Protocol 2
This section describes the phases of Protocol 2. The notation used is described in
Table 8.1. The solution focuses on the practical registration and join of VANET
members and the efficient signing/verification of V2V and V2I-I2V messages. The
protocol consists of seven phases: Setup, Registration, Join, Signing, Categorized
Verification, Trace, Revocation.
8.3.1 Setup Phase of Protocol 2
In the setup phase Set(0, 1)𝑙 → 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠, TA chooses parameters (𝐺1, 𝐺2, 𝑔1, 𝑔2,
𝜓, 𝑒) and generates an ECDSA key pair 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑇𝐴/𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑇𝐴, an ElGamal private key 𝑠𝑘𝑇𝐴
and a public key 𝑝𝑘𝑇𝐴. It then releases the public keys and parameters. GMs gener-
ate group signature keys, ElGamal private 𝑠𝑘𝐺𝑀𝑘 , an ECDSA key pair 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝐺𝑀/𝑣𝑒𝑟𝐺𝑀
and public 𝑝𝑘𝐺𝑀𝑘 keys for the secure V2I communication and publish public keys.
Every GM𝑘 randomly selects 𝑟1, 𝑟2 ∈ 𝑍*𝑝 , ℎ ∈ 𝐺*1 and sets 𝑢, 𝑣 ∈ 𝐺*1 such that
𝑢𝑟1 = 𝑣𝑟2 = ℎ. Then, GM𝑘 selects random 𝛾 ∈ 𝑍*𝑝 and computes 𝑤 = 𝑔𝛾2 . The
group public key is 𝑔𝑝𝑘𝐺𝑀𝑘 = (𝑔1, 𝑔2, 𝑢, 𝑣, 𝑤, ℎ) and the group manager secret key is
𝑔𝑚𝑠𝑘𝐺𝑀𝑘 = (𝑟1, 𝑟2).
8.3.2 Registration Phase of Protocol 2
In the registration phase Reg(𝐼𝐷𝑈𝑖)→ 𝜋𝑈𝑖, the i-th user (member) U𝑖 using a ve-
hicle V𝑖 with OBU requests a valid certified pseudonym 𝜋𝑈𝑖 from TA. First, the
user follows an off-line registration step to get the signed certificate 𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑖 . After this
process, U𝑖 owns her 𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑖 and he/she can perform the on-line registration step to
get her pseudonym, which has an expiration time.
Off-line Registration
For the first time, TA must physically verify the driver’s real ID, his/her driving
license and OBU’s ID number. U𝑖 then creates an ECDSA key pair 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑈𝑖/𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑖 ,
gives the public key to TA, which stores (𝐼𝐷𝑈𝑖 , 𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑖) in the database, and the
signed certificate 𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑖 = 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑇𝐴(𝐼𝐷𝑈𝑖 , 𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑖) is given to V𝑖.
On-line Registration
After a successful off-line registration process, the driver can request his/her pseudonym
online. Assuming that U𝑖 has 𝑝𝑘𝑇𝐴, 𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑇𝐴, the two-message of the registration phase
consists of these steps:
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1. U𝑖 self-generates ElGamal key pair (𝑠𝑘𝑈𝑖/𝑝𝑘𝑈𝑖) and sends the encrypted re-
quest 𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑝𝑘𝑇𝐴(𝑝𝑘𝑈𝑖||𝐼𝐷𝑈𝑖 || 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑈𝑖(𝑝𝑘𝑈𝑖)) to TA.
2. TA decrypts the request and checks if 𝐼𝐷𝑈𝑖 is not revoked in Global Re-
vocation List (GRL), the certificate 𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑖 and the user’s signature, which ensures
user’s authenticity and commits the 𝑝𝑘𝑈𝑖 in the certificate with a new ElGamal
key pair. Then, TA generates a challenge 𝑐ℎ 𝑅← 𝑍𝑞, a time stamp 𝑇𝑙 and sends
the encrypted response 𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑝𝑘𝑈𝑖 (𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑝𝑘𝑇𝐴(𝐼𝐷|| 𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑖 ||𝑐ℎ)||𝑇𝑙|| 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑇𝐴(𝑇𝑙||𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑝𝑘𝑇𝐴(𝐼𝐷||
𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑖 ||𝑐ℎ)||𝑝𝑘𝑈𝑖)) back to U𝑖. Finally, U𝑖 checks the signature by TA and composes
the pseudonym 𝜋𝑈𝑖 = 𝑝𝑘𝑈𝑖 ||𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑝𝑘𝑇𝐴(𝐼𝐷||𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑖 ||𝑐ℎ)||𝑇𝑙|| 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑇𝐴(𝑇𝑙||𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑝𝑘𝑇𝐴(𝐼𝐷||𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑖||
𝑐ℎ)||𝑝𝑘𝑈𝑖) and stores it.
8.3.3 Join Phase of Protocol 2
In the Join phase Join(𝜋𝑈𝑖)→ 𝑔𝑠𝑘𝑉𝑖 , 𝑔𝑝𝑘𝐺𝑀𝑘 , a vehicle V𝑖 with the user U𝑖 entering
the 𝑘-th GM𝑘 area for the first time, requests the group public key and his/her
group member secret key. Let H () be a hash function and let the two-message join
phase consist of these steps:
1. V𝑖 sends 𝜋𝑈𝑖 = 𝑝𝑘𝑈𝑖 ||𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑝𝑘𝑇𝐴(𝐼𝐷||𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑖 ||𝑐ℎ)||𝑇𝑙|| 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑇𝐴(𝑇𝑙||𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑝𝑘𝑇𝐴(𝐼𝐷||𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑖||𝑐ℎ)
||𝑝𝑘𝑈𝑖) ,which is encrypted using 𝑝𝑘𝐺𝑀𝑘 , to GM𝑘.
2. GM𝑘 decrypts 𝜋𝑈𝑖 using 𝑠𝑘𝐺𝑀𝑘 , verifies 𝜋𝑈𝑖 , which is signed by TA and controls
if 𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑝𝑘𝑇𝐴(𝐼𝐷||𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑖 ||𝑐ℎ) is not in the Group Temporary Revocation List (GTRL)
and the validity of the time stamp 𝑇𝑙. If 𝜋𝑈𝑖 is fine, GM creates 𝑔𝑠𝑘𝑉𝑖 = (𝑥𝑖, 𝐴𝑖),
where 𝑥𝑖 = 𝐻(𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑝𝑘𝑇𝐴(𝐼𝐷|| 𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑖||𝑐ℎ)||𝑇𝑙||𝛾), 𝐴𝑖 = 𝑔
1
𝑥𝑖+𝛾
1 , and stores (𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑝𝑘𝑇𝐴(𝐼𝐷||
𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑖 ||𝑐ℎ), 𝐴𝑖, 𝑇𝑙) to the join table and sends 𝑣𝑒𝑟𝐺𝑀𝑘 , 𝑔𝑝𝑘𝐺𝑀𝑘 , the group public keys
of neighboring areas and 𝑔𝑠𝑘𝑉𝑖 encrypted using 𝑝𝑘𝑈𝑖 to V𝑖.
To be noted that ElGamal encryption/decryption is probabilistic. Due to this
fact, an observer can not link two or more encrypted messages if V𝑖 requests 𝑔𝑠𝑘𝑉𝑖
for the second time.
8.3.4 Signing Phase of Protocol 2
The Signing phase Sig(𝑀, 𝑔𝑠𝑘𝑉𝑖 , 𝑔𝑝𝑘𝐺𝑀𝑘) → 𝜎 applies the modified short group
signature WLZ scheme [169], which is based on the BBS04 scheme [20]. A counter
𝑘 is included in the OBUs, a member secret key 𝑔𝑠𝑘𝑉𝑖 = (𝑥𝑖, 𝐴𝑖) and a group public
key 𝑔𝑝𝑘𝐺𝑀𝑘 = (𝑔1, 𝑔2, ℎ, 𝑢, 𝑣, 𝑤). OBU signs a message 𝑀 ∈ {0,1}* and outputs the
signature of knowledge 𝜎 = (𝑇1, 𝑇2, 𝑇3, 𝑅2, 𝑅3, 𝑅5, 𝑐, 𝑠𝛼, 𝑠𝛽, 𝑠𝑥, 𝑠𝛿, 𝑠𝜇).
If 𝑘 = 0, V𝑖 generates 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝑟𝛼, 𝑟𝛽, 𝑟𝑥, 𝑟𝛿, 𝑟𝜇 ∈ 𝑍*𝑝 , and
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computes
𝑇1 = 𝑢𝛼, 𝑇2 = 𝑣𝛽, 𝑇3 = 𝐴𝑖ℎ𝛼+𝛽,
𝛿 = 𝛼𝑥, 𝜇 = 𝛽𝑥,
(8.3)
𝑝1 = 𝑒(𝑇3, 𝑔2), 𝑝2 = 𝑒(ℎ,𝑤), 𝑝3 = 𝑒(ℎ, 𝑔2), (8.4)
stores 𝑇1, 𝑇2, 𝑇3, 𝛿, 𝜇, 𝑝1, 𝑝2, 𝑝3, and computes
𝑅1 = 𝑢𝑟𝛼 , 𝑅2 = 𝑣𝑟𝛽 , 𝑅3 = 𝑝𝑟𝑥1 · 𝑝−𝑟𝛼−𝑟𝛽2 · 𝑝−𝑟𝛿−𝑟𝜇3 ,
𝑅4 = 𝑇 𝑟𝑥1 𝑢−𝑟𝛿 , 𝑅5 = 𝑇 𝑟𝑥2 𝑣−𝑟𝜇 ,
(8.5)
𝑐 = 𝐻(𝑀,𝑇1, 𝑇2, 𝑇3, 𝑅1, 𝑅2, 𝑅3, 𝑅4, 𝑅5), (8.6)
𝑠𝛼 = 𝑟𝛼 + 𝑐𝛼, 𝑠𝛽 = 𝑟𝛽 + 𝑐𝛽, 𝑠𝑥 = 𝑟𝑥 + 𝑐𝑥,
𝑠𝛿 = 𝑟𝛿 + 𝑐𝛿, 𝑠𝜇 = 𝑟𝜇 + 𝑐𝜇.
(8.7)
Finally, V𝑖 increases the counter 𝑘++, computes the fingerprint 𝑓 of the group
public key by the hash function (e.i. SHA-256) and sends the message 𝑀 with the
signature 𝜎 = (𝑇1, 𝑇2, 𝑇3, 𝑅2, 𝑅3, 𝑅5, 𝑐, 𝑠𝛼, 𝑠𝛽, 𝑠𝑥, 𝑠𝛿, 𝑠𝜇, 𝑓).
If 𝛼 and 𝛽 are unchanged every n messages, the short-term linkability is kept
because the pseudonyms of group signature 𝑇1, 𝑇2, 𝑇3 are also unchanged. Thus,
for 𝑛 messages, when 1 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 𝑛 − 1, V𝑖 does not need to compute Equations 8.3,
8.4, contrary the WLZ scheme, but only generates random 𝑟𝛼, 𝑟𝛽, 𝑟𝑥, 𝑟𝛿, 𝑟𝜇 ∈ 𝑍*𝑝 and
computes Equations 8.5, 8.6 and 8.7. This reduces all 3 bilinear operations to 0, 10
exponentiations to 9, and 14 multiplications to 9. This mode is suitable for the fast
V2V communication where the short-term linkability is demanded. The concrete
VANET application can decide when to fix the counter 𝑘 = 0 and V𝑖 generates new
𝛼 and 𝛽 and recomputes the equations 8.3 and 8.4. This mode is suitable for the V2I
or V2I-I2V communication, where user privacy is more imported than the efficiency
of signing. It is worth mentioning that pairing equations 𝑝2, 𝑝3 are fixed and can be
precomputed only once.
8.3.5 Categorized Verification Phase of Protocol 2
The protocol uses a categorized verification which sorts the incoming signed messages
to three levels of credibility. Due to the short-term linkability, V𝑖 can keep the
Temporary List (TL) of known vehicles. Firstly, the received message𝑀𝑗 is checked
by V𝑖 if it contains a valid time stamp, real and consistent data. The precise value of
the time stamp, or a time window, depends on a concrete VANET application, used
communication technology, distance with specific latency etc. Furthermore, V𝑖 has
to check the fingerprint 𝑓 of the group public key in every received signature so that
all received signed messages are from one area with 𝑔𝑝𝑘𝐺𝑀𝑘 . Received messages with
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signatures that contain different fingerprints 𝑓 have to be verified by the different
and appropriate group public keys.
After that, the message with the group signature containing 𝑇3 is checked if 𝑇3
is in TL. If it holds, the recorded 𝑇3 with previous validity (W=1) is included and
sorted in the first batch. The validity W can be a boolean value which indicates
valid (W=1) or invalid (and unknown, W=0) signatures. If 𝑇3 is not in TL, the
signed message with the unknown 𝑇3 is sorted to the second batch which is verified
after the first batch verification. This category is formed by the messages sent via
the V2I-I2V communication. If OBU has enough time for message validation, the
rest of signed messages with 𝑇3 linked with W=0 are verified in the third batch at
the end of verification. This behaviour limits the effectiveness of Denial of Service
attacks where malicious cars try to use eavesdropped 𝑇3 and generate a lot of in-
valid signatures with known 𝑇3. This approach improves the efficiency of the batch
verification process and helps when an attacker, who is out of the group, generates
unsigned or corrupted messages.
Batch Verification
Batch verification Ver(𝑀𝑗, 𝑔𝑝𝑘𝐺𝑀𝑘 , 𝜎𝑗) → valid/invalid is investigated in [66], and
it verifies 𝑛 messages in one batch. V𝑖 uses 𝑔𝑝𝑘𝐺𝑀𝑘 = (𝑔1, 𝑔2, ℎ, 𝑢, 𝑣, 𝑤) to verify
messages 𝜎𝑗 = (𝑇𝑗1, 𝑇𝑗2, 𝑇𝑗3, 𝑅𝑗2, 𝑅𝑗3, 𝑅𝑗5, 𝑐𝑗, 𝑠𝑗𝛼, 𝑠𝑗𝛽, 𝑠𝑗𝑥, 𝑠𝑗𝛿, 𝑠𝑗𝜇) for 𝑗 = 1, ..., 𝑛.
V𝑖 restores 𝑅𝑗1 = 𝑢𝑠𝑗𝛼𝑇−𝑐𝑗1 , 𝑅𝑗4 = 𝑢−𝑠𝑗𝛿𝑇 𝑠𝑥𝑗1 , computes a new control hash 𝑐′𝑗 from
received parameters 𝑐′𝑗 = 𝐻(𝑀𝑗, 𝑇𝑗1, 𝑇𝑗2, 𝑇𝑗3, 𝑅𝑗1, 𝑅𝑗2, 𝑅𝑗3, 𝑅𝑗4, 𝑅𝑗5),
and checks if 𝑐′𝑗 = 𝑐𝑗. If yes, then V𝑖 continues with verification. Otherwise, the
message with the signature is inconsistent and it is refused.
V𝑖 randomly selects 𝜃1, 𝜃2, ..., 𝜃𝑛 ∈ 𝑍𝑝 with 𝑙𝑏 bit (the Small Exponent Test [14]),
checks batch if
𝑗=𝑛∏︁
𝑗=1
𝑅
𝜃𝑗
𝑗3 = 𝑒(
𝑗=𝑛∏︁
𝑗=1
(𝑇 𝑠𝑗𝑥𝑗3 ℎ−𝑠𝑗𝛿−𝑠𝑗𝜇𝑔
−𝑐𝑗
1 )𝜃𝑗 , 𝑔2)
𝑒(
𝑗=𝑛∏︁
𝑗=1
(𝑇 𝑐𝑗𝑗3ℎ−𝑠𝑗𝛼−𝑠𝑗𝛽)𝜃𝑗 , 𝑤)
(8.8)
and if
1𝐺1 = (𝑅𝑗5𝑅𝑗2)−𝜃𝑗𝑇
𝜃𝑗𝑠𝑗𝑥−𝜃𝑗𝑐𝑗
𝑗2 𝑣
(𝑠𝑗𝛽−𝑠𝑗𝜇)𝜃𝑗 . (8.9)
The signed message is valid if Equations 8.8 and 8.9 hold. All 𝑇3s from new valid
signed messages are added to TL with W=1. In case that the batch verification
fails, the divide-and-conquer approach is used to identify the invalid signatures that
were added to TL with W=0. The honest messages keep the mark W=1.
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Individual Verification
The Individual Verification phase Ver(𝑀, 𝑔𝑝𝑘𝐺𝑀𝑘 , 𝜎)→ valid/invalid is used at the
end of the divide-and-conquer approach where the final two messages are individually
verified.
V𝑖 restores 𝑅1 = 𝑢𝑠𝛼𝑇−𝑐1 , 𝑅4 = 𝑢−𝑠𝛿𝑇 𝑠𝑥1 , computes new control hash 𝑐′ from received
parameters 𝑐′ = 𝐻(𝑀,𝑇1, 𝑇2, 𝑇3, 𝑅1, 𝑅2, 𝑅3, 𝑅4, 𝑅5), and checks if 𝑐′ = 𝑐. If it is
equal, V𝑖 then continues with the verification. Otherwise, the message is inconsistent
and it is refused.
Then, V𝑖 checks if
𝑅3 = 𝑒(𝑇3, 𝑔2)𝑠𝑥𝑒(ℎ,𝑤)(−𝑠𝛼−𝑠𝛽)𝑒(ℎ, 𝑔2)(−𝑠𝛿−𝑠𝜇)
(𝑒(𝑇3, 𝑤)𝑒(𝑔1, 𝑔2)−1)𝑐
(8.10)
and
1𝐺1 = (𝑅5𝑅2)−1𝑇 𝑠𝑥−𝑐𝑥2 𝑣(𝑠𝛽−𝑠𝜇). (8.11)
The signed message is valid if equations 8.10 and 8.11 hold.
It is obvious from Equations 8.8 and 8.10 that the individual verification has a cost of
5 pairing operations per one message but the batch verification costs only 2 pairing
operations per 𝑛 messages. This is the main reason the individual verification is not
used and it is proposed to use the categorized batch verification.
In some long-distance VANET applications, GMs may act as routers for incoming
messages transmitted via V2I-I2V communication. In this case, GM𝑘 receives the
messages and verifies their signatures, signs the valid ones using its own private
ECDSA key 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝐺𝑀𝑘 , and finally submits them to all the users in a certain 𝑘-area.
Then, these users can easily verify the signature issued by GM𝑘 using the public
ECDSA key 𝑣𝑒𝑟𝐺𝑀𝑘 .
8.3.6 Trace Phase of Protocol 2
In Trace phase Trace(𝑀,𝜎, 𝑔𝑚𝑠𝑘𝐺𝑀𝑘)→ 𝑔𝑠𝑘𝑉𝑖 , 𝜋𝑈𝑖 every bogus signed message can
be opened by GM𝑘 using the group manager secret key 𝑔𝑚𝑠𝑘𝐺𝑀𝑘 = (𝑟1, 𝑟2). Bogus
messages are messages with correct signatures that carry malicious content which
can cause problems in traffic. GM𝑘 extracts the part of the member secret group key
𝑔𝑠𝑘𝑉𝑖 → 𝐴𝑖 = 𝑇3/(𝑇 𝑟11 ·𝑇 𝑟22 ) and searches the record (𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑝𝑘𝑇𝐴(𝐼𝐷||𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑉𝑖 ||𝑐), 𝐴𝑖, 𝑇𝑙) in
the database. The part of the member pseudonym can be sent to TA for revocation.
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8.3.7 Revocation Phase of Protocol 2
In the Revocation phase Rev(𝜋𝑈𝑖) → 𝐼𝐷𝑉𝑖 , a member can be revoked. When
there are serious circumstances, e.g., an accident, a malicious member is revoked
globally by the cooperation of GM𝑘 and TA. GM𝑘 is able to open a message
and extract the member pseudonym that is sent to TA. TA broadcasts 𝑟𝑒𝑣 =
(𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑝𝑘𝑇𝐴(𝐼𝐷||𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑉𝑖 ||𝑐), 𝑇𝑙)|| 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑇𝐴(𝑟𝑒𝑣) to other active GMs which check the sig-
nature and store 𝑟𝑒𝑣 to own GTRLs until the lifetime of this pseudonym expires.
TA extracts 𝐼𝐷𝑉𝑖 and adds it to GRL so that the malicious member can not refresh
his/her pseudonym in the next registration phase.
8.4 Security Analysis of Protocol 2
In the following parts, the adversary model and the possible attacks the proposed
protocol has to be robust against is detailed. These attacks are related to the security
requirements which must be fulfilled by the proposed protocol, namely: revocable
anonymity, message integrity and message authenticity.
8.4.1 Adversary Model
This attacker model considers an adversary who can control vehicles and can also
access communication lines to capture, modify and retransmit messages. In this
way, he/she can be a purely external attacker and also an internal one. In any
case, his/her computational power does not permit the adversary to break current
computationally secure cryptosystems.
Regarding the other entities of the proposed system, the Trusted Authority (TA)
is managed by some governmental organization such as the traffic authority of each
country. Therefore, this entity is fully trusted. Regarding the Group Managers
(GMs), these elements are assumed to be managed by some company that partici-
pates in the system as a service provider. In this way, GMs are expected to follow
the proposed protocol in an honest way (i.e., they will not tamper with messages,
drop them, etc) but they may try to retrieve the real identities of the users who use
the VANET. Gathering real identities and other personal data may report significant
economical benefits to the company in charge [2] and it is an explicit privacy threat.
Therefore, they are covered in the proposed adversary model as passive attackers
that uniquely try to break the privacy of the legitimate users. In this way, they will
not participate in any other kind of an attack. Moreover, the RSUs which are used
by the GMs to communicate with the vehicles of the VANET are assumed to be
tamper-proof elements which cannot be compromised by external attackers.
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The attacks that can be performed by the considered adversaries are summarized
in the following text. They can be broadly divided into passive and active attacks:
• Passive attacks. They only require the attacker to have access to the commu-
nication lines. Their main purpose is to jeopardize the privacy of the users by
compromising the confidentiality and/or unlinkability of the submitted mes-
sages. Specifically, those attacks are:
– Eavesdrop messages transmitted between 𝑉𝑖 and 𝑇𝐴 in the Online Reg-
istration step.
– Eavesdrop messages transmitted between 𝑉𝑖 and 𝐺𝑀 in the Join step.
– Eavesdrop messages transmitted between 𝑇𝐴 and 𝐺𝑀 .
– Trace the V2V/V2I messages sent by a certain user.
– Retrieve the real identity of a certain user in the Join step.
• Active attacks. These attacks are based on tampering with valid messages,
submitting fake ones, etc. Their main purpose is to get some benefit or simply
disrupt the normal execution of the proposed protocol. This kind of attacks
generally compromise the integrity and/or the authenticity of the submitted
messages. Specifically, the proposed protocol should be strong against:
– Tamper with messages transmitted between 𝑉𝑖 and 𝑇𝐴 in the Online
Registration step.
– Tamper with messages transmitted between 𝑉𝑖 and 𝐺𝑀 in the Join step.
– Tamper with V2V/V2I messages sent by legitimate vehicles.
– Tamper with messages transmitted between 𝑇𝐴 and 𝐺𝑀 .
– Generate a fake but valid pseudonym.
– Allow unauthorized users to generate fake but valid V2V/V2I messages.
– Launch a DoS attack against the vehicles of the VANET.
– Reuse former messages to perform replay attacks.
– Use the anonymity provided by the scheme to misbehave without being
traced.
8.4.2 System’s Behaviour against the Considered Attacks
The next part explains how the proposed protocol deals with the attacks which have
been introduced above. Note that some of these attacks may be covered together in
the same subsection.
Eavesdrop Messages Transmitted during the Different Steps of the Pro-
tocol
First, it is focuses on the messages transmitted between 𝑉𝑖 and 𝑇𝐴 in the Online Reg-
istration step. In this case, 𝑉𝑖 sends a request (𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑝𝑘𝑇𝐴(𝑝𝑘𝑈𝑖 ||𝐼𝐷𝑈𝑖||𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑈𝑖(𝑝𝑘𝑈𝑖))) in
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order to get a new pseudonym and 𝑇𝐴 answers with a response (𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑝𝑘𝑈𝑖 (𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑝𝑘𝑇𝐴(𝐼𝐷
||𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑖||𝑐ℎ)||𝑇𝑙||𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑇𝐴(𝑇𝑙 ||𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑝𝑘𝑇𝐴(𝐼𝐷|| 𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑖 ||𝑐ℎ)||𝑝𝑘𝑈𝑖))). Both messages are en-
crypted using the ElGamal cryptosystem (nowadays this cryptosystem is considered
to be secure [164]) and, hence, the attacker is unable to decrypt them and get
the transmitted data because decryption requires the knowledge of the secret keys
𝑠𝑘𝑈𝑖 and 𝑠𝑘𝑇𝐴. These keys are only known by the legitimate user and the trusted
authority, respectively.
Similarly, the attacker cannot get the data transmitted between 𝑉𝑖 and 𝐺𝑀 in
the Join step because these messages are also encrypted using the ElGamal cryp-
tosystem. In this case, the secret keys that are needed to obtain the sensitive
information are 𝑠𝑘𝑈𝑖 and 𝑠𝑘𝐺𝑀𝑘 . Both keys are only known by the legitimate user
and the contacted group manager. Note that, as explained previously, group man-
agers are controlled by a service provider and, hence, they are expected to behave
honestly.
Finally, the attacker cannot disclose any information from the messages sent
between the trusted authority and the different group managers due to the fact that
these communications are always secured using TLS.
Trace the V2V/V2I Messages Sent by a Certain User
Vehicles apply the modified short group signature WLZ scheme [169] to sign the
V2V/V2I messages that they submit. Group signatures generated under this scheme
contain the group members’ pseudonyms 𝑇1, 𝑇2, 𝑇3 which are a linear encryption of
members’ secret key 𝐴𝑖 and random 𝛼 and 𝛽. The short-term linkability property
of the messages does not violate the drivers’ privacy. When the counter 𝑘 is set
to 0 and 𝑉𝑖 generates new values for 𝛼 and 𝛽, the new generated signatures are
unlinkable with the former ones because they contain new values for 𝑇1, 𝑇2 and 𝑇3.
Retrieve the Real Identity of a Certain User in the Join step
This attack is based on retrieving the real identity of a certain user from its pseudonym
𝜋𝑈𝑖 in the Join step. Note that this attack can only be performed by the 𝐺𝑀 that is
expected to receive the message because 𝜋𝑈𝑖 is encrypted using its ElGamal public
key 𝑝𝑘𝐺𝑀 .
Pseudonym 𝜋𝑈𝑖 contains the identity of the user (ID) encrypted with the ElGamal
public key 𝑝𝑘𝑇𝐴, which is only known by 𝑇𝐴. Therefore, 𝐺𝑀 cannot retrieve the real
ID. Nevertheless, 𝐺𝑀 is capable of linking all the request messages that contain the
same 𝜋𝑈𝑖 . In order to minimize this issue, the user should update 𝜋𝑈𝑖 with a certain
frequency (following the Online Registration step).
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Tamper with Messages Transmitted during the Different Steps of the
Protocol
Focusing on the messages transmitted between 𝑉𝑖 and 𝑇𝐴 in the Online Registra-
tion step, message integrity and authenticity are ensured by the ECDSA signature
scheme. The request message contains the member public key 𝑝𝑘𝑈𝑖 signed with the
ECDSA signature key 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑈𝑖 . Assuming that both the ECDSA signature scheme and
the hash function in use are secure, if the request message is modified in any way,
the ECDSA verification process will detect this situation.
Messages transmitted between 𝑉𝑖 and 𝐺𝑀 in the Join step also ensure integrity
and authenticity. First, 𝑉𝑖 submits its pseudonym, which is signed by the 𝑇𝐴 using
the ECDSA signature scheme. Then, 𝐺𝑀 sends to 𝑉𝑖 its assigned group member
secret key 𝑔𝑠𝑘𝑉𝑖 = (𝑥𝑖, 𝐴𝑖). The use of a hash function to compute 𝑔𝑠𝑘𝑉𝑖 together
with the use of ElGamal cryptosystem to encrypt the message provide integrity and
authenticity.
Regarding the V2V/V2I messages sent by the vehicles, those elements are signed
and verified employing the modified short group signature WLZ scheme [169]. This
approach ensures message authenticity and integrity to those messages.
Finally, the attacker cannot tamper with the data exchanged between the trusted
authority and the different group managers due to the integrity and authenticity
properties provided by the use of TLS.
Generate a Fake but Valid Pseudonym
If the attacker wants to create a valid pseudonym 𝜋𝑈𝑖 , he/she needs the ECDSA
private key 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑇𝐴. This secret key is only known by the 𝑇𝐴 and, hence, the attacker
cannot obtain it to launch this attack.
It is worth mentioning that if an illegal 𝜋𝑈𝑖 is sent to a legitimate user, he/she
can use the 𝑇𝐴’s public ECDSA key 𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑇𝐴 to verify its validity.
Allow Unauthorized Users to Generate Fake but Valid V2V/V2I Mes-
sages
The attacker can launch this attack by signing a new fake message on behalf of
a group of legitimate users or by modifying a message signed and submitted by
a legitimate user.
The signing and verification phases employ short group signatures with the short-
term linkability to ensure message authenticity and integrity. As explained previ-
ously, the protocol applies the modified short group signature WLZ scheme [169]
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and inherits all its security features. As a result, only the group manager 𝐺𝑀𝑖 and
the valid group members 𝑈𝑖 can sign a message on behalf of the group.
If an attacker without the valid 𝑔𝑠𝑘𝑉𝑖 = (𝐴𝑖, 𝑥𝑖) is willing to modify a certain
message, he/she must recompute the hash 𝑐 and some signature parts. Assuming
that the hash function is secure and that the Discrete Logarithm problem holds,
computing (𝑠𝑗𝛼, 𝑠𝑗𝛽, 𝑠𝑗𝑥, 𝑠𝑗𝛿, 𝑠𝑗𝜇) without knowing 𝑥𝑖 is considered unfeasible. If
this proof of knowledge is incorrectly computed, equations 8.8, 8.9 and 8.10, 8.11
will not hold during the verification step.
Launch a DoS Attack against the Vehicles of the VANET
The attacker can launch a DoS attack by broadcasting a large number of bogus
messages containing fake pseudonyms and signatures. This attack can be more
effective if several attackers collaborate on this purpose (note that, a Sybil attack
can be considered to achieve this).
As a result of this attack, legitimate users will be flooded with a large amount
of messages and they will not be able to process all of them. The straightforward
solution for this situation is to discard some of the received messages (or all of
them). The problem of this approach is that some of these discarded messages can
be legitimate warnings of some dangerous situation. In order to prevent it, the
proposed protocol implements a categorized batch verification step.
In this way, a honest user has a Temporary List (TL) of other known and honest
drivers, which uses the short-term linkability property that keeps the pseudonym 𝑇3
of each signed message unchanged for a certain period of time. This user receives
messages and checks the TL to put the messages containing a known 𝑇3 in the first
batch of verification (the one with the highest priority). Messages with an unknown
pseudonym are stored in the second batch. Finally, potentially untrusted messages
(e.g., with validity 𝑊 = 0) are verified in the third batch only if verifier’s OBU has
free time and computational capacity to do it.
Reuse Former Messages to Perform Replay Attacks
Submitted messages contain a time stamp with current time and date. Before being
verified, the time stamp of each received message is checked. If an attacker without
the valid 𝑔𝑠𝑘𝑉𝑖 = (𝐴𝑖, 𝑥𝑖) is willing to reuse an old message with a valid signature,
he/she must refresh the time stamp and then recompute the hash 𝑐𝑗 and the sig-
nature (𝑠𝑗𝛼, 𝑠𝑗𝛽, 𝑠𝑗𝑥, 𝑠𝑗𝛿, 𝑠𝑗𝜇). Note that obtaining valid values for 𝑠𝑗𝑥, 𝑠𝑗𝛿 and 𝑠𝑗𝜇
without knowing 𝑥𝑖 is unfeasible under the Discrete Logarithm problem.
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Fig. 8.3: Process Flowchart of Signing.
Use the Anonymity Provided by the Scheme to Misbehave without Being
Traceable
The proposed protocol provides anonymity and unlinkability for drivers in front of
other vehicles and GMs. Nevertheless, this protection can be revoked if the 𝐺𝑀 of
the area and the 𝑇𝐴 collude. Since both entities are honest, this will be assumed
to happen only if the driver misbehaves.
If this is the case, each correct message submitted by a malicious member can be
opened by the 𝐺𝑀 using its group manager secret key 𝑔𝑚𝑠𝑘𝐺𝑀𝑘 . In this way, the
𝐺𝑀 extracts the part of the member secret group key 𝑔𝑠𝑘𝑉𝑖 → 𝐴𝑖 = 𝑇3/(𝑇 𝑟11 · 𝑇 𝑟22 )
and searches the record (𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑝𝑘𝑇𝐴(𝐼𝐷||𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑉𝑖 ||𝑐), 𝐴𝑖, 𝑇𝑙) in the database. Finally, the
part of the member pseudonym can be sent to the 𝑇𝐴 for retrieving the real ID.
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8.5 Experimental Implementation of Protocol 2
The proposed protocol has been implemented as a proof-of-concept in JAVA (PC)
and on the Android platform (smartphones). The main core of the experimental im-
plementations is formed by the group signature scheme that uses the Java Pairing
Based Cryptography (jPBC) Library1 in both test scenarios (jPBC on Java for the
PC version and wrapped jPBC on Android for the smartphone version). The imple-
mentation employs the MNT curves type D with the embedding degree 𝑘 = 6, the
171-bit order of curves and the pre-generated parameters d840347-175-161.param.
The registration and join phases use the ECDSA signature scheme and ElGamal
cryptosystem that are provided by the Bouncy castle Library 2. All ECDSA and
ElGamal keys can be inherited from class
org.bouncycastle.jce.provider.JDKKeyFactory. The 1024-bit ElGamal encryption
and the 256-bit ECDSA scheme with the SHA-1 hash function are employed.
In the signing phase, Fig. 8.3, a string of a message 𝑀𝑖, counter 𝑘, a member
secret key 𝑔𝑠𝑘 and a group public key 𝑔𝑝𝑘 input to the signing process. There are
two modes of signing: an initial signing mode and a normal signing mode. The
initial mode of signing is performed if 𝑘 = 0. The signature algorithm then com-
putes 𝑇1, 𝑇2, 𝑇3, 𝛿, 𝜇, 𝑝1, 𝑝2, 𝑝3, where 3 pairing operations are computed. This mode
is used in the V2I-I2V communication, respectively, in the long distance VANET
applications.
The normal mode of signing is performed if 1 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 𝑛 − 1 and the signature
algorithm uses the stored parameters 𝑇1, 𝑇2, 𝑇3, 𝛿, 𝜇, 𝑝1, 𝑝2, 𝑝3. 𝑀𝑖 is signed and the
signature 𝜎 with elements 𝑇1, 𝑇2, 𝑇3, 𝑅2, 𝑅3, 𝑅5, 𝑐, 𝑠𝛼, 𝑠𝛽, 𝑠𝑥, 𝑠𝛿, 𝑠𝜇 is produced. Then
the message 𝑀𝑖 containing the signature 𝜎 is sent. The normal mode is used in the
fast V2V communication,in the short distance VANET application respectively. The
proposed signing phase is depicted as a flowchart in more detail in Fig. 8.3.
A receiver (verifier) receives the𝑀𝑖 and checks the time stamp and consistency of
the message. Then, the receiver checks the validity of elements 𝑅1, 𝑅4, 𝑐′ and saves
the incoming 𝑀𝑖 to an input buffer. Messages are sorted out into three categories,
and 3 buffers, respectively. The sorting process is based on knowing the 𝑇3 of
incoming messages and the validity indicator𝑊 (a boolean type). Depending on the
permitted number of received messages and the maximal time limit of the verification
phase, the verifier starts to do the batch verification.
The categorized verification process outcomes the list of valid messages and up-
grades a temporary list with the elements 𝑇3 and 𝑊 . If𝑀𝑖 is valid, then 𝑊 is set to
true. Otherwise, if 𝑀𝑖 is invalid, then 𝑊 is set to false. The proposed categorized
1(avail. on http://gas.dia.unisa.it/projects/jpbc/index.html)
2(avail. on http://www.bouncycastle.org/resources.html)
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V2V scheme: Proposed
Scheme
WLZ scheme
[169]
GSIS [108] Zhang et al.
[179]
Ferrara et al.
[66]
Batch: yes yes no yes yes
Short-term link-
ability:
yes no no no no
Length of signa-
ture:
5𝐺1, 𝐺𝑇 , 5𝑍𝑝, 𝑓
(2636 bits)
5𝐺1, 𝐺𝑇 , 5𝑍𝑝
(2380 bits)
3𝐺1, 6𝑍𝑝
(1500 bits)
7𝐺1, 𝐺𝑇 , 5𝑍𝑝
(2570 bits)
3𝐺1, 𝐺𝑇 , 6𝑍𝑝
(2032 bits)
Performance of batch verification
Pairings 2 2 5n 2 2
Exponentiation 11n 11n 12n 14n 13n
Multiplication 11n+1 11n+1 8n 17n 10n+1
Performance of individual verification
Pairings 5 5 5 5 5
Exponentiation 10 10 12 12 12
Multiplication 9 9 8 8 8
Performance of initial mode signing / normal mode signing
Pairings 3 / 0 3 / 3 3 / 3 3 / 3 3 / 3
Exponentiation 12 / 9 10 / 10 12 / 12 12 / 12 12 / 12
Multiplication 12 / 9 14 / 14 12 / 12 12 / 12 12 / 12
Tab. 8.2: Comparison of Verification and Signing.
batch verification is depicted in more detail as a flowchart in Fig. 8.4. At the end
of the verification process, the valid messages are sent to VANET applications de-
pending on their time priority. The performance results of the implemented signing
and categorized verification phases are outlined in the following section.
8.6 Evaluation of Protocol 2
This section outlines a theoretical evaluation and comparison of the proposed proto-
col with the related VANET schemes which use group signatures, GSIS [108], Zhang
et al. [179] , Ferrara et al. [66] and the scheme of Wei et al. (WLZ scheme) [169].
This evaluation is independent from the used machine. In addition, the experimen-
tal implementation of the proposed protocol and the implementation of BBS group
signature scheme used in the related works are compared. The implementation of
the solution runs on two platforms, namely JAVA (PC) and the Android platform
(smartphones).
8.6.1 Theoretical Evaluation and Comparison
Generally, the time of bilinear pairing 𝑇𝑝 is considered the most expensive operation
(ten times more expensive than exponentiation operation 𝑇𝑒) and exponentiation
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is more expensive than multiplication 𝑇𝑚. The modular arithmetic operations like
addition and subtraction can be computed more efficiently than multiplication and
exponentiation as is in Chapter 6. Consequently, these fast operations in this per-
formance evaluation are omitted. In the proposed scheme, the initial signing mode
takes 3𝑇𝑝 + 12𝑇𝑒 + 12𝑇𝑚 and the normal signing mode takes only 9𝑇𝑒 + 9𝑇𝑚. The
computation complexity of the verification is linear and depends on the number 𝑛
of received messages. The verification takes 2𝑇𝑝+11𝑛𝑇𝑒+(11𝑛+1)𝑇𝑚 in the batch
verification mode, and 5𝑇𝑝 + 10𝑇𝑒 + 9𝑇𝑚 in the individual verification mode.
The signing phase of the proposed scheme costs less exponentiations than the
signing phase of the related schemes. Moreover, during the normal mode signing
of 𝑥 messages with short-term linkability, all operations are significantly reduced to
pairing (3 ⇒ 0), exponentiation (10 ⇒ 9) and multiplication (14 ⇒ 9).
The designed protocol based on the group signature scheme BBS04 [20] reaches
more efficient batch verification (2 𝑇𝑝 + 11n 𝑇𝑒) and individual verification (5 𝑇𝑝 + 10
𝑇𝑒) than the compared schemes. The results in Table 8.2 are not influenced by opti-
mization techniques apart from the batch verification. But the related solutions like
Zhang et al. [179], Ferrara et al. [66], the WS2010 scheme [168] and also the WLZ
scheme [169] use uncategorized batch verification that can be negatively affected by
malicious messages (≥ 15% from all messages). It is assumed that the proposed
protocol applies the categorized batch verification with the short-term linkability in
VANET for the first time. The categorized batch verification with the temporary
list of known vehicles reaches the high correctness of the important first batch in
case the bogus or damaged signed messages appear in the V2V communication. In
case a malicious driver Eve (E) starts the Sybil attack, which is a special kind of the
DoS attack, then she broadcasts bogus messages that contain fake pseudonyms and
signatures. Meanwhile, the honest drivers (C, D, F,...) send messages that contain
valid pseudonyms and signatures announcing an accident (sent by D) or a traffic
jam (sent by C). If existing solutions are used, E can flood the uncategorized batch
verification process and paralyze drivers who must discard some messages.
The proposed solution uses categorized batch verification. Driver Bob (B) has
a Temporary List (TL) of honest drivers. It is supposed that Bob’s TL keeps the
list of known and honest drivers like D, F,... using the property of the short-term
linkability, which keeps the pseudonym 𝑇3 unchanged for a short time (depends on
VANET applications). If B receives all messages, he checks the TL and collects
the messages containing known 𝑇3 to the first batch, and then B verifies them.
Therefore, the warning message referencing the accident from driver D is verified
in time. The messages with unknown pseudonyms like those from driver C are
collected to the second batch. The potentially untrusted messages from driver E
with validity 𝑊=0 are verified in the third batch only if Bob’s OBU has free time
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and computational capacity for this. If Eve tries to replay recent valid pseudonyms
together with false signatures, then the recomputed hash 𝑐′𝑗 is not equal to received
hash 𝑐𝑗 due to time stamps in messages. For this reason, Eve is not able to mount
a successful DoS attack against the batch verification of signatures.
8.6.2 Practical Comparison and Results
The JAVA implementation of the solution has been tested on a PC with Intel(R)
Xeon(R) CPU X3440 @ 2.53GHz, 4 GB Ram, Windows 7 Professional. The Android
implementation has been tested on two smartphones: Google Nexus S with CPU
Cortex-A8 @ 1 GHz and 512 MB Ram, and Samsung Galaxy S3 with CPU 4xCortex-
A9 @ 1.4 GHz and 1024 MB Ram.
Results of JAVA Implementation
The signing phase of the scheme is compared with the BBS scheme [20], which is also
used in the GSIS scheme [108] & Zhang et al. scheme[179] & Ferrara et al. scheme
[66] and the scheme of Wei et al. [169] (see Figures 8.5 and 8.6). The normal mode
of the proposed signing phase takes approximately 55 ms per 1 signing. This is more
efficient than the compared schemes based on the BBS scheme [20] taking approx.
165 ms per 1 signing, because the proposed solution reduced 3 pairing operations
to 0 pairings for 𝑛 messages in the signing phase. The initial mode of the designed
signing phase takes approx. 165 ms due to the same number of operation as BBS
scheme. This slowed mode is used in the long distance VANET applications where
the privacy must be kept and the time of data processing is not critical.
The performance of the Verification phase in the proposed protocol is more
efficient than related BBS schemes (see Figures 8.7 and 8.8). The verification of
a single signature takes approx. 207 ms using the proposed scheme, and approx.
224 ms using related schemes based on the BBS04 scheme. Figure 8.8 demonstrates
the efficiency of the batch verification. If the batch verification is employed, then
the verification of one signature takes only approx. 50 ms on average so the batch
verification of 10 signatures takes approx. 500 ms. Then, the verification of 6
signed messages takes approx. 300 ms. In the short distance VANET applications,
e.g. break alerts, the vehicle controls the nearest vehicles only in the front of its
direction. With the measured numbers and used hardware, the protocol can monitor
and verify the 6 signed messages from 6 vehicles that are in front of the receiving
vehicle. Assuming that the device that supports optimized cryptographic operations
like exponentiation, multiplication and pairings is used, then the protocol is able to
monitor and verify tens of cars in close distances. Moreover, due to the short-
linkability, the receiver sorts out the known and potentially honest signed messages.
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Results of Android Implementation
Moreover, the proposed protocol have been tested on two smart-phones, Google
Nexus S and Samsung Galaxy S3, which use the Android platform and support the
jPBC Library. Figures 8.9, 8.10 and 8.11 show their performance when signing and
verifying messages. These results reflect that the solution can effectively monitor
events related to long distance VANET applications, such as traffic jams, accidents,
on-road weather reports etc. Note that these messages are transmitted via V2I-I2V
connection.
Furthermore, a remarkable difference can be observed between the execution
time achieved by the two smartphones (Nexus S and Galaxy S3). The newer device
(Galaxy S3) has more computation power and, hence, it computes all the operations
faster. This is especially helpful to perform the signing step in a realistic period of
time and, hence, enable the proposal to be deployed in real environments. Regarding
the batch verification step, although a reasonable performance is obtained at this
point, this step should be executed in the OBUs for practicability.
It should be stressed that the Divide-and-conquer process can be used in those
cases when the batch verification fails due to the presence of a fake message. There-
fore, this algorithm can be used to split and process the messages until the fake one
is found. Moreover, aggregated messages can be computed and stored to avoid re-
computing them again if the verification fails. The cost of this process is logarithmic
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(𝑙𝑜𝑔2𝑁) and it still improves the cost of individual verification, which is (𝑁 + 1)/2.
Ferrara et al. show in [66] that the batch verification step of the BBS scheme can
be more efficient if fake messages are less than 15 %. The categorized verification
process which is proposed in the scheme minimizes the rate of fake messages in the
first priority batch.
8.7 Summary of Chapter 8
This chapter presents a comprehensive security solution of vehicular networks that
protects the driver’s privacy. The proposed cryptographic protocol focuses on users’
privacy while messages are transmitted between vehicles and between users and the
infrastructure. It is assumed that the infrastructure is maintained by a group man-
ager. Furthermore, the proposed protocol prevents the denial of service attacks,
which are a current problem of many secure and privacy-preserving proposals in
vehicular networks. The proposed verification is categorized. Thus, this categorized
verification is able to detect and remove some fake messages in the first stage and
the second stage processes less messages. The results of the experimental imple-
mentation on the PC point to the fact that the proposed security solution with
batch verification can be used in the short distance VANET applications which de-
mand a fast message verification. Smartphones have lower computational power
than PCs, so they could be used for processing long-distance VANET applications
because a small computational delay would not cause difficulties. It is assumed that
GM has a greater computational power than OBU or smartphones, and it can take
the responsibility of verifying the signatures transmitted via V2I-I2V communica-
tion. Moreover, the protocol is three times faster in signing than related schemes
due to the short-term linkability. In long distance VANET application, the protocol
keeps users’ privacy, guaranteeing that nobody can create a profile of them.
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9 PRIVACY-PRESERVING FRAMEWORK FOR
HETEROGENEOUS NETWORK
In this chapter, the privacy preserving cryptography framework applied in hetero-
geneous networks is proposed. The proposed solution deals with user privacy in
geosocial applications. The framework has been published as the journal paper (IF
0.311) in [117]. The solution uses the modification of the group signature scheme
based on the BBS04 scheme similarly like the protocol in the previous chapter.
9.1 Privacy in Geosocial Services
Geosocial applications have become very popular but can misuse user’s private data
and location. The proposed solution prevents tracking and protects against personal
identity and location being misused by external attackers or service providers. The
proposed framework provides security and privacy protection for geosocial applica-
tions that provide, for example, information sharing, geotagging and monitoring of
people without revealing their identity to unauthorized persons, including the service
provider. Unlike current security solutions in geosocial services, the designed solu-
tion uses advanced cryptography to secure user privacy. This protection is provided
by advanced group signatures ensuring data integrity, authenticity, non-repudiation
as well as strong privacy protection. This chapter outputs a detailed cryptographic
solution for the protection of privacy in geosocial services and its security analysis.
The proposed solution has also been implemented and the performance results are
outlined.
Emerging geosocial applications like geotagging, check-in-based services, social-
mapping services or user reviewing have come to be very popular with smartphone
users and can be useful in sharing information, from restaurant reviews to infor-
mation about disasters, e.g. an emerging epidemic, flood level, and so on. The
user position is usually used in geosocial services such as Foursquare, Yelp, Gowalla,
Facebook Places and so on. Users with their devices (smartphones, mobiles, laptops,
tablets,...) send and download data, broadcast notices and request the location-
based information. Nevertheless, the user authentication process which uses a user
identity suffers from the possibility of user identity misuse and unauthorized user
profiling.
These systems, which continuously track user’s location, can leak private infor-
mation into wrong hands. Due to this fact, the confidence in these systems decreases.
If geosocial services do not preserve privacy, there will always be the risk of misusing
the system, e.g. sending targeted ads or, in the worst case, kidnapping facilitated
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Fig. 9.1: Basic Scenario of Privacy-preserving Geosocial Applications.
by leaked position data. The situation can be changed by employing pseudonymous
authentication schemes. These schemes provide fundamental security requirements
like data integrity and authenticity as well as user privacy (by hiding identity infor-
mation) and the revocation of malicious users.
9.1.1 Basic Scenario
In Figure 9.1, the basic scenario of privacy-preserving geosocial applications is de-
picted. A service provider usually provides a geosocial service, e.g. Foursquare or
Yelp. Users can upload and share data such as their own reviews, photos or noti-
fications without disclosing their identity. On the other hand, the authenticity of
the data sent must be verified by the service provider or the user who obtains these
data. Further, the users usually download the requested data about their location
(space/area). These messages sent by users must be protected against disclosing
users’ identity to another party or eavesdroppers. Even the service provider is not
able to recognize during downloading who the concrete data are for. The users
in an area stay anonymous under their pseudonyms so they are pseudonymous. If
a dishonest user creates bogus data that have a negative impact on the users in the
geosocial service, then SP revokes their pseudonyms and blocks their next contribu-
tions to the geosocial service. In case a user repeatedly breaks the rules of SP, then
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SP requests the registration authority to reveal his/her ID and revokes the adversary
permanently. The problem of privacy protection and security must be addressed in
geosocial services where users share their data which contain sensitive and private
data.
One from main goals of this thesis is to develop and implement a secure and
efficient cryptographic protocol providing privacy to users. By using the proto-
col, geosocial services become more trustworthy and secure for users and providers.
Therefore, it is proposed a comprehensive privacy preserving framework that can
be employed in privacy-friendly geosocial applications (see the scenario in Figure
9.1). The designed solution maintains users in anonymity unless they break the
rules of the system and so the users are pseudonymous. Because some geosocial ser-
vices require exact locations, the obfuscation of user location, for example by spatial
cloaking, can compromise the utility of services. The proposed solution maintains
the exact locations of pseudonymous users. In this chapter, it is proposed a novel
framework that provides user pseudonymity and security designed for geosocial ap-
plications. The framework employs advanced cryptographic primitives considered
secure nowadays. User privacy is maintained as well as data authenticity, integrity
and confidentiality in both upload and download communication.
9.2 Privacy in Geosocial Services
Despite the current expansion of geosocial services on smartphones, there is no ap-
plication that protects user privacy and is robust as regards unauthorized profiling.
However, several theoretical proposals try to solve privacy in geosocial services. The
importance of user anonymity and privacy in on-line electronic services is investi-
gated in several works such as [96], [160], [92] and [171]. The work [148] surveys
the basic features of existing geosocial services and the privacy issues involved in
geosocial networks.
In this chapter, the features of popular geosocial services and user identity protec-
tion are outlined. Further, the authors consider that spatial and temporal cloaking
is not appropriate for some geosocial services. On the other hand, they claim that
encryption-based techniques could introduce additional system costs.
The work [98] investigates location privacy threats and countermeasures like
using anonymity, spatial and temporal degradation. The techniques using the spatial
and temporal degradation obfuscate the precise location of user and time data.
The recent techniques of anonymity like changing pseudonyms by mix zones [16],
dummy/fake positions [88], [95], anonymous attributes [77] or k-anonymity [159]
trade-off the tractability of the privacy against the accuracy of location. Further,
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the work [59] proposes to use different levels of granularity (the subset of RFC4119’s
civic location format). Users can blur the latitude and longitude coordinates by
a parameter of a specified magnitude. Nevertheless, approaches using an obfuscation
of the location are not suitable for the basic scenario, where the service provider
demands a precise localization. Due to this fact the approach based on encryption-
based techniques is more suitable to ensure privacy.
The paper [178] proposes a security mechanism including a key-exchange protocol
and a distributed content access authorization scheme not relying on servers and
trusted third parties. The authors use ECDH, MD5 and AES. First, the users must
establish a shared AES key by means of ECDH with an interlock mechanism that
protects against the MitM attack. This process takes 8 messages. Then, there is
a content key to secure a confidential group communication. The privacy of users
is protected by encryption messages and shared only among friends in the system.
This protection does not provide user privacy but only the privacy of their data.
The work [142] proposes a similar protection of user privacy in location-based social
applications. The proposal addresses the privacy protection of users (user groups)
by exchanging secret keys for symmetric cryptography. Another approach presented
in [126] is also based on symmetric cryptography and hash functions. The paper
focuses on the location privacy problem in proximity services. These concepts are
efficient but applicable only in some scenarios in geosocial applications where group
members must contact each other and establish a common secret key.
The paper [43] proposes a privacy preserving scheme of geolocation badge ser-
vices (e.g. Foursquare or Yelp). Blind signatures, an anonymizer (e.g. Tor), Quick
Response Codes (QR codes or 2D barcodes) and an anonymous authentication
scheme based on a zero knowledge method are used to verify the claimed loca-
tion and preserve user privacy at the same time. Nevertheless, the proposed scheme
is closely related to making check-ins, putting forward recommendations and col-
lecting prize badges. The locations and venues of honest users are anonymous. The
scheme protects the service provider against badges being counterfeited by malicious
users. Other privacy-preserving concepts based on cryptographic schemes usually
employ many bilinear pairing operations, such as in [103]. In practice, however, these
schemes are slow on some restricted devices like mobiles, since the bilinear pairing
operation is currently computationally very expensive (in the best case 7.5x more
expensive than exponentiation [151]) Due to this fact, it is important to optimize
schemes and use a minimum of pairing operations. The work [55] deals with the
implementation of a secure two-party computation for smartphones with an appli-
cation to a privacy-preserving interest-cast. The paper outlines a feasible framework
for smartphone environment and the implemented protocol called MobileFairPlay,
derived from the FairPlay framework [124]. The performance of the implemented
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MobileFairPlay scheme takes, however, as much as about 5 sec.
In this chapter, it is proposed a privacy-preserving security framework which is
convenient to implement on smartphones. Moreover, the solution does not use the
privacy approach with location obfuscation.
9.3 Privacy-Preserving Framework for Geosocial
Services
In this part, the proposed privacy-preserving framework for geosocial services is pre-
sented. The communication pattern of the solution, requirements and cryptographic
techniques used in the proposed framework are outlined. The framework focuses on
the practical and secure user registration and logging into a privacy preserving geoso-
cial service. The framework maintains security, user privacy and efficiency during
the upload and download of messages between users and a service provider.
9.3.1 System Model of Framework
The system model of the designed solution, which is depicted in Fig. 9.2, consists
of a Registration Authority (RA), a Service Provider (SP) and a User (U).
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• RA issues certified registration pseudonyms and can reveal the real identity
of a user in the permanent revocation phase. RA is securely connected with
a service provider and manages the registration of all users as a trusted third
party in the framework.
• SP manages geosocial applications and services in the framework. It is as-
sumed that SP is partly honest and is securely connected with the RA. SP
generates group secret keys and sends them to members in the logging phase.
SP is able to trace and open bogus messages. On the other hand, SP cannot
reveal the real user identity and cannot create the profiles of user behavior.
Nevertheless, SP issues the reputation of pseudonymous users and specifies
fees for users who break rules in geosocial services.
• U with the certified registration pseudonym can upload and download the
messages of geosocial applications. Before sending the messages, U has to
register with RA and log in to geosocial services that are managed by SP.
Further, U can report bogus messages to SP and help SP to track adversaries
in the environment of the geosocial service.
9.3.2 Security Requirements of Framework
The proposed framework meets these security requirements:
• Authenticity. In upload connection, the message signatures must be created
only by users who hold a valid and fresh group member secret key pair. In
download connection, the signature scheme provides that messages are signed
by the service provider who holds a private key.
• Non-repudiation Users or a service provider cannot deny that they created the
signed messages.
• Message Integrity. Messages cannot be modified once they have been sent.
• Message confidentiality. The framework offers message confidentiality as an
option in the encrypted upload connection and in the encrypted requested
download connection. The user can download confidential data from a ser-
vice provider and upload confidential data to a service provider. An attacker
cannot reveal the meaning of data without proper private keys. Message con-
fidentiality is ensured by probabilistic encryption/decryption.
• Pseudonymity (user privacy). An honest user U can use the registration
pseudonym signed by RA to obtain group signature parameters and keys from
a service provider. Then, U signs every upload message or request on behalf of
the group members. Nobody is able to reveal user identity from the messages
besides the RA and SP who collaborate.
• Message unlinkability. All messages, including identical messages, sent by the
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user to SP cannot be linked by other users and internal or external adversaries.
Message granularity protects against creating the profiles of users’ behaviors.
The pseudonyms of all group signatures are unique and random.
• Revocation. The solution protects user’s privacy. Nevertheless, every malicious
user is revealed due to the collaboration of SP and RA. If some user breaks
the rules, his/her messages are opened by SP. Then, depending on the contra-
vention, their pseudonym can be sent to RA, who is able to extract the user’s
identity. The next time an attacker tries to request a new pseudonym with
a fresh time stamp, RA checks if their identity is in the list of permanently
revoked users.
9.3.3 Cryptographic Components Used in Framework
The framework uses three main cryptographic components:
• A short group signature scheme to ensure privacy, authenticity, message
integrity and non-repudiation and unlinkability. A modified short group sig-
nature based on the BBS04 scheme [20] is used. This pairing-based scheme
ensures user pseudonymity in the upload and download connections of geoso-
cial applications. The scheme is based on the Decision Linear and q-SDH
problems, which are described in [20].
• A digital signature scheme to ensure authenticity, message integrity and
non-repudiation. The framework implements the ECDSA signature scheme
[93] with the public/private, i.e. verification/signature, keys of RA, SP and U.
ECDSA is employed in the logging and registration of users and in download
connection.
• A probabilistic encryption/decryption scheme to ensure message confiden-
tiality, message integrity and unlinkability. The framework uses the probabilis-
tic ElGamal encryption/decryption [164] during the logging and registration
of users and, additionally, in the encrypted download and upload connection.
9.4 Framework Phases
In this section, the framework phases are outlined. Every phase can contain one or
more processes that are defined in this section. Notation used in the framework is
summarized in Table 9.1. The framework consists of ten main phases:
• Initialization. RA, SP and U set up cryptographic parameters and keys.
• Registration. RA ⇐⇒ U: RA registers a user with installed geosocial applica-
tions.
• Logging. U ⇐⇒ SP: Users log in to a geosocial service issued by SP.
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Tab. 9.1: Notation Used in Framework.
⇐⇒ an encrypted bidirectional communica-
tion
←→ a bidirectional communication
=⇒ an encrypted one-way communication −→ a one-way communication
←˒ open user signature || concatenation
Name (in-
put) →
output
an algorithm definition 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖 actual data about areas
𝐴𝑖 a part of a member secret key 𝛼 a random element ∈ 𝑍*𝑝
𝛽 a random element ∈ 𝑍*𝑝 𝜒 an element of a group manager secret key
∈ 𝑍*𝑝
𝑐 a hash value in the group signature / self-
challenge 𝑐 𝑅← 𝑍𝑞
𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑖 users’ certificate signed by RA
𝛿 a commitment value in a signature 𝑒() a pairing operation
𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑝𝑘𝑅𝐴 an ElGamal encryption by RA 𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑝𝑘𝑈𝑖 an ElGamal encryption by U
𝜖 a signature by SP 𝛾 a secret element ∈ 𝑍*𝑝
𝑔1 a generator of 𝐺1 𝑔2 a generator of 𝐺2
𝐺1 a multiplicative cyclic group of a prime
order 𝑝
𝐺2 a multiplicative cyclic group of a prime
order 𝑝
𝑔𝑚𝑠𝑘 a group manager secret key 𝑔𝑝𝑘 a group public key
𝑔𝑠𝑘𝑈𝑖 a group member secret key ℎ a chosen element ∈ 𝐺*1
𝐻 a hash function 𝑐ℎ a challenge 𝑐 𝑅← 𝑍𝑞
𝐼𝐷𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎 an area ID 𝐼𝐷𝑈𝑖 a user ID
𝑀 a message 𝜇 a commitment value in a signature
𝑛 a number of signatures 𝜈 the element of a group manager secret key
∈ 𝑍*𝑝
𝜋𝑈𝑖 the user certificate issued by RA 𝑝𝑖 a temporary result of the pairing
𝑝𝑘𝑆𝑃 an ElGamal public key of SP 𝑝𝑘𝑅𝐴 an ElGamal private key of RA
𝑝𝑘𝑈𝑖 an ElGamal private key of a user PRL a Permanent Revocation List
Q a query 𝑟 a random reference number
𝑟𝛼, 𝑟𝛽 , 𝑟𝑥, 𝑟𝛿,
𝑟𝜇
a random elements ∈ 𝑍*𝑝 Res a response message
𝑅𝑖 a commitment value in a signature 𝑠 elements in signature∈ 𝑍𝑞
𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑆𝑃 an ECDSA private key of SP 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑅𝐴 an ECDSA private key of RA
𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑈𝑖 an ECDSA private key of a user 𝑠𝑘𝑆𝑃 an ElGamal private key of SP
𝑠𝑘𝑅𝐴 an ElGamal private key of RA 𝑠𝑘𝑈𝑖 an ElGamal private key of a user
𝜎 the product of a group signature 𝑇𝑖 pseudonyms in a signature
TRL a Temporary Revocation List 𝑡𝑙 a time stamp
𝜃 random elements ∈ 𝑍𝑝 𝑢 an element of a group public key
𝑣 an element of a group public key 𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑅𝐴 an ECDSA public key of RA
𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑃 an ECDSA public key of SP 𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑖 an ECDSA public key of a user
𝑤 an element of a group public key 𝑥𝑖 an element of a group member secret key
𝑍𝑝 the (set of) p-adic integers 𝑍𝑞 the (set of) q-adic integers
121
• Upload. U −→ SP: Users send signed messages to SP and SP verifies the
signed messages from the user.
• Encrypted Upload. U =⇒ SP: The Upload phase using the encryption and
decryption of confidential messages from users.
• Requested Download. SP←→ U: SP sends download data to users in response
to their request.
• Encrypted Requested Download. SP ⇐⇒ U: The Requested Download phase
using the encryption and decryption of confidential messages from SP.
• Multicast Download. SP −→ U: SP sends download data to the groups of users
without any requests.
• Temporary Revocation. SP ←˒ U: SP revokes a user who breaks the rules of
a geosocial service for a short time, without revealing his/her identity.
• Permanent Revocation. RA ⇐⇒ SP ←˒ U: RA collaborating with SP revokes
a user for a long time and reveals his/her identity.
The registration, logging and upload phases are based on the cryptographic en-
gine presented in [114] and are modified for use in geosocial services.
9.4.1 Initialization
The initialization phase generates all cryptographic parameters including public and
private keys.
• RA initializes the parameters (𝐺1, 𝐺2, 𝑔1, 𝑔2, 𝜓, 𝑒), generates an ECDSA key
pair 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑅𝐴/𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑅𝐴, an ElGamal private key 𝑠𝑘𝑅𝐴, and a public key 𝑝𝑘𝑅𝐴, and
releases the public keys and parameters.
• SP generates group signature keys, ElGamal private 𝑠𝑘𝑆𝑃 and public 𝑝𝑘𝑆𝑃
keys using for secure publishing the group user secret keys. To secure down-
load communication, SP generates an ECDSA key pair 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑆𝑃/𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑃 and re-
leases the public ECDSA key 𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑃 . To issue the group signature scheme,
SP randomly selects 𝜒, 𝜈 ∈ 𝑍*𝑝 , ℎ ∈ 𝐺*1. Then, SP sets 𝑢, 𝑣 ∈ 𝐺*1 such that
𝑢𝜒 = 𝑣𝜈 = ℎ and computes 𝑤 = 𝑔𝛾2 such that 𝛾 ∈ 𝑍*𝑝 is randomly selected.
The group public key is 𝑔𝑝𝑘 = (𝑔1, 𝑔2, 𝑢, 𝑣, 𝑤, ℎ) and the group manager secret
key is 𝑔𝑚𝑠𝑘 = (𝜒, 𝜈).
• Users create ECDSA key pairs 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑈𝑖/𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑖 to secure the registration and log-
ging phases.
9.4.2 Registration
In the registration phase, the i-th user U𝑖 installs a geosocial application on his/her
device and obtains the entry credential number (a serial number of installed appli-
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cation signed by SP) from SP. For the first time, RA must verify the user’s real
identity and his/her entry credential number (e.g. the serial number) obtained from
SP. Then, U𝑖 gives the ECDSA public key to RA, which stores (𝐼𝐷𝑈𝑖 , 𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑖) with
the entry credential number in the database. RA then signs and returns a certificate
𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑖 = 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑅𝐴(𝐼𝐷𝑈𝑖 , 𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑖) to U𝑖.
After successfully issuing the signed certificate, U𝑖 requests a valid registration
pseudonym 𝜋𝑈𝑖 from RA. It is assumed that U𝑖 has 𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑖 , 𝑝𝑘𝑅𝐴, 𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑅𝐴 containing the
user’s certificate, the public ElGamal key and the ECDSA key of RA, respectively.
The registration process Reg(𝐼𝐷𝑈𝑖)→ 𝜋𝑈𝑖 proceeds in these steps:
1. U𝑖 self-generates an ElGamal key pair (𝑠𝑘𝑈𝑖/𝑝𝑘𝑈𝑖) and sends the encrypted
request 𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑝𝑘𝑅𝐴(𝑝𝑘𝑈𝑖 ||𝐼𝐷𝑈𝑖 || 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑈𝑖(𝑝𝑘𝑈𝑖)) to RA using the public ElGamal key
of RA.
2. RA decrypts the ciphertext containing the request. Then, RA checks if the
𝐼𝐷𝑈𝑖 is not revoked and included in the Permanent Revocation List (PRL) and
checks the user’s signature, which ensures user’s authenticity. Finally, the 𝑝𝑘𝑈𝑖
in the certificate 𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑖 with a new ElGamal key pair are committed and a chal-
lenge 𝑐ℎ 𝑅← 𝑍𝑞 and a time stamp 𝑡𝑙 are generated and the encrypted response
𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑝𝑘𝑈𝑖 (𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑝𝑘𝑅𝐴(𝐼𝐷𝑈𝑖 || 𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑖 ||𝑐ℎ)||𝑡𝑙|| 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑅𝐴(𝑡𝑙 ||𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑝𝑘𝑅𝐴 (𝐼𝐷𝑈𝑖 ||𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑖 ||𝑐ℎ)||𝑝𝑘𝑈𝑖))
is sent back to U𝑖.
3. U𝑖 checks RA’s signature and composes the registration pseudonym 𝜋𝑈𝑖 =
𝑝𝑘𝑈𝑖 ||𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑝𝑘𝑅𝐴(𝐼𝐷𝑈𝑖 || 𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑖 ||𝑐ℎ)||𝑡𝑙|| 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑅𝐴(𝑡𝑙||𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑝𝑘𝑅𝐴(𝐼𝐷𝑈𝑖 ||𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑖 ||𝑐ℎ) ||𝑝𝑘𝑈𝑖) and
stores it.
If the registration pseudonym 𝜋𝑈𝑖 expires (𝑡𝑙 is older than is tolerable in the geoso-
cial application), the user needs to refresh his/her pseudonym by the registration
process Reg(𝐼𝐷𝑈𝑖)→ 𝜋𝑈𝑖 .
9.4.3 Logging
The user U𝑖, who is using the installed geosocial application issued by SP, is logging
into the service by requesting the group public key and his/her group member secret
key.
The logging process Log(𝜋𝑈𝑖)→ 𝑔𝑠𝑘𝑈𝑖 follows these steps:
1. U𝑖 sends his/her registration pseudonym 𝜋𝑈𝑖 = 𝑝𝑘𝑈𝑖 ||𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑝𝑘𝑅𝐴(𝐼𝐷𝑈𝑖 ||𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑖||
𝑐ℎ)||𝑡𝑙|| 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑅𝐴(𝑡𝑙||𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑝𝑘𝑅𝐴(𝐼𝐷𝑈𝑖 ||𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑖 ||𝑐ℎ)||𝑝𝑘𝑈𝑖), which is encrypted by the El-
Gamal scheme using the SP public key 𝑝𝑘𝑆𝑃 , to SP.
2. SP decrypts 𝜋𝑈𝑖 by its own private ElGamal key 𝑠𝑘𝑆𝑃 , and verifies 𝜋𝑈𝑖 by the
public ECDSA key 𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑅𝐴 and checks if 𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑝𝑘𝑅𝐴(𝐼𝐷𝑈𝑖 ||𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑖 ||𝑐ℎ) is not on the
Temporary Revocation List (TRL). If 𝜋𝑈𝑖 is valid, SP creates 𝑔𝑠𝑘𝑉𝑖 = (𝑥𝑖, 𝐴𝑖),
where 𝑥𝑖 = 𝐻(𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑝𝑘𝑅𝐴(𝐼𝐷𝑈𝑖 || 𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑖||𝑐ℎ)||𝑡𝑙||𝛾), 𝐴𝑖 = 𝑔
1
𝑥𝑖+𝛾
1 and H () is a hash
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function. Then, SP stores (𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑝𝑘𝑅𝐴(𝐼𝐷𝑈𝑖 || 𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑖 ||𝑐ℎ), 𝐴𝑖, 𝑡𝑙) in the logging table
and sends 𝑔𝑠𝑘𝑈𝑖 encrypted by 𝑝𝑘𝑈𝑖 to U𝑖.
3. U𝑖 decrypts the message by its own private ElGamal key 𝑠𝑘𝑈𝑖 and checks the
𝑥𝑖 by the hash function.
SP also verifies the validity of the time stamp 𝑡𝑙. Depending on the geosocial
service policy, the 𝜋𝑈𝑖 with the time stamp 𝑡𝑙 can be marked as expired after a
certain period. If U𝑖 wants to continue using the geosocial service, they need to
register a new pseudonym with fresh 𝑡𝑙. This approach reduces the size of TRL.
The ElGamal encryption/decryption is probabilistic, hence eavesdroppers cannot
link two or more encrypted messages if U𝑖 requests 𝑔𝑠𝑘𝑈𝑖 for a second time, i.e. the
next user logs in Log(𝜋𝑈𝑖)→ 𝑔𝑠𝑘𝑈𝑖 .
9.4.4 Upload
The communication pattern of upload connection is depicted in Figure 9.3. The users
upload their data to share them in geosocial services. The upload phase employs
the short group signature scheme, namely the BBS04 scheme [20].
U1
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U3
U4
UNSP
M1,o1
M2,o2
M3,o3
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Fig. 9.3: Upload Connection.
Upload - Signing
Every user U𝑖 who wants to send a new message to SP has to sign the message.
Every U𝑖 has a member secret key 𝑔𝑠𝑘𝑈𝑖 = (𝑥𝑖, 𝐴𝑖) and a group public key 𝑔𝑝𝑘 =
(𝑔1, 𝑔2, ℎ, 𝑢, 𝑣, 𝑤). U𝑖 signs a message 𝑀 ∈ {0,1}* and outputs the signature of
knowledge 𝜎 = (𝑇1, 𝑇2, 𝑇3, 𝑅2, 𝑅3, 𝑅5, 𝑐, 𝑠𝛼, 𝑠𝛽, 𝑠𝑥, 𝑠𝛿, 𝑠𝜇).
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The Upload Signing process UpSig(𝑀, 𝑔𝑠𝑘𝑈𝑖 , 𝑔𝑝𝑘) → 𝜎 consists of the next
steps:
1. U𝑖 generates random elements 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝑟𝛼, 𝑟𝛽, 𝑟𝑥, 𝑟𝛿, 𝑟𝜇 ∈ 𝑍*𝑝 ,
2. computes
𝑇1 = 𝑢𝛼, 𝑇2 = 𝑣𝛽, 𝑇3 = 𝐴𝑖ℎ𝛼+𝛽, (9.1)
𝛿 = 𝛼𝑥, 𝜇 = 𝛽𝑥, (9.2)
𝑝1 = 𝑒(𝑇3, 𝑔2), 𝑝2 = 𝑒(ℎ,𝑤), 𝑝3 = 𝑒(ℎ, 𝑔2). (9.3)
3. stores 𝑇1, 𝑇2, 𝑇3, 𝛿, 𝜇, 𝑝1, 𝑝2, 𝑝3, and
4. computes
𝑅1 = 𝑢𝑟𝛼 ,
𝑅2 = 𝑣𝑟𝛽 ,
𝑅3 = 𝑝𝑟𝑥1 · 𝑝−𝑟𝛼−𝑟𝛽2 · 𝑝−𝑟𝛿−𝑟𝜇3 ,
𝑅4 = 𝑇 𝑟𝑥1 𝑢−𝑟𝛿 ,
𝑅5 = 𝑇 𝑟𝑥2 𝑣−𝑟𝜇 ,
(9.4)
𝑐 = 𝐻(𝑀,𝑇1, 𝑇2, 𝑇3, 𝑅1, 𝑅2, 𝑅3, 𝑅4, 𝑅5), (9.5)
𝑠𝛼 = 𝑟𝛼 + 𝑐𝛼, 𝑠𝛽 = 𝑟𝛽 + 𝑐𝛽, 𝑠𝑥 = 𝑟𝑥 + 𝑐𝑥,
𝑠𝛿 = 𝑟𝛿 + 𝑐𝛿, 𝑠𝜇 = 𝑟𝜇 + 𝑐𝜇.
(9.6)
5. U𝑖 sends the message𝑀 with the signature 𝜎 = (𝑇1, 𝑇2, 𝑇3, 𝑅2, 𝑅3, 𝑅5, 𝑐, 𝑠𝛼, 𝑠𝛽,
𝑠𝑥, 𝑠𝛿, 𝑠𝜇).
The elements 𝑇1, 𝑇2, 𝑇3 computed in Equation 9.1 are pseudonyms in the signa-
ture 𝜎. The signatures carrying identical messages contain dissimilar pseudonyms
due to the regeneration of parameters. Then a certain content that is periodically
sent by a certain user cannot be linkable. Moreover, U𝑖 can precompute Equations
9.1, 9.2, 9.3 and 9.4 and save time for the processing of real-time data. This reduces
all 3 bilinear operations to 0, 10 exponentiations to 0 and 14 multiplications to 5.
The protection against denial of service attacks can be achieved by employing
a short linkability and categorized verification presented in the Chapter 8 and in the
paper [114]. For a short time period, the signer uses the same pseudonyms 𝑇1, 𝑇2, 𝑇3
and random values 𝛼 and 𝛽 in steps 1 and 2. Then, SP can use a temporary list of
honest users, who are known by the same pseudonyms, sort out the potential valid
signed messages into the first priority level of verification and potential corrupt
signatures into lower priority levels of verification.
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Upload - Verification
The Service Provider (SP) verifies the messages received from pseudonymous users.
The solution uses a batch verification for a more efficient verification process. The
batch verification, investigated in [66], verifies 𝑛 messages in one batch. First, the
𝑗-th received message 𝑀𝑗 is checked by an SP server if it contains a valid time
stamp, real and consistent data of geosocial applications. The precise value of
the time stamp, or the time window, depends on a concrete geosocial application,
communication technology used, distance with specific latency, etc. If the batch
verification is invalid, then the divide-and-conquer approach is used to identify the
invalid signatures that are verified in the individual verification.
The Batch Verification process BaVer(𝑀𝑗, 𝑔𝑝𝑘, 𝜎𝑗)→ valid/invalid, where
SP uses 𝑔𝑝𝑘 = (𝑔1, 𝑔2, ℎ, 𝑢, 𝑣, 𝑤) to verify messages 𝜎𝑗 = (𝑇𝑗1, 𝑇𝑗2, 𝑇𝑗3, 𝑅𝑗2, 𝑅𝑗3
, 𝑅𝑗5, 𝑐𝑗, 𝑠𝑗𝛼, 𝑠𝑗𝛽, 𝑠𝑗𝑥, 𝑠𝑗𝛿, 𝑠𝑗𝜇) for 𝑗 = 1, ..., 𝑛, does:
1. SP restores
𝑅𝑗1 = 𝑢𝑠𝑗𝛼𝑇−𝑐𝑗1 , 𝑅𝑗4 = 𝑢−𝑠𝑗𝛿𝑇 𝑠𝑥𝑗1 , (9.7)
2. computes a new control hash 𝑐′𝑗 from the parameters received:
𝑐′𝑗 = 𝐻(𝑀𝑗, 𝑇𝑗1, 𝑇𝑗2, 𝑇𝑗3, 𝑅𝑗1, 𝑅𝑗2, 𝑅𝑗3, 𝑅𝑗4, 𝑅𝑗5),
3. checks if 𝑐′𝑗 = 𝑐𝑗. If yes, then SP continues with the verification, otherwise the
message with the signature is inconsistent and is refused.
4. SP randomly selects 𝜃1, 𝜃2, ..., 𝜃𝑛 ∈ 𝑍𝑝 with 𝑙𝑏 bit, checks the batch if
𝑗=𝑛∏︁
𝑗=1
𝑅
𝜃𝑗
𝑗3 = 𝑒(
𝑗=𝑛∏︁
𝑗=1
(𝑇 𝑠𝑗𝑥𝑗3 ℎ−𝑠𝑗𝛿−𝑠𝑗𝜇𝑔
−𝑐𝑗
1 )𝜃𝑗 , 𝑔2)
𝑒(
𝑗=𝑛∏︁
𝑗=1
(𝑇 𝑐𝑗𝑗3ℎ−𝑠𝑗𝛼−𝑠𝑗𝛽)𝜃𝑗 , 𝑤)
(9.8)
and whether
1𝐺1 = (𝑅𝑗5𝑅𝑗2)−𝜃𝑗𝑇
𝜃𝑗𝑠𝑗𝑥−𝜃𝑗𝑐𝑗
𝑗2 𝑣
(𝑠𝑗𝛽−𝑠𝑗𝜇)𝜃𝑗 . (9.9)
5. If Equations 9.8 and 9.9 hold, the signed message is valid .
In case the batch verification is valid, then all messages from the batch continue
into the application process of a geosocial service. Some of the valid messages can
be resent to other relevant users in a certain area. These phases are described in
the following subsections: Requested Download and Multicast Download.
In case the batch verification fails, then the divide-and-conquer approach is used
to identify the invalid signatures that can be discarded.
At the end of the divide-and-conquer approach, the final two messages are indi-
vidually verified.
126
The Individual verification process InVer(𝑀, 𝑔𝑝𝑘, 𝜎)→ valid/invalid con-
sists of these steps:
1. SP restores
𝑅1 = 𝑢𝑠𝛼𝑇−𝑐1 , 𝑅4 = 𝑢−𝑠𝛿𝑇 𝑠𝑥1 , (9.10)
2. computes a new control hash 𝑐′ from the parameters received:
𝑐′ = 𝐻(𝑀,𝑇1, 𝑇2, 𝑇3, 𝑅1, 𝑅2, 𝑅3, 𝑅4, 𝑅5).
3. checks if 𝑐′ = 𝑐. If yes, then SP continues with the verification, otherwise the
message is inconsistent and is refused.
4. SP checks if
𝑅3 = 𝑒(𝑇3, 𝑔2)𝑠𝑥𝑒(ℎ,𝑤)(−𝑠𝛼−𝑠𝛽)𝑒(ℎ, 𝑔2)(−𝑠𝛿−𝑠𝜇)
(𝑒(𝑇3, 𝑤)𝑒(𝑔1, 𝑔2)−1)𝑐
(9.11)
and
1𝐺1 = (𝑅5𝑅2)−1𝑇 𝑠𝑥−𝑐𝑥2 𝑣(𝑠𝛽−𝑠𝜇). (9.12)
5. The signed message is valid if Equations 9.11 and 9.12 hold.
Equations 9.8 and 9.11 indicate that the individual verification requires 5 pairing
operations per one message without optimization techniques and the batch verifica-
tion requires only 2 pairing operations per 𝑛 messages. Due to this fact, the scheme
uses the batch verification in preference to the individual verification.
9.4.5 Encrypted Upload
The confidential message which is uploaded from U𝑖 to SP, is encrypted by the
ElGamal scheme.
U𝑖 signs a message 𝑀 ∈ {0,1}* by the process UpSig(𝑀, 𝑔𝑠𝑘𝑈𝑖 , 𝑔𝑝𝑘) → 𝜎 and
then they use the 𝑝𝑘𝑆𝑃 to encrypt the message to a ciphertext. SP 𝑠𝑘𝑆𝑃 decrypts
the ciphertext to a plain text (the original message) and then they verify the group
signature 𝜎.
9.4.6 Requested Download
Every user U𝑖 who wants to download the data of a geosocial service from SP sends
a query 𝑄, which is a request, to SP. The query message contains the location of
the user, a time stamp, his/her request, and so on. The requested download phase
is depicted in Fig. 9.4.
The Requested Download process ReqDown(𝑟,𝑄, 𝑔𝑠𝑘𝑈𝑖 , 𝑔𝑝𝑘) → 𝑅𝑒𝑠, 𝜖 con-
sists of these steps:
127
U SP
Res, r, ε=sigSP(Res, r, Q)
r, Q, οU(r, Q)
-generates  random r
-signs r,Q by group 
signature → οu
gpk, sigSP
gpk, 
gskU,verSP
-verifies group 
signature οu by gpk
-creates response 
Res
-signs Res, r, Q by 
private key sigSP
-verifies the signature ε
 by public key verSP
Fig. 9.4: Requested Download Connection.
1. U𝑖 generates a random reference number 𝑟 and sends a request that consists
of the triplet 𝑟,𝑄, 𝜎 to SP. 𝜎 is the output of process UpSig(𝑟,𝑄, 𝑔𝑠𝑘𝑈𝑖 , 𝑔𝑝𝑘)
where the random reference number 𝑟 and query 𝑄 are signed by the user
group secret key 𝑔𝑠𝑘𝑈𝑖 .
2. SP verifies 𝜎 by 𝑔𝑝𝑘. Only a valid member of the group can request data suc-
cessfully. Then, based on the query 𝑄, SP compounds a response message 𝑅𝑒𝑠
containing the requested data. SP signs this message 𝑅𝑒𝑠 by his/her private
ECDSA key 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑆𝑃 . SP sends 𝑅𝑒𝑠 and 𝑟 in plain text and 𝜖 = 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑆𝑃 (𝑅𝑒𝑠, 𝑟,𝑄)
back to the user.
3. U𝑖 checks the signature 𝜖 by the SP public key 𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑃 .
The group signature ensures authenticity, integrity and user privacy (pseudonymity
and unlinkability). The authenticity and integrity of downloaded data are ensured
by the ECDSA scheme.
9.4.7 Encrypted Requested Download
The encryption of requested download communication provides data confidentiality.
If the requested data are confidential, the user encrypts his/her query 𝑄 and a
random 𝑟 by the public ElGamal key of SP 𝑝𝑘𝑆𝑃 . The encrypted and signed (by
𝑔𝑠𝑘𝑈𝑖) query is sent to SP that can decrypt and verify the signature. Then SP
encrypts the xor-ed response 𝑅𝑒𝑠 with the random 𝑟 by the private ElGamal key
𝑠𝑘𝑆𝑃 and sends this message to the user. The user decrypts the message by 𝑝𝑘𝑆𝑃 ,
uses the stored random 𝑟 and uses the xor function on the decrypted message to
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obtain the response 𝑅𝑒𝑠. The process of encrypted requested download phase is
depicted in Fig. 9.5.
U SP
Enc_skSP(Res r), ε=sigSP(Res, r, Q)
Enc_pkSP(r, Q), οU(r, Q)
-generates  random r
-signs r,Q by group 
signature → οu
gpk, skSP, 
sigSP
gpk, gskU, 
pkSP,verSP
-decrypts (r,Q) 
-verifies group signature οu 
by gpk
-creates response Res
-signs Res, r, Q by private 
key sigSP
-encrypts Enc_skSP(Res r) 
-decrypts Res = Dec_pkSP(Res r) r
-verifies the signature ε
 by public key verSP
Fig. 9.5: Encrypted Download Connection.
9.4.8 Multicast Download
In multicast download connection, SP sends actual data 𝐴𝑐𝑡 about areas where
active pseudonymous users are located. SP knows only the location of a user from
his/her recent uploading or the query 𝑄. These multicast messages are marked by
an 𝐼𝐷𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎 flag defining certain areas (e.g. streets, malls, districts, etc.). All messages
that are sent from SP to users are signed by the SP private key 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑆𝑃 . Users check
if the 𝐼𝐷𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎 is correct and verify the downloaded messages by the SP public key
𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑃 . The multicast download connection is depicted in Fig 9.6.
9.4.9 Temporary Revocation
Every message signed by a group member can be opened by SP using the group
manager secret key 𝑔𝑚𝑠𝑘 = (𝜒, 𝜈). Bogus messages are messages with a correct
signature but carrying a malicious content which breaks the policy of geosocial
applications.
The Temporary Revocation process TemRev(𝑀,𝜎, 𝑔𝑚𝑠𝑘) → 𝑔𝑠𝑘𝑈𝑖 , 𝜋𝑈𝑖 is
described in the following text:
SP extracts a part of the group member secret key 𝑔𝑠𝑘𝑈𝑖 → 𝐴𝑖 = 𝑇3/(𝑇 𝜒1 ·𝑇 𝜈2 ) and
searches the record (𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑝𝑘𝑅𝐴(𝐼𝐷𝑈𝑖 ||𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑖 ||𝑐ℎ), 𝐴𝑖, 𝑡𝑙) in the database. SP identifies
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Fig. 9.6: Multicast Download Connection.
the registration pseudonym of the user 𝜋𝑈𝑖 who sent the bogus message. SP saves this
registration pseudonym in the Temporary Revocation List (TRL) until the lifetime
of this registration pseudonym expires.
When the malicious user is logging to the system for the next time, SP does not
issue a new group member secret key to the user so the user cannot sign and send
more bogus messages. In serious cases, the registration pseudonym can be sent to
RA for Permanent Revocation.
9.4.10 Permanent Revocation
In serious cases, such as breaking the rules repeatedly, a malicious user is revoked
globally by the cooperation of SP and RA. SP is able to open a message and ex-
tract a group member secret key that is saved together with the user’s registration
pseudonym.
The Permanent Revocation process PerRev(𝜋𝑈𝑖)→ 𝐼𝐷𝑈𝑖 is described in the
following text:
SP sends the registration pseudonym of a user who seriously breaks the rules
to RA. RA extracts 𝐼𝐷𝑈𝑖 by decrypting the registration pseudonym 𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑝𝑘𝑅𝐴(𝐼𝐷𝑈𝑖
||𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑖||𝑐ℎ), 𝑡𝑙) and adds 𝐼𝐷𝑈𝑖 to the Permanent Revocation List (PRL) so the ma-
licious group member cannot update his/her pseudonym in the next registration
phase. Moreover, RA can send 𝐼𝐷𝑈𝑖 and the serial number to SP and/or another
government office (police) that can penalize the malicious user.
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9.5 Security Analysis of Framework
This section presents possible attacks and a security analysis of the proposed frame-
work according to the requirements given in 9.3.2. It is assumed that an attacker
can control user devices and can also eavesdrop on, capture, modify and retransmit
messages but his/her computational power does not permit the attacker to break
current computationally secure cryptography schemes. Attackers can be external or
also internal adversaries and can have access to SP database. As potential internal
adversaries, SP or a user can be considered only. The Registration Authority (RA)
is the trusted third authority that can be controlled by some governmental organi-
zation. Therefore, this entity is fully trusted. Regarding the Service Provider (SP),
this entity is assumed to be managed by a private company that provides geosocial
services. Then, it is expected that SP performs the phases in an honest way. It
is expected that SP does not manipulate with messages, block them, etc. On the
other hand, SP may try to retrieve users’ identities to gather personal data and
make users’ profiles, which is a privacy threat. Hence, it is assumed that SP can try
to break the privacy of users in the geosocial service.
9.5.1 Possible Attacks
Possible attacks can be divided into passive and active attacks. An attacker who
performs a passive attack must have access to the communication. The main goal is
to endanger user privacy by compromising the message confidentiality, unlinkability
or both. The attacker performing passive attacks tries to track and link messages
sent by a certain user, retrieve the real identity of a certain user or eavesdrop on
messages transmitted between 𝑈𝑖 and RA in the Registration phase, between 𝑈𝑖
and SP in the Logging phase, Encrypted Requested Download and Encrypted Upload
phase, and between RA and SP.
Active attacks tamper with valid messages, submit fake messages, etc. The
usual purpose is to affect the normal execution of the proposed scheme to get some
benefit. Active attacks compromise the message integrity, authenticity or both. The
attacker performing active attacks usually tries to tamper with messages transmitted
between 𝑈𝑖 and RA in the Registration phase, between 𝑈𝑖 and SP in the Logging
phase, Upload / Encrypted Upload / Requested Download / Encrypted Requested
Download / Multicast Download phase, and between 𝑅𝐴 and SP.
The attacker may then attempt to create fake but valid registration pseudonyms
or certificates. Active attacks also include the generation of fake messages by unau-
thorized users, reusing the former messages to perform replay attacks or misusing
the psedonymity without being traced and revoked.
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9.5.2 Protection of the Framework against Possible Attacks
The behavior of the framework as regards the considered attacks is described and
analyzed in the following text.
Protection of the Framework against Tracing of Messages Sent by a Cer-
tain User
All users sign messages by the modified short group signature BBS scheme [20].
Every generated group signature contains the group member’s pseudonym 𝑇1, 𝑇2,
𝑇3, which is a linear encryption of the member’s secret key 𝐴𝑖 and random elements
𝛼 and 𝛽. If 𝑈𝑖 generates new elements 𝛼 and 𝛽, then the new generated signatures
contain different pseudonyms 𝑇1, 𝑇2, 𝑇3. Due to this fact, the group signature
scheme used provides unlinkability of the former signatures with the new ones.
Behavior of the Framework as Regards Extracting the Identity of a Cer-
tain User
The framework contains only two phases where the user identity 𝐼𝐷𝑈𝑖 is a part of
the process.
In the Registration phase, users show their 𝐼𝐷𝑈𝑖 only to a trusted RA, who issues
a registration pseudonym 𝜋𝑈𝑖 to the user. The pseudonym 𝜋𝑈𝑖 containing the user
𝐼𝐷𝑈𝑖 is encrypted by the ElGamal public key 𝑝𝑘𝑅𝐴. Only RA with his/her ElGamal
private key 𝑠𝑘𝑅𝐴 can decrypt the pseudonym and reveal the user’s 𝐼𝐷𝑈𝑖 .
In the Logging phase, users send their pseudonym to SP. The message is en-
crypted by the ElGamal private keys 𝑠𝑘𝑆𝑃 but the pseudonym is decrypted by
𝑝𝑘𝑅𝐴. Hence, SP cannot retrieve the real user identity. SP can link all the request
messages that contain the same 𝜋𝑈𝑖 . On the other hand, if the user pseudonym 𝜋𝑈𝑖 is
updated with a certain frequency, then the pseudonym linkability is minimized. The
frequency of the pseudonym updates affects the length of the Temporary Revocation
List (TRL) and the unlinkability of users towards SP. If the frequency is high, then
the size of TRL should be smaller and more user sessions are unlinkable but users
have to register new pseudonyms more often, which burdens the communication
overhead and the infrastructure. The pseudonyms should be released in advance
to one user for several certain time periods and services. The optimal frequency
then strongly depends on the concrete geosocial services, the number of users, the
percentage of malicious users, etc.
If an attacker wants to retrieve the real user identity, they must decrypt the mes-
sage and the pseudonym. This is unfeasible without the knowledge of the ElGamal
private keys of RA and SP.
132
Protection of the Framework against Eavesdropping on the Messages
In the Registration phase, 𝑈𝑖 sends a request (𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑝𝑘𝑅𝐴(𝑝𝑘𝑈𝑖 ||𝐼𝐷𝑈𝑖 ||𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑈𝑖(𝑝𝑘𝑈𝑖))) in
order to get a new pseudonym and RA sends back a response (𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑝𝑘𝑈𝑖 (𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑝𝑘𝑅𝐴(𝐼𝐷𝑈𝑖||
𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑖 ||𝑐ℎ)||𝑡𝑙|| 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑅𝐴(𝑡𝑙||𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑝𝑘𝑇𝐴(𝐼𝐷𝑈𝑖 || 𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑖 ||𝑐ℎ)||𝑝𝑘𝑈𝑖))). The response and request
messages are encrypted using the ElGamal scheme, which is currently considered
to be secure [164]. Because decryption requires the knowledge of the secret keys
𝑠𝑘𝑈𝑖 and 𝑠𝑘𝑅𝐴, the attacker cannot decrypt the cipher text of messages to get the
transmitted data. The secret keys are only known by the honest user and the trusted
registration authority.
In the Logging phase, the attacker cannot get the data transmitted between 𝑈𝑖
and SP because the messages are also encrypted using the ElGamal scheme. The
secret keys which are necessary to decrypt the sensitive information are 𝑠𝑘𝑈𝑖 and
𝑠𝑘𝑆𝑃 . These keys are only known by the honest user and the service provider. It is
assumed that SP behaves honestly.
In the Encrypted Requested Download and Encrypted Upload phases, the sensi-
tive information is sent between 𝑈𝑖 and SP. The attacker is not able to disclose this
information from the encrypted messages because the messages from users to SP
are encrypted using the ElGamal scheme. The attacker will be unable to decrypt
them and get the transmitted data because decryption requires the knowledge of the
secret key 𝑠𝑘𝑆𝑃 . In the Encrypted Requested download phase, the messages from
SP to users are encrypted by the secret key 𝑠𝑘𝑆𝑃 and xor-ed by a random number
𝑟. Having the public key 𝑝𝑘𝑆𝑃 , the attacker can perform the ElGamal decryption
but without the knowledge of 𝑟 they cannot get the data transmitted from SP to
a certain user. Only the user knows a certain 𝑟 and can get the data.
It is assumed that the connection between RA and SP is always secured using
TLS, which uses asymmetric and symmetric cryptosystems to establish security
properties like message authenticity, integrity and confidentiality.
Protection of the Framework against Tampering with Messages
In the Registration phase, message integrity and authenticity are ensured by the
ECDSA signature scheme. The request messages contains the user public key 𝑝𝑘𝑈𝑖 ,
which is signed with the ECDSA signature key 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑈𝑖 . Assuming that the ECDSA
signature scheme and the hash function SHA-1 used are secure, then the ECDSA
verification process detects if the request message has been modified.
In the Logging phase, message integrity and authenticity are ensured in a similar
way. 𝑈𝑖 sends its pseudonym, which RA signs using the ECDSA signature scheme.
SP sends 𝑈𝑖 its group member secret key 𝑔𝑠𝑘𝑈𝑖 = (𝑥𝑖, 𝐴𝑖) encrypted by the user’s
ElGamal public key. The user can check if 𝑔𝑠𝑘𝑈𝑖 is computed from his/her certificate
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by the SHA-1 hash function. The integrity and authenticity of the group member
secret key are provided by the hash function SHA-1 and ElGamal scheme.
In the Upload phase, the messages are signed and verified employing the modified
short group signature BBS scheme [20]. This approach ensures message authenticity
and integrity of the messages.
In the Requested Download phase, the messages transmitted between SP and
𝑈𝑖 ensure integrity and authenticity by the ECDSA signature scheme (from SP to
users) and by the modified short group signature BBS scheme (from users to SP).
In the Multicast Download phase, all downloaded messages transmitted between
SP and 𝑈𝑖 also ensure integrity and authenticity by the ECDSA signature scheme.
It is assumed that the connection between RA and SP, which uses TLS, is secured
against tampering with messages.
Creating a Fake but Valid Pseudonym or User Message
To create a valid pseudonym 𝜋𝑈𝑖 , the attacker needs the ECDSA private key 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑅𝐴,
which is only known by the RA. Due to this fact the attacker is not able to launch
this attack. Moreover, if a fake pseudonym 𝜋𝑈𝑖 is sent to a user, then they use the
public ECDSA key 𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑅𝐴 of RA to verify its validity. The user does not accept any
fake pseudonyms.
The employed short group signature scheme ensures message authenticity, in-
tegrity and unlinkability of every message in the phases that use signing and verifi-
cation processes. The proposed framework employs a modified short group signature
BBS scheme [20] and inherits all its security features for the concrete phases and
processes. Thus, only the service provider and the valid group member 𝑈𝑖 are able
to sign a message on behalf the group.
The attacker must recompute the hash 𝑐 and some signature parts if they try
to modify a certain message. It is assumed that the attacker cannot use the valid
key 𝑔𝑠𝑘𝑈𝑖 = (𝐴𝑖, 𝑥𝑖). Then, if the hash function used is secure and the Discrete
Logarithm problem holds, computing the signature parts (𝑠𝑗𝛼, 𝑠𝑗𝛽, 𝑠𝑗𝑥, 𝑠𝑗𝛿, 𝑠𝑗𝜇)
without knowing 𝑥𝑖 is considered unfeasible.
Protection of the Framework against Replay Attacks
In the designed framework, all messages contain a time stamp with the current time
and date. The time stamp of each received message is checked before the verification
of the group signatures or ECDSA signatures. Assuming that the attacker without
a valid 𝑔𝑠𝑘𝑈𝑖 = (𝐴𝑖, 𝑥𝑖) tries to reuse former messages with valid signatures, then
they must also refresh the time stamp and recompute the hash 𝑐𝑗 and the signature
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(𝑠𝑗𝛼, 𝑠𝑗𝛽, 𝑠𝑗𝑥, 𝑠𝑗𝛿, 𝑠𝑗𝜇). The computation of valid values for 𝑠𝑗𝑥, 𝑠𝑗𝛿 and 𝑠𝑗𝜇 without
knowing 𝑥𝑖 is unfeasible under the Discrete Logarithm problem.
Behavior of the Framework Relative to Misbehavior of Pseudonymous
Users
Every honest user is pseudonymous and unlinkable relative to other users and SP.
If a user breaks the rules of geosocial services, e.g. sends malicious content, uses
vulgarisms, etc., then the SP using its own group manager secret key 𝑔𝑚𝑠𝑘 opens
the message with correct signature and extracts part of the member secret group key
𝑔𝑠𝑘𝑈𝑖 → 𝐴𝑖 = 𝑇3/(𝑇 𝜒1 ·𝑇 𝜈2 ). Then SP searches the record (𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑝𝑘𝑅𝐴(𝐼𝐷𝑈𝑖 ||𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑖 ||𝑐), 𝐴𝑖, 𝑡𝑙)
in the database and decides if the user will be revoked temporarily or permanently.
If the user who is temporarily revoked tries to log to a geosocial service, then SP
can block their access and does not provide them with a new valid 𝑔𝑠𝑘𝑈𝑖 . Moreover,
that user does not receive any downloaded data and cannot request data from SP.
If the user breaks the rules periodically or behaves maliciously then SP can send
his/her pseudonym to RA, who is able to retrieve the real user identity by ElGa-
mal decryption and find in the database his/her serial number of the implemented
geoservice application. Based on the serial number and the real identity of the user,
SP or a government office can penalize the user.
9.6 Evaluation and Results of Framework
In this section, the cryptographic components used in the framework are evaluated.
Further, an experimental results of employed cryptographic components and the
framework phases are outlined.
9.6.1 Evaluation of Framework
The modified privacy preserving group signature scheme BBS04 [20] is employed
in the Upload, Encrypted Upload, Requested Download, and Encrypted Requested
Download phases. Section 6.1.1 shows that modular arithmetic operations like ad-
dition and subtraction can be computed more efficiently than multiplication 𝑇𝑚 and
exponentiation 𝑇𝑒 or bilinear pairing 𝑇𝑝. Due to this fact, the fast operations can be
omitted in this performance evaluation. The used group signature scheme achieves
a more efficient batch verification (2 𝑇𝑝 + 11n 𝑇𝑒) and individual verification (5 𝑇𝑝
+ 10 𝑇𝑒) than the pure BBS04 scheme [20] and Ferrara et al. [66] scheme due to
the fewer exponentiation operations, likewise the scheme in Protocol 2. Further,
the signing phase with precomputed parameters in the used scheme is more efficient
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GS scheme: Designed scheme (based
on BBS04 [20])
BBS04 [20] Ferrara et al. [66]
Batch: yes no yes
Length of signa-
ture:
5𝐺1, 𝐺𝑇 , 5𝑍𝑝 (2380 bits) 3𝐺1, 6𝑍𝑝 (1500
bits)
3𝐺1, 𝐺𝑇 , 6𝑍𝑝
(2032 bits)
Performance of batch verification
Pairings 2 5n 2
Exponentiation 11n 12n 13n
Multiplication 11n+1 8n 10n+1
Performance of individual verification
Pairings 5 5 5
Exponentiation 10 12 12
Multiplication 9 8 8
Performance of normal mode signing / precomputed mode signing
Pairings 3 / 0 3 3
Exponentiation 12 / 0 12 12
Multiplication 12 / 5 12 12
Tab. 9.2: Evaluation of Group Signature Signing and Verification
than the signing of pure BBS04 scheme [20] or Ferrara et al. [66] scheme, see Table
9.2. The signing phase of the framework is more efficient than signing in Protocol 1
and similarly efficient as signing in Protocol 2.
The Requested Download, Multicast Download, Logging and Registration phases
employ the ECDSA signature scheme. ECDSA is more efficient than group signa-
tures due to the few inexpensive modular operations (modular multiplicative in-
verses, multiplications, additions) in signing and verification. On the other hand,
the ECDSA signature scheme is not designed for privacy-preserving schemes. For
every single ongoing message, users must create new triplets that contain a signa-
ture, a public key and a certificate to achieve the unlinkability of those messages.
Therefore, this improper approach generates a lot of public keys and certificates.
Due to this fact, the system entities must deal with huge amounts of keys and
certificates in the revocation and issuing phases. For these reasons, the solution
employs the ECDSA signature schemes only on non-privacy communication such
as the registration phase or on messages that are signed by and downloaded from
a service provider. The service provider can take advantage of the efficiency of the
ECDSA signature scheme and sends the signed messages to users.
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GS scheme: Designed scheme BBS04 [20]
Number of messages Time [ms]
Verification
1 108 232
10 290 2297
20 977 4548
50 2301 11205
100 4681 22284
200 9251 44644
500 23294 111757
Signing
1 157 226
5 498 861
10 786 1686
20 1326 3237
50 3106 7978
Tab. 9.3: Performance of Group Signature Schemes.
9.6.2 Experimental Implementation and Results
The cryptographic primitives have been implemented in JAVA. The experimental
implementation is formed by three main cryptographic components. The first com-
ponent is the ECDSA signature scheme provided by JAVA (JDK 7). Developers
can also use the third party library such as the Bouncy castle Library1, which offers
more options and utilities. The ECDSA scheme implemented uses a 256-bit key size
and employs the 256-bit SHA-1 hash function.
The second cryptographic component is a group signature scheme that uses the
Java Pairing Based Cryptography (jPBC) Library2. The implementation employs
the MNT curves type D with the embedding degree 𝑘 = 6, the 171-bit order of
curves and the pre-generated parameters d840347-175-161.param.
The registration and logging phases use the ElGamal encryption, which is the
third cryptographic component in the experimental implementation. All ElGamal
keys can be created by class org.bouncycastle.jce.provider.JDKKeyFactory. The
1024-bit ElGamal encryption is used. The framework is tested on a PC machine
with Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU X3440 @ 2.53GHz, 4 GB Ram, Windows 7 Professional.
Table 9.3 shows the results measured for the used group signature scheme (sign-
ing, verification), which is compared with pure BBS04 scheme [20]. The verification
1(available on http://www.bouncycastle.org/resources.html)
2(available on http://gas.dia.unisa.it/projects/jpbc/index.html)
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ECDSA mode: Signing Verification Signing Verification
Size of messages: 500 B 8 kB
Number of messages Time [ms]
1 2 3 3 3
10 18 30 24 32
50 82 143 93 152
100 163 288 184 294
500 802 1418 865 1482
1000 1594 2847 1638 2922
Tab. 9.4: Performance of ECDSA Signature Scheme.
Side: User SP/RA User SP/RA
Size of messages: 500 B 8 kB
Framework phases: Time [ms]
Registration 61 15 - -
Logging 6 11 - -
Upload 157 (75*) 108 (50*) 157 (75*) 108 (50*)
Encrypted Upload 161 (79*) 110 (52*) 220 (138*) 139 (81*)
Requested Download 160 (78*) 110 (52*) 160 (78*) 111 (53*)
Encrypted Requested
Download
166 (84*) 116 (58*) 254 (172*) 205 (147*)
Multicast Download 3 2 3 3
Tab. 9.5: Performance of Framework Phases per 1 Message / Request.
of the pure BBS04 scheme does not apply batch verification, which significantly
affects the performance. The verification of the BBS04 scheme takes about 225 ms
per one message on average. The batch verification of the scheme takes about 50
ms per one message on average. Moreover, it is assumed that a service provider who
performs upload verification has at their disposal a more powerful machine so that
the verification would be more efficient. Further, the upload signing in the frame-
work takes about 75 ms per one message on average, which is a better result than
for the BBS04 scheme, which performs the signing phase in 175 ms per one message
on average. Assuming that users’ smartphones usually are less powerful than the
machine used, then it is expected a little bit longer signing. On the other hand, the
user usually does not sign messages as frequently as a service provider does.
Table 9.4 shows the results measured for the ECDSA signature scheme. Two
sizes of messages, 500 B and 8 kB, have been tested. The shorter length of message
carries short check-in messages that consist of an ID venue, an event, a shout (e.g.
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140 characters in Foursquare [56]), a user position, and so on. The 8 kB size messages
should carry longer text messages, reviews, restaurant menus, programmes, and
so on. The lengths of the output ECDSA signature are 70/71/72 B because they
contain a random element. With the machine tested, the verification of 100 messages
takes less than 300 ms and signing the 100 messages takes about 163 ms (for 0.5 kB
messages), or 184 ms (for 8 kB messages). Assuming that service providers have at
their disposal more powerful devices, they are able to secure more messages per the
same time. The results listed in Table 9.4 indicate that the size of messages does
not affect dramatically the performance of verification or signing. Due to the SHA-1
function, every message before signing or verifying is hashed to the 256 bit size.
The implemented 1024 bit ElGamal scheme is performed in 100 iterations and
the average values measured are outlined. The ElGamal key initialization takes
about 50 ms. The ElGamal encryption takes about 4 ms for 500 B messages or
63 ms for 8 kB messages. The ElGamal decryption takes about 2 ms for 500 B
messages or 31 ms for 8 kB messages.
Table 9.5 shows the performance of the framework phases and steps. The total
times of phases only include the performance of cryptographic components. The
communication latency, data processing in application, etc. are not included. The
registration and logging phases employ messages ≤ 500 B between a user and SP or
RA, due to this fact the performance measurement with 8kB messages is omitted.
The most frequently used phases such as the upload phase take about 125* (265) ms
per 1 message on average, signing takes about 75* (157) ms and verification takes
50* (108) ms. The * marked results indicate average values that are computed via
optimization techniques such as precomputation and batch verification. The upload
with encryption takes about 131* (271) ms per one 500 B message on average and
219* (359) ms per one 8 kB message on average. The requested download phase
takes 78* (160) ms on the user side and 52* (110) ms on the SP side. The frame-
work offers more practical cryptography protection than the work [55], where the
implemented privacy preserving framework takes about 5s to establish one secure
two-party connection. Considering the total time of logging, upload and requested
download phases, the framework takes about 220 (442) ms with (without) precom-
putation. If users need to transmit confidential data, then the Encrypted Upload
and Requested Download phases offer message encryption. The performance of the
ElGamal encryption used depends on the length of messages. For 8 kB messages
the ElGamal encryption adds 63 ms and the ElGamal decryption adds 31 ms to the
total time.
Furthermore, the framework phases have been implemented on computational
restricted smartphones with the Android platform. The framework phases run on
the user side are tested on a smartphone device, Samsung Galaxy S (I9000) with a 1
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GHz Cortex-A8 processor, 512MB RAM and Android OS v2.3. The upload phase
requires about 900 ms due to the precomputed signing mode of a group signature.
The requested download phase takes 1150 ms in total without a communication
delay. The verification of 1 ECDSA signature with 256 SHA-2 takes about 250 ms
on the smartphone. Thus, the multicast download phase takes only 250 ms.
9.7 Summary of Chapter 9
The chapter introduces a cryptographic solution that preserves security, efficiency
and user privacy in geosocial services. This privacy-preserving framework ensures
message integrity and authenticity in the download and upload messages between
users and a service provider that manages geosocial services and applications. Data
confidentiality is also provided in encrypted upload and download phases to en-
sure more security and user privacy. Furthermore, the proposed solution provides
pseudonymity and unlinkability for the users in front of other users and SP. User
pseudonymity conceals user identity and unlinkability prevents creating profiles of
users’ behaviors. On the other hand, this protection can be revoked if the pseudony-
mous user misbehaves. The framework offers two levels of revocation. Temporary
revocation is used if the user’s misbehaviour is not very serious while permanent
revocation is performed if a user behaves maliciously and/or breaks the rules pe-
riodically. Besides a trusted registration authority, no party is able to reveal the
identity of a certain user. Geosocial services providing pseudonymity become more
trustworthy among users that are concerned about their privacy.
The main cryptographic components and the framework phases such as upload
(signing, batch and individual verification) and download are implemented and mea-
sured. The results show that the framework is efficient and is ready to be employed
in geosocial services that connect thousands of users. Moreover, the user-side phases
of the privacy preserving framework can be applied in geosocial applications where
users use computational restricted devices like mobiles or smartphones.
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10 DISCUSSION
In this chapter, the contribution of the proposed protocols from Chapters 7 and 8 is
discussed. Besides the contribution of designed protocols, possible future extensions
are outlined. Then, the proposed solution from Chapter 9 is discussed. Finally, the
overall contribution and accomplishment of objectives of this thesis are summarized.
10.1 Discussion: Protocol 1
Protocol 1 (Chapter 7) provides standard group signature properties like authen-
ticity, anonymity, data integrity, non-reputation, correctness and one public key.
The scheme does not need the reinitialization of parameters and keys of members
when a new user is added, revoked or epoch is ended. In contrary to schemes [131],
[105], [48] and [28] where time intervals are employed, in the designed protocol,
a Revocation List (RL) is reduced by the natural expiration of secret keys which
is convenient for applications where the individual time of group membership expi-
ration is needed. To actual best knowledge, only the scheme proposed by Chu et
al. 2012 [54] uses time-bound secret keys to the natural expiration of these keys.
Nevertheless, the proposed protocol is more efficient in a computational overhead
than Chu et al. scheme [54] by using a different design and employing optimization
techniques such as the batch verification. The protocol needs only 8 elements per a
revocation token in contrary to 14 elements needed in [54]. According to the results
in Section 9.6.2, the proposed protocol has better performance in the verification
phase than the current VLR group signatures proposed in [131], [23], [28] and [54].
As future work, it would be worth including back unlikability into the proposed
protocol by chopping the time-bound secret key. Further, the impact of the natural
expiration on the revocation control for a large number of users can be investigated.
10.2 Discussion: Protocol 2
This section discusses Protocol 2 (Chapter 8) which deals with privacy-protection
and security in VANET applications. The protocol focuses on providing security
and privacy protection and tries to offer efficient signing and verification processes.
In addition to those features, it is aimed at the protection against denial of services
attacks, which is not usually covered in the literature.
In the V2V communication, the protocol provides efficient signing with the short-
term linkability. The proposal uses the modified scheme of Wei et al. (WLZ scheme)
[169]. Nevertheless, the designed protocol adds short-term linkability obtaining
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a more efficient signing phase than in the WLZ scheme. Moreover, the WLZ scheme
is focused on the V2V communication and does not describe the registration and
join phases in detail. The short-term linkability is demanded for several applica-
tions [157] and can protect against Sybil and Denial of Service attacks. Due to this,
the proposed protocol in this thesis can provide an efficient categorized batch ver-
ification with this short-term linkability. Generally, in group signatures, the batch
verification of 𝑛 messages is more efficient than individual verification, but the com-
plexity of a batch computation with bogus messages increases from O(1) to O(ln n).
In [66], the authors claim that if ≥ 15% of the signatures are invalid, then a batch
verification is not more efficient than an individual verification. The proposal mod-
ifies the WLZ scheme [169], where the batch verification costs only 2 pairings and
11n exponentiations. But the WLZ scheme and related solutions use an uncatego-
rized batch verification which can cause less efficient verification if bogus messages
appear during attacks like the Sybil attack, the Denial of Services (DoS) attack etc.
However, the proposed protocol applies the categorized batch verification which sort
potential honest messages to the first batch, and potential untrusted messages to
the second or third batch with lower priorities, so the verification phase can be more
efficient and strong against Sybil and DoS attacks.
In V2I communication, the designed protocol uses probabilistic cryptography for
keeping the long-term unlinkability and privacy protection of drivers. The join or
registration phase takes only two messages (request /response) and the protocol does
not need tamper-proof devices. Moreover, the solution can avoid the inefficient linear
growth of revocation list with the secret keys of members. Certified pseudonyms are
valid to expiration date and, after the expiration date, certified pseudonyms are
automatically revoked. Vehicles do not have to deal with a Revocation List (RL).
Instead, the protocol uses only a Group Temporary Revocation List (GTRL) to
deny malicious members accessing the group of VANET members.
As future work, the security of V2V communication should be done in more
efficient way. At this stage, the designed protocol provides secure and private V2V
communication for several participants, but in some cases the users can be more,
and then the VANET application can be tardy in the message verification process.
10.3 Discussion: Framework
In the following text, the proposed framework from Chapter 9 is discussed.
The framework offers user privacy in geosocial applications. This privacy-preserving
framework for geosocial applications provides that every honest user uses geosocial
services without leaking his/her identity (ID) while downloading information and
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uploading shared data. By using advanced cryptographic primitives, pseudonymous
communication among users in geosocial applications is achieved. Moreover, the ser-
vice provider is not able to reveal user ID and make user profiles. This is ensured by
using a trusted third party. The cryptographic framework is practical, secure and
efficient. In the proposed solution, the used cryptographic primitives are consid-
ered secure nowadays. The outlined security analysis vindicates the security of this
solution. The experimental implementation proves the efficiency of the framework.
To make the framework more practical, two modes of user revocation are pro-
posed. The modes of revocation depend on the infraction of a certain user. If a cer-
tain user breaks a soft rule of the service provider, they are temporarily revoked.
A service provider issuing a geosocial service can block the user by a revocation list
for a certain period. The size of the revocation list is periodically reduced by the ex-
piration time of a certain user’s credentials. The permanent revocation is applied to
a user who behaves maliciously by breaking the rules periodically. His/her identity
can be revealed, and he/she is revoked permanently by a trusted third authority.
10.4 Overall Contribution
In this section, the overall contribution of the thesis is summarized.
• Security The designed cryptographic protocols ensure the basic security prop-
erties such as authentication, integrity, confidentiality and non-repudiation.
The designed protocols and the framework employ only secure cryptographic
primitives and schemes with the secure lengths of parameters and keys. The
proposed cryptographic solutions protect against well-know attacks and the
security analyses are provided.
• User privacy The designed cryptographic solutions provide user privacy.
Users communicate in a secure and privacy-friendly way. The cryptographic
protocols protect users’ private data such as (users’ locations, personal in-
formations, behavior manners). The authentication of users is designed as
pseudonymous. The users are anonymous against the attackers and eavesdrop-
pers, but in special cases their identity can be revealed by certain authorities
in a communication system.
• Efficiency The solutions are designed to keep efficiency in a computational
and communication overhead in huge heterogeneous networks with a lot of
users having different end devices. These devices have different performance
characteristics and different software specifications. The security properties
are assigned to the certain types of data to decrease a burden of cryptographic
protocols on systems and various end nodes. The phases of proposed protocols
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are accelerated by optimization methods to get better performance mainly in
scenarios where users process many messages in real-time.
• Efficient key management The key management is simplified. The pro-
posed protocols based on group signature schemes use only one public key
beside conventional digital signature such as RSA or ECDSA where every
user has own public key that must be spread in a communication system.
Further, the join phases which deal with member secret key distribution are
designed to keep security and privacy.
• Applicability The proposed cryptographic protocol (Chapter 8) and the
framework (Chapter 9) are designed for concrete communication systems used
on heterogeneous networks, i.e. Vehicular Ad hoc Networks applications and
geolocalization services.
10.5 Accomplishment of Thesis Objectives
The accomplishment of the thesis objectives presented in Chapter 3 is summarized
as follows.
• Modern privacy-preserving cryptographic schemes such as group signature
schemes and their security options on computationally restricted devices are
analyzed and evaluated in Chapters 4, 5 and 6.
• The efficiency of cryptographic primitives and modular arithmetic operations
such as multiplication, exponentiation, pairings, hash functions are measured
on various devices (PCs, smartphones, smart cards) and the results are de-
scribed in Section 6.1.
• In the thesis, two privacy-preserving cryptographic protocols based on pairing-
based group signatures are proposed in Chapters 7 and 8. Both protocols focus
on efficiency and user privacy. Protocol 1 deals with the efficient revocation.
Protocol 2 aims at efficient signing and the verification of messages.
• Both proposed cryptographic protocols (1 and 2) are optimized by techniques
such as precomputation and batch verification in basic phases such as signing
the messages and the verification of signatures.
• The privacy-preserving cryptographic framework is introduced in Chapter 9
and is suitable for geosocial services run on heterogeneous networks. The
framework uses a group signature, encryption and key establishment tech-
niques to provide user privacy and data security.
• The security analyses of the proposed framework and Protocol 2 are provided.
These analyses describe the protection of solutions against common active and
passive attacks.
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11 CONCLUSION
The main goal of this thesis is research in privacy-preserving protocols based on
group signature schemes that can be employed in the heterogeneous networks using
various types of end nodes. In the thesis, the two novel privacy-preserving protocols
and one framework which are based on group signature schemes are proposed.
The first protocol aims at the revocation of users in group signature schemes.
Protocol 1 provides an efficient user revocation which is based on the natural ex-
piration of member secret keys. This protocol is designed to achieve the efficient
verification phase. Due to this fact, the verifier is able to check more signatures of
messages than verifiers who use related schemes. The drawback of this protocol is
the signing phase which performs 2 computational expensive pairing operations.
The second protocol is designed for systems where user privacy, user revocation
and data security are required. This group signatures-based protocol introduces
a novel categorized batch verification that mitigates possible denial of service attacks
in the vehicular ad hoc network applications. Protocol 2 ensures user privacy, long-
term unlinkability, data authenticity, and integrity of messages. Moreover, users can
compute expensive pairing operations that are needed for signing in advance due to
the short-term linkability property. Thus, the signing phase can be more efficient,
and the protocol can be implemented into delay-tolerant vehicular services that use
restricted end nodes, e.g. smartphones or tablets. The security analysis proves that
the protocol is secure.
The framework, as the third proposal in this thesis, provides a comprehensive
secure, privacy-preserving solution for heterogeneous networks such as geosocial net-
works. Besides the message authenticity and integrity, user privacy, the framework
offers the confidentiality of the messages. Due to the optimization techniques such
as batch verification applied on the proposed framework, a computation overhead is
reduced on the verifier’s side. Moreover, the precomputation of the pairing opera-
tions in the signing phase makes this framework suitable for restricted devices such
as smartphones, tablets and other devices used in geosocial services. The framework
is proven to be secure by the security analysis provided.
The presented proposals and used group signature schemes in this thesis are
verified by practical implementations. These implementations have been realized by
the JAVA programming language and have been tested on the various types of the
devices (e.g. personal computers, smartphones, tablets). The obtained results have
been published at international conferences and in journals with an impact factor.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
AAA Authentication, Authorization and Accounting
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
ATM Asynchronous Transfer Mode
ART Android RunTime
B Data Bandwidth [bit/s]
BAN Body Area Network
BBS04 the Boneh, Boyen and Shacham group signature scheme
BS04 the Boneh, Shacham group signature scheme
BDHP Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem
BIDHP Bilinear Inverse Diffie-Hellman Problem
BSDHP Bilinear Square Diffie-Hellman Problem
BU Backward Unlinkability
CDHP Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem
CN Cellular Network
CPU Central Processing Unit
CZK Computational Zero-Knowledge protocol
DDHP Decision Diffie-Hellman Problem
DH Diffie-Hellman Protocol
DL Discrete Logarithm
DLP Discrete Logarithm Problem
DLDHP Decision Linear Diffie-Hellman Problem
DES Data Encryption Standard
DoS Denial of Service
DSA Digital Signature Algorithm
ECC Elliptic Curves Cryptography
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman protocol
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
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EDGE Enhanced Data Rates for GSM Evolution
GLOMONET Global Mobility Network
GM Group Manager
GPRS General Packet Radio Service
GSM Global System for Mobile Communications
H Hash function
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol
HVZK Honest Verifier Zero Knowledge
IBGS Identity Based Group Signature
ICT Information and Communications Technology
ID Identity
IP Internet Protocol
IPS Intrusion Prevention Systems
iOS iPhone Operating System
IoT Internet of Things
IrDA Infrared Data Association
IZK Interactive Zero-Knowledge protocol
LAN Local Area Network
MAC Message Authentication Code
MAN Metropolitan Area Network
MANET Mobile Ad hoc Network
MD5 Message-Digest algorithm
MIX Mixes mechanism
MN Mesh Network
MNT Miyaji-Nakabayashi-Takano curves
MPLS Multiprotocol Label Switching
MULTOS Multi-application smart card Operating System
NFC Near Field Communication
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NIWI Non-Interactive Witness-Indistinguishable
NIZK Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge protocol
OBUs On Board Units
P Prover
PAN Personal Area Network
PBC Pairing-Based Cryptography
PC Personal Computer
PETs Privacy Enhancing Technologies
PK Proof of Knowledge
PKDL Proof of Knowledge of Discrete Logarithm
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
PZK Perfect Zero-Knowledge protocol
QR Quick Response codes
qSDHP 𝑞-Strong Diffie-Hellman problem
RAM Random-Access Memory
RFID Radio-Frequency IDentification
RNG Random Number Generator
RO Random Oracle
RSA Rivest, Shamir, Adleman
RSU Road Side Units
SDH Synchronous Digital Hierarchy
SDHP Strong Diffie-Hellman Problem
SIM Subscriber Identification Module
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SONs Self-Organizing Networks
SONET Synchronous Optical Network
SP Service Provider
SZK Statistical Zero-Knowledge protocol
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TA Trusted Authority
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
TDES Triple Data Encryption Standard
TLS Transport Layer Security Protocol
TTP Third Trusted Party
U User
UMTS Universal Mobile Telecommunication System
V Verifier / Vehicle(in protocol 2)
VANET Vehicular Ad-Hoc Network
VLR Verifier Local Revocation
VoIP Voice-Over-IP
V2I Vehicle to Infrastructure communication
V2V Vehicle to Vehicle communication
WiMAX Worldwide interoperability for Microwave Access
WMN Wireless Mesh Network
WMMN Wireless Metropolitan Mesh Network
WSN Wireless Sensor Network
XDHP eXternal Diffie-Hellman Problem
ZK Zero-Knowledge
... Other notation used in Protocol 2 and the framework are in Tables 8.1 and 9.1
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